REBELS ARE LOSING THEIR EDGE IN COLOMBIA'S CIVIL WAR

BOGOTA, Colombia -- A month after peace talks collapsed, this is what
Colombia's war looks like:

In the countryside, leftist guerrillas have demolished bridges,
detonated car bombs and killed soldiers and police in small groups. In
the cities, people go on Sunday bike rides, dine at fine restaurants
and attend fashion shows.

In other words, the war looks pretty much the same as it did before
Feb. 20, when President Andres Pastrana ended negotiations with the
country's largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, or FARC.

Despite predictions, the end of talks has not produced a blood bath.
Instead, more than three years after a devastating series of rebel
victories prompted the talks, there is growing evidence that the
guerrillas have lost their military advantage.

The Colombian military is stronger, with more troops and better
equipment. The country's right-wing paramilitary groups have turned
into a powerful enemy. And the U.S.-supported battle against cocaine
production and trafficking has cut into the rebels' primary source of
revenue, analysts believe.

As a result, the war is at a deadlock. The rebels seem to be
positioning themselves for an eventual return to talks rather than
national conquest, launching hit-and-run attacks against political
figures and infrastructure to improve their negotiating position.

"It's going to take much blood, much destruction and thousands of
dead. Then the talks will start again," said Armando Borrero, a former
national security chief.

There is a ray of hope: Negotiations with a smaller rebel group, the
National Liberation Army, or ELN, have improved. Both sides are
examining the possibility of a truce in coming months. The ELN,
thought to number fewer than 5,000 rebels, has been devastated by
paramilitary attacks.

The end of the peace talks with FARC, which is more than three times
the size of the ELN, has not produced a massive surge in casualties in
Colombia's internal conflict, which has simmered since 1964. Fighting
this year between the military and rebels has killed about 40
combatants a week, up from last year's average of about 26 a week.

Nor have the rebels been able so far to unleash a promised wave of
attacks against cities, where more than 70 percent of the population
lives. Military and police have detained dozens of alleged urban
guerrillas. The federal prosecutor's office has conducted nationwide
raids, seizing dynamite and bombs.

FARC, made up mostly of impoverished, uneducated peasants, has so far
been unable to mount complex operations that would suggest its
fighters are ready for the urban warfare necessary to take control of
Bogota, the capital, experts say.

"They are historically weak in the cities," said Adam Isacson, the
Colombia analyst for the Center for International Policy, a center-
left think tank based in Washington. "I don't think they have that
capacity."

Even in rural areas, both rebel groups have had difficulty asserting
the dominance they once showed. Congressional elections held March 10
went smoothly in all but 15 of the more than 1,000 counties
nationwide, a major achievement considering that the two groups
control an estimated 40 percent of rural areas and the FARC had
demanded a boycott.

None of this means that the rebels are on the verge of defeat. Their
ubiquitous presence and proven ability to destroy infrastructure have
frustrated the military. The result is a stalemate, say officials and
analysts, with no side able to dominate and years of bloodshed ahead.

"Terrorism is an endemic disease," said Gen. Fernando Tapias, the
armed forces chief. "It cannot be totally eliminated, but we can cut
down the levels of destruction."

The standoff has changed the character of the war. In the late 1990s,
the FARC had grown strong enough to attack army bases and cities in
sustained operations with hundreds of fighters.

The rebels wiped out an elite counter-guerrilla battalion outside the
southern town of El Billar during a two-day battle in March 1998,
killing 107 of the unit's 154 soldiers. In November that year, as
Pastrana was preparing to hand over a demilitarized zone to the rebels
as a prelude to talks, hundreds of FARC rebels overran Mitu, a
regional capital in eastern Colombia, killing 150 soldiers.

More recently, the rebels have had trouble mounting such logistically
complicated operations, thanks in part to U.S. military hardware and
satellite intelligence. Last August, an elite Colombian strike force
of about 5,000 soldiers transported by U.S.-made Black Hawk
helicopters routed a column of about 1,000 rebels who were trying to
recapture a crucial drug-and-arms-smuggling corridor in a remote
corner of southeastern Colombia.

The rebels also face a better-paid, better-trained army. The number of
professional soldiers in the 140,000-member military has more than
doubled, from 20,000 to 50,000, in the last three years. The rest are
draftees who by law are not allowed into combat situations. The army
plans to add 10,000 more soldiers each year for the next two years.

"Both sides got stronger during the past three years. But the army
strengthened themselves more," said Mauricio Silva, an analyst who has
written about FARC.

As a result, the rebels in small squads have returned to hitting
police and military outposts, then fleeing into the jungle. On
March12, army officials accused the guerrillas of detonating a car
bomb near a police station in a town about 100 miles south of Bogota,
killing three soldiers and four civilians.

At the same time, FARC has stepped up sabotage attempts, launching
attacks against vulnerable targets: railroad tracks, bridges, roads
and electrical towers in the countryside. Guerrillas blew up more than
143 transmission towers through the beginning of this month, compared
with 254 for all of last year.

The rebels have also made it clear that they plan to kidnap political
figures, even those who have previously shown sympathy for leftist
causes. Only days after the peace process ended, guerrillas kidnapped
Ingrid Betancourt, an independent whose fight against Bogota's
political machinery mirrored FARC complaints about the country's
entrenched corruption.

"The FARC have returned to being guerrillas," said Alfredo Rangel, a
military consultant. "They are seeking to strengthen themselves in
negotiations."

The motive seems clear. Such attacks target politicians and ordinary
people, increasing pressure for negotiations. One key point in coming
months will be presidential elections in May. FARC may stage a show of
force then to intimidate the incoming president.

But there are few who expect talks to begin soon. Hard-liner Alvaro
Uribe, the front-runner, has said he will not negotiate unless FARC
stops the kidnapping, extortion and violence it uses to finance its
operations.

After three fruitless years of talks, the country seems in no mood for
a return to the table.

Military analysts attribute the change in the FARC's tactics to
serious internal and external challenges. Its membership has shot up
in numbers, jumping from about 7,000 in 1995 to an estimated 17,000
today. The fighters also have spread from their base in eastern
Colombia to operate in every department, or state, in mainland Colombia.

That growth has required more money at a time when attacks against
FARC financing seem to be bearing fruit. A U.S. State Department
report recently found that aerial fumigation in Colombia, performed by
U.S. contractors, has sharply cut back the cultivation of coca, the
plant used to make cocaine.

Gen. Gustavo Socha, the head of Colombia's anti-narcotics unit,
estimated that the drop has resulted in millions of dollars in lost
revenue for the rebels, who tax coca production and have become more
directly involved in production and trafficking over the years.

Finally, there is some evidence that FARC is having problems gaining
and retaining recruits. Defections have increased. And there are
anecdotal accounts of a jump in forced recruitment of teenagers as
more and more rural youths flee to cities in search of jobs and an
escape from violence.