CONFUSION IN COLOMBIA

In the next few weeks, Colombia's complex conflict with guerrillas and drug
traffickers is likely to come to a head, on more than one front.

In the jungle-draped southern state of Putamayo, two new U.S.-trained
Colombian army battalions are supposed to go into action for the first time
in support of a major offensive against the plantations and labs of the
cocaine industry, marking the military debut of Plan Colombia, the
multibillion-dollar program to combat the narcotics trade.

Meanwhile, President Andres Pastrana faces a major crossroads in his brave
but feckless attempt to negotiate peace with the rebel groups that control
large parts of the countryside and the drug traffic, including most of
Putamayo. On Jan. 31, the extended term of a huge safe haven that Mr.
Pastrana granted two years ago to the largest insurgent group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, expires, and Colombians
are clamoring for the government to shut it down. But Mr. Pastrana is
instead talking about granting control over a second large chunk of
territory to another rebel group, the National Liberation Army, or ELN,
which like the FARC has proved less interested in revolution than in
profiting from drugs and kidnapping.

In short, the Colombian army may spend the next few weeks in tough fighting
to take back control of one part of the countryside from guerrilla
organizations, even as the government contemplates handing over other parts
to some of the same groups.

While the military offensive may or may not work, the results of ceding
territory are clear. The FARC has used its safe haven to increase drug
cultivation, assassinate uncooperative civilians, force children to join
its armed forces in new offensives, and hold more than 450 government
police and soldiers captive in open-air pens. It has refused to negotiate
peace.

This bizarre confluence of policies rests on a couple of political fictions
to which Mr. Pastrana and the Clinton administration have clung. Despite
mounting evidence to the contrary, Mr. Pastrana has stuck to the notion
that the FARC and the ELN are conventional insurgent movements with
political agendas that can be discussed, and not syndicates whose main
interests now center on consolidating control over territory and drug
revenues. The Clinton administration, for its part, continues to insist
that Plan Colombia and the military operations that go with it are aimed at
drug traffickers, and not the insurgents, even though the two are
inextricably mixed. The administration also continues to give strong
support to Mr. Pastrana and embrace him as a partner in the Plan Colombia
project, even though most senior U.S. officials regard his peace initiative
as misguided and unworkable.

Both governments argue that Colombia's problems are complex and require
complicated policies. While that is true, this month's mix of remedies
bespeaks less sophisticated complexity than simple confusion.

In fact, both governments would do better to acknowledge Colombia's tough
realities. Mr. Pastrana should shut down the safe zones for the guerrillas
and accept that while some negotiations may be useful, sweeping political
treaties will not end the conflict. And the United States should stop
pretending that it is only supporting a campaign against the drug traffic
in Colombia. If it is to continue training and equipping the Colombian
army, the new administration cannot avoid involvement in the larger
Colombian conflict. It should have a clearer policy for it.

- - THE WASHINGTON POST.