News (Media Awareness Project) - US CA: SWAT Standards Proposed |
Title: | US CA: SWAT Standards Proposed |
Published On: | 2002-07-01 |
Source: | Sacramento Bee (CA) |
Fetched On: | 2008-08-30 07:48:19 |
SWAT STANDARDS PROPOSED
The Statewide Plan Was Prompted By The 2000 Shooting Death Of A Modesto
Boy, 11.
A plan that would create statewide standards for SWAT teams is due to be
delivered this week to California Attorney General Bill Lockyer.
A draft copy of the plan, spurred by the September 2000 shooting death of
11-year-old Alberto Sepulveda by a Modesto police SWAT officer, calls for a
number of reforms, including:
* A uniform definition for what constitutes a Special Weapons and Tactics
team. Without a specific definition, any group of law enforcement officers
can be called a SWAT team, even if those officers have not completed
specialized training. The definition proposed by a Lockyer-appointed
commission would focus the role of SWAT teams on high-risk emergencies,
including hostage-taking, barricaded suspects, snipers and terrorist acts.
* Uniform training standards. Now, there are no mandated training
requirements now, leaving a wide variance between agencies and the types of
emergency situations they are capable of handling. Lockyer's commission
proposes a three-tiered rating system for SWAT team preparedness. The
amount of training required would increase for each level.
* Written operational procedures for each SWAT team. The commission found
that there also is a wide variance statewide as to how and when SWAT teams
are used. For example, some agencies use their teams to serve all
drug-related warrants. Others call out their teams only for hostage-taking
or similar high-risk emergencies.
While the standards would not be mandated, law enforcement agencies would
have a difficult time ignoring them. Stanislaus County Sheriff Les Weidman
said last week the standards would be considered written policy, so
agencies still could be held accountable.
Weidman is vice chairman of the commission that Lockyer created more than a
year ago, in the aftermath of Alberto's death and other fatal accidents
involving SWAT teams.
Modesto settled a federal wrongful-death lawsuit stemming from the
shooting, agreeing to pay the Sepulveda family $2.55 million. Earlier this
year, the federal government paid the boy's family $450,000 for the federal
role in the tragedy.
Last summer, Alberto's parents urged the Lockyer commission to enact
reforms that would lessen the likelihood of such accidental shootings
occurring in the future.
"I'm pleased with the progress we've made so far," Weidman said. "We sort
of went on hiatus after (the terrorist attacks of) September 11th. We're
back on track now."
Headed by Pasadena Police Chief Bernard K. Melekian, the 20-member panel
includes police officers, legal experts and scholars, and private citizens.
Weidman said the draft report will be presented to Lockyer on Wednesday.
Commission members surveyed law enforcement agencies throughout the state,
and last summer conducted a series of public hearings.
SWAT teams came into vogue in the late 1960s as a way to deal with
high-risk emergencies requiring special training. The elite police teams
rely upon military-style tactics with sophisticated negotiation techniques
to defuse potentially volatile situations.
Although accidental SWAT shootings are rare, Lockyer became concerned that
such tragedies were eroding the public's confidence in law enforcement.
SWAT representatives, however, worried that the commission might be an
overreaction to an isolated problem.
Groups such as the National Tactical Officers Association worried that
crafting policy in response to a small number of tragedies, such as the
Sepulveda shooting, "might overshadow the fact that over 95 percent of all
(SWAT) deployments are concluded without firing a shot."
Weidman, however, said such concerns are unfounded. "We didn't want to put
any agency in a bad position," he said. "I think we've got a pretty
thorough report."
One of the first things the panel learned, he said, was that there is no
agreed upon definition in the state on what constitutes a SWAT team. More
often than not, according to Weidman and the commission, many law
enforcement agencies try to employ SWAT tactics even though officers might
not be fully trained or equipped.
That can have tragic consequences. "Most, if not all, of the errors that
have occurred during high-risk incidents," the draft report states, "were
not committed by actual SWAT teams but by a collection of officers who were
not fully trained or equipped to function as a SWAT unit."
That does not appear to have been the case in Alberto's shooting, however.
Weidman said he believes that by establishing statewide standards for SWAT
training, as well as clearly defined protocols governing when, where and
how SWAT teams are deployed, tragedies such as Alberto's death may be
prevented in the future.
"There is no question that the tactical capabilities afforded by SWAT teams
are a necessity for law enforcement," the commission report states.
"Without such teams, there would be more tragic stories to tell, not fewer.
