THE STEPS COLOMBIA NEEDS TO TAKE

Colombian President Andres Pastrana can't be faulted for breaking off peace
talks with leftist rebels.

Despite a concerted effort by the United Nations, the talks stalled.

The rebels have become increasingly violent, and the Colombian public has
lost patience with 40 years of bloody war. But the escalation of fighting
intensifies the need to separate old disputes over land and political
reform from Colombia's immediate problem with narco-terror. This is the
wrong time for the United States to become more involved in Colombia's
civil war.

Pastrana went further to accommodate FARC, the main rebel group, than many
Colombians wanted.

Despite his granting them time and territory, the rebels never came through
with a cohesive response.

They also poisoned their image with a recent spasm of violence, kidnapping
government and political leaders, executing captives, blowing up roads,
bridges and power stations and bringing their terror campaign to the cities.

That strategy has pushed Colombian voters to the right in advance of
presidential elections in May.

FARC's decision to use the peace process as a cover to kidnap, murder and
traffic in drugs goes down as one of the biggest missed opportunities for
leftists in Latin America. The rebels failed to show they could responsibly
govern the safe haven Pastrana granted them. They failed to curtail
violence and failed to show courage or sophistication in their so-called
proposals for peace.

Legitimate grievances over human rights, corruption and social justice
failed to rally the world, because the FARC's hypocrisy on those very
issues undermined its support at the United Nations, in Europe and in Latin
America.

Colombia has two challenges in stopping the violence, neither one advanced
by the Bush administration's proposal to loosen restrictions on military
assistance there.

The government needs to put an end to the drug trade, which is financing
the rebels and the rightist paramilitaries. It also needs to bring
paramilitary leaders under control. The political equation of the civil war
is eclipsed by the hold the drug economy has on killers on both the left
and the right. Allowing Colombia to use American military aid directly
against the rebels detracts from its broader war on drugs.

It also strengthens the hand of Colombia's military during a political
transition there.

The U.S. interest in a stable Colombia has many components. One is
persuading the leadership there to distinguish between terror and the
struggle for social reform.

Colombia has not done an adequate job of protecting its populace,
controlling its military or opening its civil institutions, and the
reconstructive part of Plan Colombia, as the U.S.-financed drug eradication
effort is known, has not done enough to help farmers survive on legal crops.

These are steps the Colombian government needs to take before the question
of a larger American role comes into play.