U.S. ASSISTANCE TO COLUMBIA SHOWS PROGRESS BEING MADE

Residents of Bojaya in the impoverished Colombian province of Choco
know misery -- flooding for four months out of each year, electricity
two to three hours every couple of days, drinking water obtainable
only from rain collection. Their one thing of value -- the town's
location along the Atrato River -- also landed them in the middle of a
10-year battle between the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and Colombia's right-wing United Self-Defense Forces
(AUC) as each rebel group sought control of an important transit zone
for illegal drugs and weapons.

The town was barely on the Colombian government's radar until May 2,
2002, and what became known as the Bojaya massacre.

On that day, the FARC launched a mortar attack against AUC forces
seeking cover within a churchyard. A shell landed directly on the
church altar, killing 119 innocent townspeople, many of them children,
who had sought refuge in the sanctuary.

Today, things are much different in Bojaya. Colombian military forces
now patrol the Atrato and, with the full involvement of the locals, a
new town is being built on higher, drier land. U.S. funds are paying
for a new health center while national and foreign aid is directed to
improving schools and generating new economic activity independent of
the illegal drug trade.

That's progress, but not the kind typically reported in Colombia's
long war against insurgents and drug trafficking. The United States
has pumped more than $4.5 billion into Colombia's 6-year-old anti-drug
and pro-peace development strategy, the largest amount of U.S. aid
outside the Middle East. Most of it has been directed to security.

The results -- a drop in the number of murders and kidnappings, and
increases in the extradition of drug kingpins, the eradication of coca
crops and the number of irregular combatants killed or demobilized --
have made a big splash in Washington and given Colombian President
Alvaro Uribe nearly a superhero status in the U.S. capital.

But not everyone in Washington is impressed, especially those who have
long criticized the military emphasis of U.S. aid to Colombia. "If you
spend a billion dollars and in return you get a ham sandwich, it's
better than nothing but it's not what you paid for," said Tim Rieser,
foreign policy aide to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, the ranking
Democrat on the Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on state and
foreign operations. Rieser, who recently traveled to Colombia and
acknowledges security advances in some parts of the country, is
particularly frustrated that not enough funds are directed to the
social and economic development projects he thinks are necessary for
Plan Colombia to succeed.

Primarily targeting the aid at securing the country is a too "narrow
reading of security," said Mark Schneider, senior vice president of
the International Crisis Group and an assistant administrator for
Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development during
the Clinton administration. "Whenever you throw the FARC out of an
area, what you want to have is a coherent rural development plan so
people see immediate benefits."

Colombian officials agree.

In fact, according to Ambassador Carolina Barco, officials meeting in
Bogota with a high-level U.S. delegation last week stressed the need
for U.S. assistance to continue in order for Colombia to consolidate
its progress on the battlefield. What's needed is "not only military
action but also social and economic investment" -- a replication of
the kind of assistance seen now in Bojaya.

Barco said that her government is planning to invest more than $1.6
billion over the next four years on development projects to help
maintain "territorial control" -- Colombia's way for framing security
gains as fully dependent on economic development. Without such
projects, the goals associated with the drug war -- such as coca
eradication or interdiction -- will not be sustainable, said Barco. As
part of that effort, she added, the government hopes to levy a new tax
on the wealthy and has launched a new appeal for assistance to the
international community, particularly in Europe, where drug
consumption is growing faster than in the United States.

Back in 1999, an enormous effort went into defining a comprehensive
long-term strategy to help Colombia. It was evident then that one of
the most redeeming qualities of Plan Colombia was that it broadened
the understanding of Colombia's challenges beyond a mere problem of
illegal drug trafficking. Now, as U.S. and Colombian officials discuss
the next phase of Plan Colombia, it is crucial to remember that more
than narrow successes on the battlefield are essential to have the
kind of progress seen in Bojaya.