"Nevertheless, law enforcement operations are not military operations.
There is not an acceptable level of casualties, particularly of innocent
bystanders."
The Statewide Plan Was Prompted By The 2000 Shooting Death Of A Modesto
Boy, 11.
A plan that would create statewide standards for SWAT teams is due to be
delivered this week to California Attorney General Bill Lockyer.
A draft copy of the plan, spurred by the September 2000 shooting death of
11-year-old Alberto Sepulveda by a Modesto police SWAT officer, calls for a
number of reforms, including:
* A uniform definition for what constitutes a Special Weapons and Tactics
team. Without a specific definition, any group of law enforcement officers
can be called a SWAT team, even if those officers have not completed
specialized training. The definition proposed by a Lockyer-appointed
commission would focus the role of SWAT teams on high-risk emergencies,
including hostage-taking, barricaded suspects, snipers and terrorist acts.
* Uniform training standards. Now, there are no mandated training
requirements now, leaving a wide variance between agencies and the types of
emergency situations they are capable of handling. Lockyer's commission
proposes a three-tiered rating system for SWAT team preparedness. The
amount of training required would increase for each level.
* Written operational procedures for each SWAT team. The commission found
that there also is a wide variance statewide as to how and when SWAT teams
are used. For example, some agencies use their teams to serve all
drug-related warrants. Others call out their teams only for hostage-taking
or similar high-risk emergencies.
While the standards would not be mandated, law enforcement agencies would
have a difficult time ignoring them. Stanislaus County Sheriff Les Weidman
said last week the standards would be considered written policy, so
agencies still could be held accountable.
Weidman is vice chairman of the commission that Lockyer created more than a
year ago, in the aftermath of Alberto's death and other fatal accidents
involving SWAT teams.
Modesto settled a federal wrongful-death lawsuit stemming from the
shooting, agreeing to pay the Sepulveda family $2.55 million. Earlier this
year, the federal government paid the boy's family $450,000 for the federal
role in the tragedy.
Last summer, Alberto's parents urged the Lockyer commission to enact
reforms that would lessen the likelihood of such accidental shootings
occurring in the future.
"I'm pleased with the progress we've made so far," Weidman said. "We sort
of went on hiatus after (the terrorist attacks of) September 11th. We're
back on track now."
Headed by Pasadena Police Chief Bernard K. Melekian, the 20-member panel
includes police officers, legal experts and scholars, and private citizens.
Weidman said the draft report will be presented to Lockyer on Wednesday.
Commission members surveyed law enforcement agencies throughout the state,
and last summer conducted a series of public hearings.
SWAT teams came into vogue in the late 1960s as a way to deal with
high-risk emergencies requiring special training. The elite police teams
rely upon military-style tactics with sophisticated negotiation techniques
to defuse potentially volatile situations.
Although accidental SWAT shootings are rare, Lockyer became concerned that
such tragedies were eroding the public's confidence in law enforcement.
SWAT representatives, however, worried that the commission might be an
overreaction to an isolated problem.
Groups such as the National Tactical Officers Association worried that
crafting policy in response to a small number of tragedies, such as the
Sepulveda shooting, "might overshadow the fact that over 95 percent of all
(SWAT) deployments are concluded without firing a shot."
Weidman, however, said such concerns are unfounded. "We didn't want to put
any agency in a bad position," he said. "I think we've got a pretty
thorough report."
One of the first things the panel learned, he said, was that there is no
agreed upon definition in the state on what constitutes a SWAT team. More
often than not, according to Weidman and the commission, many law
enforcement agencies try to employ SWAT tactics even though officers might
not be fully trained or equipped.
That can have tragic consequences. "Most, if not all, of the errors that
have occurred during high-risk incidents," the draft report states, "were
not committed by actual SWAT teams but by a collection of officers who were
not fully trained or equipped to function as a SWAT unit."
That does not appear to have been the case in Alberto's shooting, however.
Weidman said he believes that by establishing statewide standards for SWAT
training, as well as clearly defined protocols governing when, where and
how SWAT teams are deployed, tragedies such as Alberto's death may be
prevented in the future.
"There is no question that the tactical capabilities afforded by SWAT teams
are a necessity for law enforcement," the commission report states.
"Without such teams, there would be more tragic stories to tell, not fewer.
"Nevertheless, law enforcement operations are not military operations.
There is not an acceptable level of casualties, particularly of innocent
bystanders."
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