THE COLOMBIA QUANDARY

To Date, U.S. Aid Has Done Almost Nothing To Reduce The Flow Of Cocaine.

WASHINGTON -- Before we rush to bring the war against international
terrorism to the jungles of Colombia--as the administration and some
in Congress now urge--we would do well to understand that country's
feudal history. We should also review what has been done with the
nearly $2 billion we have appropriated for Colombia in the past two
years.

"Plan Colombia," devised by the Clinton administration and the
Colombian government to drastically curtail cocaine production in
Colombia, called for $7.5 billion.

At the time, we were told that Colombia would contribute $4 billion
and the U.S. share was to be $1.6 billion.

Donations by other countries, mostly European, have not materialized.
The Colombian government's support has also fallen short.

Now the Bush administration seeks an additional $537 million for
fiscal year 2003.

So far, U.S. tax dollars have paid for a fleet of aircraft to spray
chemical herbicide over large areas of the country planted in coca,
for combat helicopters to protect the planes from groundfire and for
training and equipment for counter-drug battalions. Funds also went to
economic programs to give coca farmers alternative sources of income
and to reform Colombia's dysfunctional justice system.

Because of the Colombian military's poor human rights record, Congress
conditioned aid on the prosecution of military officers implicated in
serious abuses and on the severing of the military's links with
illegal paramilitary groups.

These groups, like the guerrillas, have been designated by the
administration as terrorist organizations.

By any objective measure, Plan Colombia's results have been
disappointing.

Initially, the State Department predicted a 30% reduction in coca
cultivation by the end of this year. Although nearly 85,000 hectares
were sprayed last year, coca cultivation in Colombia actually rose, by
at least 21,100 hectares.

Other than raising questions about possible adverse health and
environmental effects, the spraying seems to have produced few
results. There has not been any significant reduction in the flow of
illegal drugs into the U.S., and virtually no one in the
administration thinks there will be.

Moreover, U.S.-funded economic programs have produced little in the
way of viable alternatives for farmers.

It is dangerous and difficult to implement successful programs in the
conflict zones where coca is grown, particularly without stronger
support from the Colombian government, which has not invested enough
of its own money in these areas and has done little to reform its
sagging economy.

Last week, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell certified that, while
additional improvement is important, Colombia has met the human rights
conditions on which further U.S. aid is contingent. But the
certification had more to do with the fact that U.S. aid was running
out than with Colombia's actually making sufficient progress on human
rights.

Senior military officers who have been implicated in the murders of
civilians or who have abetted paramilitary violence and drug
trafficking have not been jailed. Many remain on active duty and some
have been promoted.

Human rights investigators and prosecutors have been threatened,
killed or forced to flee the country.

Although some soldiers have been suspended, none have been prosecuted
and some have joined the paramilitary groups responsible for a large
share of targeted assassinations and gruesome attacks against unarmed
civilians.

Like the guerrillas, the paramilitary groups are deeply involved in
drug trafficking. Yet some local military commanders share airfields,
intelligence and logistics with them.

For a time, it seemed that President Andres Pastrana's brave efforts
to negotiate peace might pay off. Now, though, the talks have
collapsed. Violence has intensified, and the guerrillas, especially
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have sharply
escalated kidnappings, assassinations and other terrorist acts. They
are unlikely to defeat the Colombian military, but they can lay siege
to cities by cutting off water and power supplies.

Colombia's generals are now asking the U.S. for additional aid to
fight the war.

Americans need to understand that Colombia is really two "countries,"
a condition that is at the heart of its problems.

The thinly populated, impoverished eastern half, which the government
has ignored for generations, is mired in the 19th century, while the
sophisticated, urban west is edging toward the 21st. There are deeply
rooted social, economic and political reasons why Latin America's
oldest conflict is no closer to resolution, and why drug money,
corruption and lawlessness permeate Colombian society.

These problems, which ultimately only Colombians can solve, will not
be fixed by simply attacking the symptoms, and an all-out war against
the twin terrorist threats--guerrillas and paramilitaries--would cost
far more, take far longer and cause more havoc than anyone in
Washington has acknowledged so far.

Until now, we have confined our aid to funding anti-drug
measures.

But that may be changing.

Earlier this year, the administration asked Congress for an additional
$98 million to protect 100 miles of an oil pipeline that has been a
frequent target of guerrilla attacks, costing Colombia $500 million a
year in oil revenues.

A vote on the funding is pending.

The White House is also seeking broad new counter-terrorism authority
in an interim spending bill now pending before Congress, opening the
door to a deeper, open-ended U.S. involvement in Colombia.

Colombia is not Afghanistan, and no one has advocated sending U.S.
troops. But we should remember that the U.S. sent $5 billion to the
military of El Salvador, a country with 1"50th the land area of
Colombia and they could not defeat the guerrillas there.

Are we and the Colombian people--who currently spend a meager 3% of
their GDP on the army--prepared for a wider war, which would bring
with it not only economic costs but also many more displaced people
and an inevitable increase in civilian casualties.

Before taking this path, we should consider alternatives. Should we
send an envoy of the caliber of Richard Holbrooke to push for a
cease-fire and actively support a much more inclusive negotiating
strategy than was pursued previously. What about attacking the
security problems that have given rise to paramilitary groups by
strengthening Colombia's National Police, which has a cleaner human
rights record and which may be more effective in responding to
kidnappings and other terrorist acts.

We want to help Colombia, particularly as the FARC has evolved from a
rebel movement with a political ideology to a drug-financed terrorist
syndicate. But we and the Colombians need to be clear about our goals
and what it would take to achieve them. We should not rush to commit
ourselves to a costly and ambiguous policy.

Continued U.S. aid to the Colombian military must be tied to
accountability for abuses and to aggressively fighting the
paramilitaries. Goal-setting should also be coordinated, after the
elections in May, with Colombia's new president, who may favor an
entirely different approach.

Finally, just as Colombians need to take far more responsibility for
their own problems, we need to understand that Colombia cannot solve
America's drug problem, nor is Columbia responsible for it. Our meager
attempts to reduce demand for drugs have failed, and unless we devote
far more effort to what we know works--education and treatment--the
drugs will keep coming and Americans will keep dying.