CBI TRIAL EXPOSES MORALE WOES, CRIES OF MISMANAGEMENT

Agent's Acquittal, Public Criticisms Injure Agency

On March 20, 2000, Colorado Bureau of Investigation agent Gary Koverman was
arrested by two of his senior agents as he walked out the door of his
Montrose office at the end of a workday. They accused him of taking illegal
drugs from the CBI laboratory.

A jury this summer decided quickly and unanimously that the 19-year
laboratory agent didn't take the drugs. And that verdict did more than hand
the CBI a defeat.

The very public arrest of one of the organization's longtime agents was
intended to show that the CBI is a clean organization that polices itself well.

Instead, jurors said, it put the CBI on trial, and the agency lost.

Testimony at the trial opened a door on reports of increasing morale
problems, charges of cronyism and complaints about mismanagement,
particularly in the Montrose office of the 35-year-old organization.

The CBI was formed by the Colorado legislature in 1967 to assist local law
enforcement agencies.

The agency keeps the statewide crime index, fingerprint records and the sex
offender register, does checks for gun purchases and provides most of the
laboratory work on evidence for local law enforcement departments.

Agents who testified in Koverman's trial gave a glimpse of some turmoil
behind all those duties. They characterized his arrest as a setup by
managers who were out to get him.

A former agent-in-charge of the Montrose office termed it the worst thing
to happen in the stormy history of the agency. Jurors called the top
Colorado law enforcement agency's actions "unprofessional."

CBI Director Bob Cantwell said he doesn't regret his agency's initiating
the case against Koverman and added that he would do it again. But he said
he was concerned enough about bureau problems that came out in agents'
testimony that he traveled to Montrose afterward to consult individually
with agents.

Seven agents, technicians and former agents testified in Koverman's defense.

Five agents and CBI deputy director Pete Mang testified for the prosecution.

Those who testified for the defense said that Dennis Mooney, agent-in-

charge of investigations for the Montrose office, and Kevin Humphries,
agent-in-charge of the Montrose laboratory, wanted to get rid of Koverman,
so they targeted him in a poorly put-together drug case.

Mooney and Humphries testified they had adequate reason to believe Koverman
took drugs from the lab and that they had no vendetta against him.

Some who testified for the defense said they, too, feel targeted in an
office where agents have been asked to consent to searches at any time and
to submit saliva samples so their DNA will be on file. They are monitored
in their offices by video cameras and asked to document their whereabouts
at all times. They say they are no longer allowed to talk to the media,
although Cantwell disputes that.

Their testimony under oath was the first time agents spoke publicly about
problems that have been whispered about for years. Agent Rosa Perez
testified that management at the Montrose office is not above lying to
target agents, and she detailed an incident in which she said Mooney
misrepresented her actions at a shooting range to discipline her.

Agent Roy Taylor testified that Mooney had told him before a sting
operation on Koverman had been carried out that Koverman was going to be
arrested.

Jack Haynes testified that it was widely known Mooney and Humphries didn't
like Koverman.

Former agent John Moran testified that lab policies weren't clear and there
was a culture of fear and cronyism inside the agency.

Koverman testified he was offered a plea agreement if he would inform on Moran.

"This is the most dysfunctional organization I've ever had anything to do
with," said Moran, who has written several papers on perceived
mismanagement at the CBI for his MBA studies at the University of Colorado.
"Some individuals in the CBI are more concerned about building empires than
making the agency better."

Much of the turmoil in the CBI might not have filtered out of an agency
increasingly known for secrecy if Koverman had not gone to trial to defend
himself. His superiors set up their case by giving him a phony drug case
and telling him to rush an analysis of the evidence. Koverman held out
eight tablets of the drug Ecstasy from the evidence.

The pills were found in a drawer at his laboratory workstation.

After initially telling his supervisors he had used those pills up in the
testing, Koverman changed his story and said he kept them out to use as
"standards" for comparison in future drug cases, something he had been
doing, with approval, for years.

He said he initially lied because he had broken an administrative rule by
not noting on a form that he had kept out the pills.

