News (Media Awareness Project) - Peru: 'You Fly, You Die' Approach To Drug War Faces Scrutiny |
Title: | Peru: 'You Fly, You Die' Approach To Drug War Faces Scrutiny |
Published On: | 2001-04-25 |
Source: | Los Angeles Times (CA) |
Fetched On: | 2008-09-01 11:37:39 |
'YOU FLY, YOU DIE' APPROACH TO DRUG WAR FACES SCRUTINY
Peru: Tough Policy That Turned Tragic Was Making A Difference In The Andes,
Former U.S. Officials Say.
Anti-drug warriors involved in a U.S.-Peruvian airborne interdiction effort
that has slashed the South American nation's cocaine production had a
warning for smugglers: "You fly, you die."
That warlike motto governed the zone of low-intensity conflict into which a
Cessna seaplane carrying U.S. Baptist missionaries flew last week with
disastrous results: A Peruvian air force jet assisted by a CIA surveillance
plane mistakenly shot down the Cessna, killing a woman and her infant daughter.
The shoot-down policy will get thorough scrutiny from a team of
investigators from the CIA, National Transportation Safety Board, Drug
Enforcement Administration and other U.S. agencies who are expected in the
coming days in Lima, the Peruvian capital. The U.S. has suspended its
aerial interdiction operations in Peru.
"Smuggling flights are going to get through now, but that's the price you
pay," said a former official with the U.S. Embassy in Lima. "It's critical
they get the answer to why this happened and make sure it's never repeated.
But I don't think they'll kill the shoot-down policy: It's a national
security question."
Friday's incident was the first in which innocent parties were harmed
during the 8-year-old air interdiction program, according to U.S.
officials. And former U.S. Embassy officials say the safeguards they built
into the aerial operations contributed to a success story in the war on
drugs in the Andean region.
The numbers are impressive. Peru has reduced cultivation of the coca plant
by about 70% since 1995. The drop resulted from eradication efforts on the
ground combined with the offensive on smugglers who fly coca paste into
Colombia, where it is refined into cocaine and smuggled to the United
States and Europe.
The joint effort in Peru disrupted coca production, drove up coca prices
and served as a general deterrent, as exemplified by this underworld market
indicator: In the early 1990s, smuggling pilots charged $30,000 per flight
into the nation. After the Peruvian air force interceptions began, the fee
jumped to $180,000--in advance.
There has been similar progress in Bolivia, one of the two other major
countries that grow coca in the region. A militarized ground campaign to
eradicate coca there has reduced cultivation by about 70%--and even more in
the key growing area that supplies drug traffickers.
Colombian traffickers reacted to the woes of Peruvian and Bolivian coca
suppliers by stepping up production at home. The estimated area of
cultivation, concentrated largely in regions controlled by the well-armed
guerrillas of the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, has more
than quadrupled since 1993.
And success in Peru came at a cost. As the regime of President Alberto
Fujimori and his spy chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, drifted into
authoritarianism in the 1990s, it retained U.S. support largely because of
its anti-drug performance.
That weakened Peruvian institutions, leading inevitably to the crisis that
toppled both men, critics say. And the priorities of the drug war turned
the U.S. national security apparatus into a shadow that hovers over most
important events in Peru--including Friday's tragedy.
So far, the CIA has made a convincing and specific case that its contract
employees aboard the surveillance plane urged Peruvian air force officers
to refrain from firing on the missionaries' aircraft, which U.S. radar
operators had detected and identified as suspicious.
Moreover, if established procedures were followed, the final decision to
open fire was made by a Peruvian general on the ground.
Still, the CIA's role reminds Peruvians of the agency's longtime influence
here, according to critics.
"A great deal of what happened in Peru in these years was resolved in
negotiations with the U.S. Embassy and especially with the CIA," said
Carlos Tapia, a Peruvian political analyst.
Early in the Fujimori years, the relationship with the U.S. reached a low
point after an alarming episode that demonstrated the Peruvian air force's
potential for aggressiveness.
