U.S. AID AT ISSUE AS COLOMBIA CONFLICT SHIFTS

Questions For Powell Visit: Is Support Helping Fight Against Drug
Trade? Is More Needed?

LOS POZOS, Colombia - When President Clinton visited Colombia one
year ago, few officials of either country questioned that U.S.
support was essential to save Colombia's democracy from a siege by
guerrillas and drug traffickers.

Secretary of State Colin Powell will find a dramatically different
scenario when he takes his first trip to Colombia on Tuesday. The
nation's two largest rebel groups are on the defensive, according to
President Andr=C8s Pastrana, and the U.S.-backed military is making
unprecedented advances to retake lost ground.

At the same time, however, there are strong indications that
guerrilla ranks are growing rapidly, as is the amount of acreage
under drug-crop cultivation.

The question now pressing decision-makers in both countries is
whether $1.5 billion in mostly military aid from Washington has made
a difference in Colombia and whether additional aid is needed to
complete the job.

Commanders of the nation's largest rebel group, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, insist it is no coincidence that
the army launched a recent 6,000-troop offensive just as Mr. Powell
and other senior U.S. officials began a series of visits to Colombia
starting last month.

"They want to show the United States - Mr. Powell more than anyone -
some big results, because they want to get more aid," Raul Reyes, a
top FARC commander, said in an interview in the guerrilla's
government-granted haven in southern Colombia.

Mr. Reyes said everything has been orchestrated to persuade
Washington to expand its contribution to the counter-narcotics
program known as Plan Colombia. The Bush administration says it is
considering that very prospect at the same time Congress reviews the
results achieved so far.

"They need more dollars. They need more helicopters. They need more
advisers than they have now in Colombia," Mr. Reyes added. "To make
it happen, they have to present this great success."

Aid Parameters

U.S. military aid is strictly limited to units involved in fighting
drug traffickers and armed groups that support the trade. Since both
governments contend that the FARC is deeply involved in the drug
trade across southern Colombia, they can be attacked using
U.S.-supplied equipment.

Colombian military commanders, however, are minimizing the U.S.
contribution to recent battlefield successes, in which they claim to
have inflicted scores of guerrilla casualties.

Mr. Reyes said the military offensive was not as successful as the
government asserts, causing "fewer than 30" guerrilla deaths. He
acknowledged, however, that a FARC field commander was killed.

The military command denies that any part of the offensive was timed
to coincide with the visit of Mr. Powell or another high-level
delegation that toured Colombia from Aug. 29 to 31.

But commanders acknowledge that Colombia has benefited significantly
from the help it has received, and that the military still needs and
badly wants more U.S. aid, particularly if both governments hope to
turnback the insurgent groups that provide support and protection for
Colombia's drug trafficking industry.

In Bogot=B7, Gen. Fernando Tapias, the nation's top military commander,
said U.S.-trained counternarcotics forces did not play a role in a
month-old offensive against the rebels.

The Plan Colombia aid, he said, "didn't have anything to do with the
operations going on in other parts of the country."

Not one of the newly created Rapid Deployment Force battalions that
participated in the offensive has received counter-narcotics aid, he
added. "The [U.S.-made] helicopters that were used belong to the
Colombian forces. Not a single helicopter provided under Plan
Colombia was authorized for use."

Another military source said, however, that U.S. aerial and satellite
intelligence played a crucial role in monitoring the guerrilla
mobilization so that Colombian troops could react quickly.

Another source said U.S. contractors have been dropped into southern
Colombia's jungles by helicopter to install a network of small
antennas and relay stations. The network has enabled both governments
to monitor even the most remote guerrilla radio communications. The
United States has allocated about $163 million under Plan Colombia
for intelligence-gathering, radar upgrades and airborne
reconnaissance.

Need For Transportation

What Colombia's military needs now is transportation, commanders say.
The military's fleet of U.S. and Russian-made helicopters numbers
fewer than 50 to cover territory equal in size to Italy, Germany and
Poland combined. The United States already has begun delivering the
16 Blackhawk and 30 Huey UH-1H helicopters funded under Plan
Colombia. But the deliveries will not be completed until late this
year.

In spite of the offensive's results, which included an aerial attack
against an estimated 1,000 guerrillas emerging from the haven,
Colombian officials say there are signs of problems to come.

Mr. Pastrana told foreign reporters in Bogot=B7 on Thursday that it
might be necessary to evaluate the results of Plan Colombia so far to
determine whether it is helping to solve the nation's problems or
making them worse.

"The conclusions are not good," he said. "Drugs continue to be the
biggest or second-biggest business in the world." He described the
international drug-trafficking industry as a $500 billion-a-year
business.

Colombia and the United States contend that the primary source of
income for the FARC, as well as its archrival, the United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, is drugs. With drug revenue
mounting, the two governments contend, Colombia's armed groups have
been able to launch massive recruitment campaigns.

According to a Colombian military report, a new assessment of FARC
strength dwarfs the previous government assessment of about 16,500
fighters. The new assessment notes the presence of an estimated
10,000 additional FARC operatives inside Colombia's largest urban
centers.

A military source described the members as serving in a noncombat
role but providing intelligence to FARC commanders about potential
kidnap targets, weak points in government defenses, and potential
sites for planting bombs.

Mr. Reyes declined to comment on the military figures. "At the same
time, he conceded that the Colombian army is a better fighting
machine today than before the U.S. training began.

"To say they aren't prepared would be, well, not to speak seriously,"
he said. "They have to be well prepared because they spend all of
their time combating the Colombian people. "

Gen. Tapias insisted that neither Colombian nor U.S. tax dollars are
being used to wipe out the guerrillas. Rather, the goal is to sever
their links to the drug trade and force them to engage in serious
peace negotiations.

"Our military strategy is not designed to wage a war of
extermination," he said. "We are not looking only for a military
solution, but a military solution combined with a political
settlement. ... If the military solution fails, then there is no
chance to reach a negotiated political settlement."