BRINGING THE THAKSIN REGIME TO ACCOUNT

In the 'war on drugs' in Thailand in 2003, around 3,000 people died
with no proper judicial accounting. The National Human Rights
Commission has assembled convincing evidence that several victims had
no involvement in drug trading. The mechanics of the campaign were
lethally simple. Provincial governors and police chiefs were told to
eliminate drug trading. Blacklists of names were compiled and success
was measured against numerical targets.

It has been a bad few weeks for national leaders who might have their
own people's blood on their hands. Saddam Hussein was condemned to
death for atrocities at Dujail. President Arroyo of the Philippines
was charged in an international court with human rights violations.
The case against Arroyo, which details torture, abductions, 186 forced
disappearances, and 778 killings was spearheaded by a senator and
supported by relatives of several victims. The Permanent People's
Tribunal in The Hague is a self-constituted court which has no power
to enforce punishments, but considerable moral authority because it is
run by eminent international jurists.

In 1998, Augusto Pinochet was arraigned in a Spanish court on charges
relating to abductions, torture and executions during his 17 years as
president of Chile. An arrest warrant was served while he was in a
hospital in London. He was detained by the UK authorities but managed
to resist extradition and was finally released on grounds of ill
health. Although the case failed, it established a precedent that the
judicial responsibility for atrocities is not obstructed by national
boundaries.

In the "war on drugs" in Thailand in 2003, around 3,000 people died
with no proper judicial accounting. The National Human Rights
Commission has assembled convincing evidence that several victims had
no involvement in drug trading. The mechanics of the government
campaign were lethally simple. Provincial governors and police chiefs
were told to eliminate drug trading. Blacklists of names were compiled
and success was measured against numerical targets. Thaksin's speech
launching the campaign on January 14, 2003 gave strong hints of what
was expected:

"The drug sellers have been ruthless with the Thai people, with our
children, so if we are ruthless with them, it is not a big deal. ... If
drug traders are listening they must make up their minds whether to
stop selling or carry on. If they don't stop, there is a chance they
will be dealt with in every way, both life and limb. ... With the
traders, you must use hammer and fist, that is, act decisively and
without mercy. Police General Phao Sriyanon once said 'There is
nothing under the sun that the Thai police cannot do.' So I'm
confident that drugs are something that the Thai police can deal with.
(Phao was famous for ordering political assassinations.) If some drug
traders die, it will be a common thing."

Wan Muhammed Nor Matha, who was directly responsible for
implementation as Interior minister, made sure the instructions were
clear: "Tell them to stop selling drugs and leave the communities for
good or they will be put behind bars or even 'vanish without a trace'
. Who cares?" He added: "I think human rights activists should not
worry too much about these traffickers' lives."

Police chiefs in charge of implementing the policy at the local level
were even more explicit. One called the campaign "a plan to shorten
the lives of drug dealers.... A normal person lives for 80 years. But a
bad person should not live that long". Another, who said he had been
instructed to extract information from suspects and then kill them,
asked, "Why should we spare the scum?"

Officials were threatened to make sure they complied. In his speech,
Thaksin told the police: "You all know everything; it's just a
question whether you will do anything or not. Today if you don't, I
will do you." The Interior minister made this point more clearly: "In
our war on drugs, the district chiefs are the knights, and provincial
governors the commanders. If the knights see the enemy but do not
shoot them, they can be beheaded by their commanders." In case anyone
thought the term "beheading" was meant as a metaphor, the minister
directed them to study King Naresuan, who stationed crack troops at
the rear of an attacking army with orders to behead, impale and
otherwise eliminate any soldier attempting to desert.

Incitement to murder is a straightforward criminal offence.
Responsibility for torture and abduction is more complex.

In March 2004, Somchai Neelapaijit made public allegations against the
police for torturing people to extract "confessions" of involvement in
the Narathiwat armoury raid. According to Somchai, one victim was
"blindfolded by police officers and physically assaulted; strangled
and choked, hands tied behind his back and beaten with pieces of wood
on the back and head ... hanged from the toilet door with a piece of
rope and ... then electrocuted with a fork charged with electric
currents". Given the high political profile of the Narathiwat raid, it
is unlikely the local police were acting solely on their own authority.

Somchai was abducted one day after making this statement. There has
always been a suspicion that this abduction was ordered at a very high
level. Two weeks later, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, deputy prime minister,
let slip in parliament that he knew Somchai was already dead. Thaksin
set up a probe under the Department of Special Investigations, but
this exercise seemed designed to prevent any revelation. A case was
brought against five police officers, but the phone records which
might have pointed to the chain of command were excluded from the evidence.

This is a critical moment for Thailand's judicial system. Under the
Thaksin regime, judicial institutions were manipulated, intimidated
and sabotaged. The King's summons to the judiciary to help solve the
crisis promised a new beginning. But that summons has now been
overshadowed by the coup, an explicitly lawless act. One regime that
aspired to absolute power has been replaced by another with something
approaching it. Judicial institutions may again become subordinate or
irrelevant. Even worse, there are reasons to fear that a military
regime will be reluctant to establish precedents for arraigning former
leaders for violating human rights.

It will be a pity if the Thaksin regime has to be brought to judicial
account outside, not inside, the country.