In 1992, two Soviet-made Peruvian fighter jets fired on a U.S. Air Force
transport plane that was on a mission to photograph illegal coca
plantations, killing a crew member and wounding two others.
That case differs from Friday's incident because it occurred near the
Pacific Coast, rather than over the smuggling zones of the Amazon.
Moreover, U.S.-Peruvian relations were tense at the time because Fujimori
had recently shuttered his nation's Congress in a "self-coup."
Ground-level interdiction had faltered: DEA agents showed Fujimori
well-documented evidence that Peruvian generals were protecting thriving
jungle airstrips used to ferry cash and drugs to and from Peru and Colombia.
The new proposal--similar to a program adopted in Colombia--called for the
U.S. to use its intelligence-gathering might to help the Peruvian air force
shoot down airborne smugglers.
The idea provoked internal debate in the U.S. government, however. Lawyers
for the State and Justice departments warned that "mistakes are likely to
occur under any policy that contemplates the use of weapons against civil
aircraft in flight," and "a shoot-down leading to the death of innocent
persons would likely be a serious diplomatic embarrassment," according to
declassified U.S. documents obtained by the National Security Archive, a
private group in Washington.
The bulk of the shoot-downs took place in the mid-1990s. Although U.S.
officials did not provide a tally of casualties, most of the suspected
smugglers died in the attacks, according to former U.S. Embassy officials.
In total, the Peruvian air force has shot down, forced down or strafed more
than 30 suspected smuggling planes and seized more than a dozen aircraft on
the ground, according to U.S. Embassy officials.
It is hard to verify the assertion that all of those who died were involved
in smuggling. Former U.S. Ambassador Dennis Jett and two other former U.S.
Embassy officials said they did not know of any mistaken shoot-downs. In
all the incidents one former embassy official was aware of, authorities
reported that they found evidence of drug trafficking in the planes' wreckage.
Moreover, the Peruvian air force and CIA-employed air crews have a
reputation for professionalism, according to the former officials.
But another embassy official said one weakness of the CIA crews was that
only a few spoke Spanish well, causing potential communication difficulties
with Peruvian air force officers.
The downings of planes have tapered off markedly as smugglers have shifted
to rivers and short-hop flights. That relative inactivity bolsters the
theory that the Peruvian officers involved in the Friday incident might
have been inexperienced and overeager.
Peru: Tough Policy That Turned Tragic Was Making A Difference In The Andes,
Former U.S. Officials Say.
Anti-drug warriors involved in a U.S.-Peruvian airborne interdiction effort
that has slashed the South American nation's cocaine production had a
warning for smugglers: "You fly, you die."
That warlike motto governed the zone of low-intensity conflict into which a
Cessna seaplane carrying U.S. Baptist missionaries flew last week with
disastrous results: A Peruvian air force jet assisted by a CIA surveillance
plane mistakenly shot down the Cessna, killing a woman and her infant daughter.
The shoot-down policy will get thorough scrutiny from a team of
investigators from the CIA, National Transportation Safety Board, Drug
Enforcement Administration and other U.S. agencies who are expected in the
coming days in Lima, the Peruvian capital. The U.S. has suspended its
aerial interdiction operations in Peru.
"Smuggling flights are going to get through now, but that's the price you
pay," said a former official with the U.S. Embassy in Lima. "It's critical
they get the answer to why this happened and make sure it's never repeated.
But I don't think they'll kill the shoot-down policy: It's a national
security question."
Friday's incident was the first in which innocent parties were harmed
during the 8-year-old air interdiction program, according to U.S.
officials. And former U.S. Embassy officials say the safeguards they built
into the aerial operations contributed to a success story in the war on
drugs in the Andean region.
The numbers are impressive. Peru has reduced cultivation of the coca plant
by about 70% since 1995. The drop resulted from eradication efforts on the
ground combined with the offensive on smugglers who fly coca paste into
Colombia, where it is refined into cocaine and smuggled to the United
States and Europe.
The joint effort in Peru disrupted coca production, drove up coca prices
and served as a general deterrent, as exemplified by this underworld market
indicator: In the early 1990s, smuggling pilots charged $30,000 per flight
into the nation. After the Peruvian air force interceptions began, the fee
jumped to $180,000--in advance.
