BUILDING ON PLAN COLOMBIA

Residents of Bojaya in the impoverished Colombian province of Choco
know misery -- flooding for four months of each year, electricity two
to three hours every couple of days, drinking water obtainable only
through rain collection. Their one thing of value -- the town's
location along the Atrato River -- landed them in the middle of a
10-year battle between the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and the country's right-wing United Self-Defense
Forces (AUC) as the groups vied for control of an important transit
zone for illegal drugs and weapons.

The town was barely on the Colombian government's radar screen until
May 2, 2002, the day of what became known as the Bojaya massacre. On
that day, the FARC launched a mortar attack against AUC forces seeking
cover in a churchyard. A shell landed directly on the church altar,
killing 119 innocent townspeople, many of them children, who had
sought refuge in the sanctuary.

Today, things are much different in Bojaya. Colombian military forces
patrol the Atrato and, with the full involvement of the locals, a new
town is being built on higher, drier land. U.S. funds are paying for a
health center while national and foreign aid has been directed to
improving schools and generating economic activity independent of the
drug trade.

That's progress, but not the kind typically reported in Colombia's
long war against insurgents and drug trafficking. The United States
has pumped more than $4.5 billion into Colombia's six-year-old
anti-drug and pro-peace development strategy, the largest amount of
U.S. aid outside of the Middle East. Most of it has been directed to
security. The results -- a drop in the number of murders and
kidnappings, and increases in the extradition of drug kingpins, the
eradication of coca crops and the number of irregular combatants
killed or demobilized -- have made a big splash in Washington and
given Colombian President Alvaro Uribe nearly superhero status in the
U.S. capital.

But not everyone in Washington is impressed, especially those who have
long criticized the military emphasis of U.S. aid to Colombia. "If you
spend a billion dollars and in return you get a ham sandwich, it's
better than nothing but it's not what you paid for," said Tim Rieser,
foreign policy aide to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.). Rieser, who
recently traveled to Colombia and acknowledges security advances in
some parts of the country, is particularly frustrated that not enough
funds are directed to the social and economic development projects he
thinks are necessary for Plan Colombia to succeed.

Primarily targeting the aid at securing the country is a too "narrow
reading of security," said Mark Schneider, senior vice president of
the International Crisis Group and an assistant administrator for
Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development during
the Clinton administration. "Whenever you throw the FARC out of an
area, what you want to have is a coherent rural development plan so
people see immediate benefits."

Colombian officials agree. In fact, according to Carolina Barco,
Colombia's ambassador to the United States, officials meeting in
Bogota with a high-level U.S. delegation last week stressed the need
for U.S. assistance to continue in order for Colombia to consolidate
its progress on the battlefield. What's needed is "not only military
action but also social and economic investment" -- a replication of
the kind of assistance seen now in Bojaya.

Barco said that her government is planning to invest more than $1.6
billion over the next four years in development projects to help
maintain "territorial control" -- Colombia's way of framing security
gains as fully dependent on economic development. Without such
projects, the goals associated with the drug war -- such as coca
eradication and interdiction -- will not be sustainable, said Barco.
As part of that effort, she added, the government hopes to levy a new
tax on the wealthy and has launched an appeal for assistance from
other countries, particularly in Europe, where drug consumption is
growing faster than in the United States.

Back in 1999, enormous effort went into defining a comprehensive
long-term strategy to help Colombia. It was evident then that one of
the most redeeming qualities of Plan Colombia was that it broadened
the understanding of Colombia's challenges beyond a problem of mere
drug trafficking. Now, as U.S. and Colombian officials discuss the
next phase of Plan Colombia, it is crucial to remember that more than
narrow successes on the battlefield are essential for the kind of
progress seen in Bojaya.