COLOMBIA'S TREADMILL

War With Rebels Enters New Phase

After 38 years, it's arguable that the conflict in Colombia between
government and rebel forces will never end and that the United States --
which has sent $1.7 billion to Bogota since 1999, with much more to come --
should leave Colombians to their own devices.

That's tempting, but to do that now, when Colombia's new president has
unprecedented public support for stepping up a government counteroffensive,
would be an ill-timed vote of no-confidence.

That doesn't mean Colombia's armed forces, even if President Alvaro Uribe
succeeds in doubling their size and strengthening their fighting skills,
can ever prevail on the battlefield. But the main rebel group, the Marxist
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), having bargained in bad
faith for years with the previous government, now seems to feel it can
strike ever harder -- lately, in urban areas -- with virtual impunity.

As always in Colombia's struggle, in which an estimated 200,000 people have
been killed, the best hope is that both sides will finally conclude that a
negotiated settlement is the only way out of the deadly impasse.

What complicates matters is that there are more than two parties.

What began as vigilante groups hired by ranchers for protection against
thievery, kidnappings and extortion have become brutal right-wing
paramilitary groups that by now are even deadlier than the FARC.
Recognizing that, Uribe, with U.S. support, plans to include the
paramilitaries both as military targets and, ultimately, in negotiations to
end the war. That even-handed approach has persuaded Congress to support a
Bush administration plan to allow U.S. military aid to be used not only
against narcotics traffickers but against rebel groups and the
paramilitaries -- a decision that recognizes what has increasingly been
happening anyway.

Whether this strategy succeeds or not, U.S. troops must continue to be
barred from any combat role in Colombia, and U.S. pressure for improvements
in Colombian forces' human rights behavior must persist. Nor must U.S.
support for Colombia be seen as an integral part of the global anti-terror
struggle, as Bush officials now seek to do. Terrorist acts by both left and
right in Colombia are surely taking place, but there is no evidence they
are tied to al-Qaida or allied groups seeking to attack America.

U.S. aid should continue until there is evidence that Uribe's
counteroffensive is likely to succeed or fail. Sadly, the latter seems
likelier. U.S. support for a program to persuade Colombia's farmers to
switch from coca to other crops has failed so badly that, last year, coca
production increased by 25 percent.

In the meantime, this country's best weapon against drug production in
Colombia is here at home, with greater efforts to deter illicit drug use
and much more treatment of those addicted.

Until Americans take responsibility for their contribution to Colombia's
agony, no amount of aid can remove drugs as a major source of funds for
Colombia's unending war.