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News (Media Awareness Project) - US: In The Grip Of Drug War Logic, An 'Isolated Incident' Isn't
Title:US: In The Grip Of Drug War Logic, An 'Isolated Incident' Isn't
Published On:2001-04-29
Source:Los Angeles Times (CA)
Fetched On:2008-09-01 11:05:14
IN THE GRIP OF DRUG WAR LOGIC, AN 'ISOLATED INCIDENT' ISN'T

SAN DIEGO--It came as a shock: the news 10 days ago that two American
citizens, a 35-year-old missionary woman and her infant daughter, were
killed when a Peruvian air force jet shot down their unarmed Cessna
seaplane over the Amazon jungle. The woman's husband and 7-year-old son
survived, as did the pilot, who was hospitalized with a gunshot wound to
the leg.

They were casualties of the war on drugs. In this instance a U.S.
government tracking aircraft, piloted by contract employees of the CIA,
notified the Peruvian military that an allegedly suspicious plane was in
the area. After hasty consultation, a Peruvian A-37 fighter went up to
investigate. Less than an hour later, the jet pilot opened fire on what
turned out to be an innocent civilian aircraft.

Under a program dating back to 1994, the CIA and other U.S. agencies are
authorized to assist Peru in the interdiction of aircraft when there is
"reasonable suspicion" that they are trafficking in drugs. The purpose has
been to interrupt the flow of cocaine paste from Peru to Colombia, where it
is transformed into cocaine powder and then exported to U.S. and other markets.

As word of the disaster spread, exculpation and finger-pointing predictably
ensued. The U.S. Department of Defense made clear that it was not involved.
The CIA asserted that the surveillance plane was under contract employees,
not full-time agents, and that they were not involved in the shoot-down.
American authorities claimed that Peruvians had failed to take appropriate
precautionary measures before authorizing the attack. Peruvian officials
expressed regret for the loss of life but claimed that their pilot had
fired only "as a final recourse."

The two governments have agreed to suspend the interdiction program,
pending a thorough review. Presumably, the investigation will determine who
was at fault and why. One or more Peruvian officers might be cashiered.
Then, perhaps with stronger safeguards, aerial interdiction will probably
resume. It will be lamentable if this is all that happens.

Precisely because it is so gruesome, the tragedy calls for a reevaluation
of its ultimate cause: the U.S. war on drugs. Since the early 1980s, U.S.
policy has placed inordinate emphasis on reducing the supply of illicit
drugs, mainly through eradication of crops and interdiction of shipments.
Reduce the supply, according to this logic, and prices will climb to the
point where would-be consumers can no longer afford them. Demand will
decline, and all will be well.

That is the basis for U.S. action in Peru and for massive aid, mostly
military, to neighboring Colombia. Since 1994, the aerial interdiction
program in Peru has led to the downing of at least 30 planes and to the
grounding of dozens more. Proponents hail these efforts as a major reason
for a two-thirds decline in coca production in Peru. They usually fail to
note that Colombia has picked up almost all the slack, and that cocaine is
as available on the U.S. market as it ever was. The evidence is clear: As
long as demand is strong, suppression of supply in one location leads to an
increase somewhere else.

In pursuit of its strategy, the United States has made a second mistake:
reliance upon the military, its own and (especially) that of other
countries. One justification for this tactic, widely challenged by fact, is
that military forces are less susceptible to corruption than the police.
Another argument is that only force, rather than careful investigation and
intelligence, will disrupt the trafficking rings. Shoot now, ask
later--almost by definition this results in human rights abuses, as it
leads to attacks on people who have been neither charged with nor convicted
of criminal activity.

In collaborating with Peru, the U.S. has made a third mistake: allying
itself with one of the most unsavory militaries in all Latin America. This
is not to impugn individuals involved in last week's incident. But under
the autocratic Alberto Fujimori and his mysterious henchman, Vladimiro
Montesinos, the Peruvian military became notorious for its corruption,
impunity and abuse of human rights. It would have been hard to pick a less
desirable partner.

Add these elements together, and this is what you get: A shoot-down of
innocent civilians. It was not an "isolated incident," as the White House
recently claimed. It was a logical outcome of flawed and shortsighted
policy. Is there an alternative?

Most serious analysts of the drug trade argue that the U.S. government
should give top priority to the reduction of demand, rather than supply.
This means not only prevention and education for children, but also
treatment and rehabilitation for addicts. It would require a serious
reallocation of the federal drug budget, nearly two-thirds of which is now
devoted to law enforcement.

Second, the United States should concentrate law enforcement on key aspects
of the trade--especially money laundering--rather than possession or
street-level distribution. Like other entrepreneurs, drug traffickers are
in search of profits. Bust their profits and you bust their operation.

Third, the United States should engage countries of Latin
America--including Colombia and Peru--in a multilateral effort to reduce
the growing consumption of dangerous drugs throughout the hemisphere.
Instead of recruiting them as allies in a semi-military war against supply,
we could bring these nations together in a collaborative effort to reduce
demand.

An approach of this kind could save lives at home and spare them abroad. If
such steps are adopted, the death of a mother and child might not have been
entirely in vain.
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