A RISKY POLICY UNFOLDS--AND NO ONE IS PAYING ATTENTION

WASHINGTON--At Donald H. Rumsfeld's confirmation hearing earlier this
month, a remarkable exchange took place between Arizona Sen. John
McCain, among the Senate's most respected foreign-policy experts, and
the new secretary of defense:

McCain: "Recently, the United States made a very significant investment in
the problems in Colombia, largely . . . unnoticed by Americans and their
representatives. I take it from your [previous] answer--'I have less than
well-informed personal views [on Colombia], which I'd prefer to discuss
with the appropriate officials before taking a public position'--that you
haven't paid as much attention to it as maybe other issues. . . . You know
that we've just invested about $1.3 billion in the last appropriation cycle."

Rumsfeld: "That's my understanding."

McCain: "And we're upgrading a base in Ecuador, which I found out--perhaps
I shouldn't admit this--by looking at a newspaper."

Rumsfeld: "I didn't know that."

McCain: "There's a lot of things going on in Colombia, Mr. Secretary, and I
hate to harken back to other conflicts, but I hope you'll get very well
aware of this situation--what we're doing, what the involvement of U.S.
military personnel is in the area and what kind of investment [and], more
importantly, what goals we seek there. . . ."

In all likelihood, McCain had Vietnam in mind when he referred to
"other conflicts," a conflict the former prisoner of war knows only
too well.

Nothing evokes Vietnam more these days than U.S. policy toward
Colombia. Many worry that the $1.3-billion anti-drug, mostly military
aid package approved last summer by Congress--and the placement of
several hundred U.S. trainers in the Andean country--could be the
first steps on a slippery slope to a Vietnam-style quagmire.

Yet, as the McCain-Rumsfeld exchange sharply reveals, there has been
scant public debate about U.S. Colombia policy, and there is little
understanding about what it is supposed to accomplish. The
bewilderment about Colombia policy can be juxtaposed with the
country's relentless deterioration--and the high stakes of such
deterioration for the United States. There is a wide gap between the
urgency of Colombia's crisis and the relatively low level of attention
it is receiving as the Bush administration takes over.

President George W. Bush and his foreign-policy team would do well to
reframe and elevate the debate on Colombia. The exchange between
McCain and Rumsfeld underscores how imperative it is to do so, and as
quickly as possible. To guide a more productive policy debate on
Colombia, it is crucial to ask some pointed questions, especially
about two controversial issues: drugs and human rights.

Does it make sense to justify U.S. policy toward Colombia only in
terms of fighting drugs. Is that Colombia's core problem. Or is it
rampant insecurity and lawlessness, reflected in the more than 3,000
kidnappings--a record--that took place last year. Is it realistic to
expect that the United States can solve drug-related problems at home
by attempting to eradicate coca plants in southern Colombia. Should
U.S. Colombia policy and U.S. drug policy be one and the same. How can
U.S. policymakers better grapple with Colombia's complex realities.

With respect to human rights, what is the best way to help Colombians
improve their situation. Colombia, whose internally displaced
population is the world's third largest, following Sudan and Angola,
is wracked by violence from many sources, including leftist guerrillas
and right-wing paramilitary forces. Beyond humanitarian, social and
economic support, should the United States assist the Colombian
military and police to contain and reduce such violence. If so, should
the assistance emphasize the provision of helicopters and training of
anti-drug battalions, or a broader, institutional reform and
professionalization of government security forces.

In light of what is known about the military and economic power of the
paramilitary forces--and the reported links they have with some
elements of Colombia's military--what would be the likely consequences
of cutting off all support to the security forces. Should Americans
worry more about being tainted by a military with a troubling
human-rights record or about how best to apply pressure and leverage
to reverse the downward spiral in South America's oldest democracy.

These sets of questions should be fully discussed within the U.S.
government, indeed, throughout U.S. society. Too often, the debate has
been muddled, or trivialized, by references to numbers of helicopters
or acres of coca destroyed.

It is important to recognize that, though certain risks will no doubt
accompany U.S. involvement in Colombia, they do not necessarily mean
that we are heading toward another Vietnam. Such risks, taken in
support for a beleaguered government trying to protect its frightened
citizens from many lawless forces, can, after all, be held in check by
sensible planning and a clear policy focus. Moreover, Colombia's
government, however weak, is democratic, a fact that undercuts the
Vietnam analogy. And unlike Vietnam--or the Central American conflicts
in the 1980s, for that matter--Colombia is not, as is widely assumed,
in the midst of a "civil war." It is, rather, in the midst of an
"uncivil war," with thousands of combatants terrorizing the
overwhelming majority of Colombians who simply want to live in peace
and do not support the guerrilla groups. Is the United States capable
of pursuing an effective and coherent policy--aimed at assisting a
government under siege to help restore its authority--without
repeating the mistakes made in Vietnam.

The Bush foreign-policy team may be forced to face these questions
sooner than it expects. On Jan. 31, Colombia's president, Andres
Pastrana, must make a key decision, one bound to be controversial,
about whether to extend the time period the country's largest
insurgency, the FARC, is allowed to control a zone the government
granted the guerrillas in November 1998. In February, the U.S.
conducts its annual review of other countries' cooperation in the
fight against drugs. And in mid-April, Bush is scheduled to join his
Latin American counterparts in Quebec for a summit. Even if not
formally on the agenda, Colombia's crisis--and what the United States
is up to in the region--will be foremost in the minds of the other
hemispheric leaders. Neighboring countries are particularly nervous
about the spillover effects of violence, drugs and refugee flows. It
will be impossible for Bush to avoid the Colombia question in Quebec.

McCain is right to ask what goals we seek in Colombia. More than a
quarter-century after the U.S. ended its involvement in Vietnam, he,
along with other members of Congress, should undertake a serious
review of U.S. policy in Colombia to determine precisely what those
goals are.