THE WAR ON DRUGS: A LOSING BATTLE

The current U.S. drug policy towards Colombia is in need of serious change.
A militaristic approach will not solve the problem; we need a policy based
on lowering demand and providing alternatives for those on the supply side.
A militaristic approach is public and lets the government appear as if they
are making progress, but as long as demand is high and the reward is high,
the problem will remain unsolvable.

There needs to be less of an emphasis placed on appearance and more
importance placed on a comprehensive and long-term plan. First, we must
realize that our current plan has failed despite our large financial
backing and time investment.

The price of drugs in the U.S. has dropped drastically while the purity has
increased, showing that drugs are entering the country in an alarmingly
easy fashion.

The number of high school seniors who say that hard drugs are readily
available to them has risen sharply over the last two decades.

Coca production in Peru grew by 3,700 acres in 1999.

These types of statistics are what the war on drugs is supposed to prevent.
We are losing the war. One of the reasons that we are losing is that we are
fighting the battle in the wrong areas.

We will never stop the supply as long as the demand is so rampant and there
are so few options for people on the supply side. Time has shown that for
every large-scale drug dealer that is stopped, another will rise in his place.

For every field that is raided or sprayed with chemicals, another will be
planted in a more remote area. After a strong campaign of crop annihilation
in the Chapare region of Bolivia, much of the actual coca growing moved to
Colombia. Every time that we limit transportation, there is a new method
developed.

We started shooting down planes and it has been shown that a much larger
portion of drug trafficking is now done by river.

We tightened the Mexican border, it has been shown that new trafficking
routes have developed through the Caribbean and Florida. The high cash
reward for dealing drugs is hard to resist and fairly addictive once involved.

As long as this incentive exists and demand is high, there is very little
to do that can eliminate supply.

Another major problem with our policy is that we are funneling money to
groups of police and military that are extremely corrupt and undermine the
human rights that we hold central to our way of life. Over ten percent of
the entire federal judicial police in Colombia were fired for drug-related
charges between 1992 and 1995. The problem cannot be solved if those trying
to regulate it are profiting from the problem's very existence.

Beyond monetary corruption there is the fact that many of the groups that
we financially support are torturing those in their custody and severely
harassing citizens.

By supporting them, we are in turn supporting this corruption and abuse.

It has been shown that treatment is ten times more cost effective when
compared to interdiction. Education of both young children and parents has
also proven to be very effective in preventing primary use. We also need to
help individuals in small countries find alternatives to the drug trade to
support themselves. Coca substitution programs, where farmers are paid to
produce crops other than coca, are effective, but very expensive and will
take time and persistence before positive results are seen. By spraying
fields we are truly only hurting peasants; the large dealers are rarely
affected by such actions.

The U.S. government is hesitant to try these methods because they know that
with a militaristic approach, their efforts are very public and short-term
answers are provided.

They can post statistics as to how many fields of coca have been destroyed
and how many arrests have been made, but they do not post the negative
statistics showing increased use and availability. They are worried about
appearance and that will get us nowhere in the war on drugs.