IN COLOMBIA, ANTI-DRUG PLAN HAS COME A CROPPER

FLORENCIA, Colombia -- State Department officials have concluded that an
alternative development plan aimed at slashing drug crops has failed, a
decision that raises doubts about the U.S.-backed effort to eradicate the
primary source of cocaine on America's streets.

Farmers in southern Colombia who signed voluntary agreements to eliminate
coca, the source of cocaine, in exchange for aid have eliminated little or
none of their harvest and have no intention of doing so before a deadline
later this year, according to a confidential State Department report.

As a result, U.S. Embassy officials have decided to largely abandon a plan
to encourage the substitution of other crops and products for coca.
Instead, they will concentrate on building large infrastructure projects to
provide jobs, and improve living conditions and transportation.

And they will rely increasingly on a controversial aerial fumigation
program to show farmers, mostly rural poor with small plots of land, that
their coca will be wiped out if they do not stop growing it.

"There's nothing that we can offer [the farmers] as an alternative that
comes near the value of coca," said Ken Ellis, the head of the U.S. Agency
for International Development in Colombia. "They're not going to give that
up unless there's a credible threat that they will be forced to eradicate."

The U.S. decision represents a radical new direction in the alternative
development program, long touted as the only way to ensure a permanent
reduction in the coca crops that fill valleys and riverbanks throughout
southern Colombia, which is the source of most of the cocaine that reaches
the United States.

Experts on alternative development and peasant farming say that the changes
spell disaster. Small-time coca farmers, who often plant coca alongside
traditional crops such as corn, will face food shortages if spraying
becomes the primary tool to encourage eradication and kills their food
crops as well.

And they say that many of the farmers, who migrated to isolated southern
Colombia in search of work, will simply move to other areas to grow coca if
they are not taught how to raise other crops.

"You can spray all you want, you can spend all the money in Europe and the
United States, but the problem of coca will continue," said Jesus Bastidas,
the director of an alternative development program in Florencia, the
capital of Caqueta state.

More Funding Urged

Colombian government officials acknowledge that the alternative development
program has failed to produce results. But they say more time and money are
needed. Only 96 of Colombia's 222 coca-growing counties have programs in place.

"We need permanent support," said Maria Ines Restrepo, the head of
Colombia's alternative development program. "Our conflict is not going to
end without social investment."

There are few problems more stubborn in the fight against drugs than what
to do about the 100,000 or so small coca farmers in Colombia, a dilemma
involving social, political and economic issues intertwined with Colombia's
nearly 40-year-old guerrilla war.

Most of the farmers moved to isolated corners of Colombia in the 1970s and
'80s in search of jobs or land. Once there, they grew traditional crops
along with coca on small, five-acre plots. They were helped by narcotics
traffickers and leftist guerrillas, who provided seeds, loans and technical
advice.

Although estimates vary, such farmers account for at least 15% of the coca
grown in Colombia, which last year had about 321,000 acres of coca,
according to a State Department report. The rest is grown on huge plantations.

Experts say that wiping out the coca through fumigation would simply lead
to widespread displacement, food shortages and environmental damage, as
farmers push deeper into Colombia's rain forest.

That's why Plan Colombia, the multibillion-dollar U.S.-backed effort to
halve drug production here by 2005, included a budget of more than $100
million for alternative development. The idea was to wean farmers off coca
by providing new sources of income through alternative crops or jobs in
industries such as rubber production.

As of the beginning of this year, Colombian officials had signed up nearly
40,000 small farmers who had planted about 45,000 acres of coca and poppy,
the source of heroin. Most of those projects were concentrated in the
southern state of Putumayo.

A program created and initially funded by the Colombian government in
Putumayo provided farmers a package of aid worth as much as $1,000,
including chickens, cows, seeds or technical assistance. In return, the
farmers would pull up their coca crops by this July.

But State Department officials said a confidential, 21/2-month study of the
area late last year concluded that the farmers had no intention of pulling
up their crops. The officials added that it was unclear whether the
Colombian government actually expected them to do so.

Similar alternative development programs in the past had failed.

The Colombian government's aid was slow in reaching the area, whose drug
crops have made it one of the most contested regions in the guerrilla war.
The U.S. government also insisted that farmers pull up all their coca crops
before receiving any U.S. aid. That led to confusion among many farmers and
local alternative development groups, who say they were told that aid would
flow to help soften the blow as farmers pulled up their crops.

As a result, say those involved in the program, neither side trusted the
other, and few farmers pulled up any coca plants.

A General Accounting Office report in February found that the alternative
development program had made "little progress" and was in need of review.

"The results to date have been disappointing," said a top U.S. Embassy
official during a recent conference in Miami. "In violation of the
agreements, many of these communities continue to plant new coca."

Isolation a Problem

Another problem was that many of the proposed alternatives to coca crops
were simply not viable. Putumayo, just west of the Amazon basin, is a
tropical region long separated from the rest of Colombia. Its isolation
makes it nearly impossible to economically transport agricultural goods to
market. And the region's poor soils cannot sustain intensive farming or
grazing.

Plans to encourage farming of rice, beef cattle, chickens, pigs and fish
have all been shelved. The U.S. will continue to support such projects
elsewhere in Colombia and back some alternative development in Putumayo,
such as a plan to grow trees for specialty lumber.

But even those projects have no guarantees should they prove unprofitable.

"We have not gone back on our word on these activities," Ellis said.
"Coupled with infrastructure, there are some activities that may be feasible."

A final problem with alternative development is security. The Colombian
military, paramilitaries and leftist guerrillas are constantly battling in
the region. Two aid workers were killed in Putumayo last year.

To replace the existing plans, the U.S. is rushing to put into action a new
plan to build about $17 million in infrastructure.

Smaller projects, chosen by individual communities that eradicate their
coca, will include new schools, health clinics, running water and
electricity. Large projects will be managed by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and involve building bridges and roads to better connect Putumayo
with the rest of Colombia.

However, development of infrastructure projects raises fears that U.S.
money will help speed the flow of the region's coca crop to U.S. markets.
It also creates the possibility that U.S. aid will end up in the hands of
the guerrillas, who control much of Putumayo and demand protection payments
from workers and contractors.

One aid worker acknowledged that he already writes up fake invoices when he
distributes aid from a previous alternative development project funded by
the Interamerican Development Bank and the United Nations so that he can
pay off the guerrillas.

"That's what you have to do here," said the worker, who asked not to be
identified.