There has been similar progress in Bolivia, one of the two other major
countries that grow coca in the region. A militarized ground campaign to
eradicate coca there has reduced cultivation by about 70%--and even more in
the key growing area that supplies drug traffickers.
Colombian traffickers reacted to the woes of Peruvian and Bolivian coca
suppliers by stepping up production at home. The estimated area of
cultivation, concentrated largely in regions controlled by the well-armed
guerrillas of the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, has more
than quadrupled since 1993.
And success in Peru came at a cost. As the regime of President Alberto
Fujimori and his spy chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, drifted into
authoritarianism in the 1990s, it retained U.S. support largely because of
its anti-drug performance.
That weakened Peruvian institutions, leading inevitably to the crisis that
toppled both men, critics say. And the priorities of the drug war turned
the U.S. national security apparatus into a shadow that hovers over most
important events in Peru--including Friday's tragedy.
So far, the CIA has made a convincing and specific case that its contract
employees aboard the surveillance plane urged Peruvian air force officers
to refrain from firing on the missionaries' aircraft, which U.S. radar
operators had detected and identified as suspicious.
Moreover, if established procedures were followed, the final decision to
open fire was made by a Peruvian general on the ground.
Still, the CIA's role reminds Peruvians of the agency's longtime influence
here, according to critics.
"A great deal of what happened in Peru in these years was resolved in
negotiations with the U.S. Embassy and especially with the CIA," said
Carlos Tapia, a Peruvian political analyst.
Early in the Fujimori years, the relationship with the U.S. reached a low
point after an alarming episode that demonstrated the Peruvian air force's
potential for aggressiveness.
In 1992, two Soviet-made Peruvian fighter jets fired on a U.S. Air Force
transport plane that was on a mission to photograph illegal coca
plantations, killing a crew member and wounding two others.
That case differs from Friday's incident because it occurred near the
Pacific Coast, rather than over the smuggling zones of the Amazon.
Moreover, U.S.-Peruvian relations were tense at the time because Fujimori
had recently shuttered his nation's Congress in a "self-coup."
Ground-level interdiction had faltered: DEA agents showed Fujimori
well-documented evidence that Peruvian generals were protecting thriving
jungle airstrips used to ferry cash and drugs to and from Peru and Colombia.
The new proposal--similar to a program adopted in Colombia--called for the
U.S. to use its intelligence-gathering might to help the Peruvian air force
shoot down airborne smugglers.
The idea provoked internal debate in the U.S. government, however. Lawyers
for the State and Justice departments warned that "mistakes are likely to
occur under any policy that contemplates the use of weapons against civil
aircraft in flight," and "a shoot-down leading to the death of innocent
persons would likely be a serious diplomatic embarrassment," according to
declassified U.S. documents obtained by the National Security Archive, a
private group in Washington.
The bulk of the shoot-downs took place in the mid-1990s. Although U.S.
officials did not provide a tally of casualties, most of the suspected
smugglers died in the attacks, according to former U.S. Embassy officials.
In total, the Peruvian air force has shot down, forced down or strafed more
than 30 suspected smuggling planes and seized more than a dozen aircraft on
the ground, according to U.S. Embassy officials.
It is hard to verify the assertion that all of those who died were involved
in smuggling. Former U.S. Ambassador Dennis Jett and two other former U.S.
Embassy officials said they did not know of any mistaken shoot-downs. In
all the incidents one former embassy official was aware of, authorities
reported that they found evidence of drug trafficking in the planes' wreckage.
Moreover, the Peruvian air force and CIA-employed air crews have a
reputation for professionalism, according to the former officials.
But another embassy official said one weakness of the CIA crews was that
only a few spoke Spanish well, causing potential communication difficulties
with Peruvian air force officers.
The downings of planes have tapered off markedly as smugglers have shifted
to rivers and short-hop flights. That relative inactivity bolsters the
theory that the Peruvian officers involved in the Friday incident might
have been inexperienced and overeager.
Member Comments |
No member comments available...