Following a six-day trial, the jury came back with a not guilty verdict
because no drugs were found on Koverman's person, in his car or at his
home. Hundreds of his cases that were reviewed did not show any
improprieties. No drugs were missing from the office standards.

Juror Darren Reed said he "absolutely" believed Koverman was targeted and
the CBI had put together a poor case. He said the jury decided Koverman's
innocence "in about five seconds" following the six-day trial.

"It seems like there are some definite issues in that office. It just seems
to me like there is some really poor management over here in Montrose. The
way they treated that guy (Koverman) was unbelievable," Reed said.

Cantwell said he views the trial as an "O.J. Simpson" event - the defense
attorney "turned it around and put the CBI on trial." He characterized the
complaints he heard after the trial as bickering from agents who are
"acting like kids." He said they would not or could not give him concrete
examples of problems. He called former agents with complaints "crybabies."

"We all sat back here and re-evaluated the Koverman case," Cantwell said.
"And I believe in my heart that what was done was right. I would do the
same thing all over."

As Koverman considers a civil lawsuit against the CBI and the agency faces
cuts in its $20 million annual budget, possible layoffs and a backlog of
evidence testing that isn't going away, the problems revealed in the trial
remain.

And they stretch back much farther than Gary Koverman's arrest.

The Fraternal Order of Police, a professional association that includes
many CBI agents in its membership, in spring considered taking a vote of no
confidence against CBI management. That vote was later dropped on the
advice of their attorneys because there were no allegations of any criminal
wrongdoing on the part of management, said an FOP member who asked not to
be named for fear of reprisal in his job.

In 1994, there was enough discontent in the Montrose office that previous
CBI director Carl Whiteside had outside consultants study the problems.

Their study found "this is an office that has a high degree of distress,
and conditions will only continue to deteriorate in every respect unless a
substantial intervention of some sort takes place."

That study showed divisions in the office and a lack of support from
management at the Denver headquarters. The study also cited a serious need
for more training.

Leo Konkel, who resigned in 1995, said the bureau, around the time of the
study, relaxed qualifications for new agents because of a budget crunch.

Five new agents sent to the Montrose office to work narcotics on the
Western Slope included a former construction worker, a shoe salesman, a
carnival barker and a landscaper.

Cantwell said part of the problem now is that he has tried to strengthen
standards for the bureau and its 50 agents. He said he wants to continue to
make it a more professional organization. And that has ruffled some feathers.

"Some of this may be my fault. I have tried to tighten up some of the
policies and procedures for the CBI," Cantwell said.

He said that last week he started what he calls "quality circles." He is
bringing agents together from each of the CBI offices to talk about how to
improve management, to deal with the coming budget cuts and to resolve
problems in the agency.

"I am trying to do what is right," Cantwell said. "Not what people want."

(SIDEBAR)

CBI HIGHLIGHTS AND LOWLIGHTS

1935-66: With the support of J. Edgar Hoover (then chief of investigations
for the Department of Justice) the Colorado legislature in 1935 begins a
long spell of drafting, then failing to pass, bills that would create a
state investigative department. The bills are defeated under heavy lobbying
by Colorado sheriffs who fear their power will be usurped.

1967: A bill finally passes to create a CBI. But the proposed new agency is
a seriously weakened version of what had originally been proposed. It is
created as a pilot program with two employees, no crime laboratory and an
annual budget of just $56,000. The first office was set up in the back of a
defunct mortuary building near the Capitol.

1968: The new agency draws criticism for not being functional because it is
severely hampered by a lack of funds and lab access.

1970: CBI Acting Director James Shumate sparks protests by blacks and is
demoted for making a racial slur during a law enforcement training session.

A grand jury in Pueblo has to be dismissed after a CBI agent improperly
questions jurors.

1971: Shumate and CBI agent William McCord are fired and agent Dean Johnson
resigns for allegedly having an improper relationship with a convicted
felon. The allegations include a tip-off from an agent about an impending
arrest.

1973: After losing appeals with the state personnel board, Shumate is
reinstated as deputy director of the CBI by a district judge who rules that
Shumate's civil rights were violated when he was fired by Director James
"Scoop" McIvor.

Thieves steal 379 pounds of marijuana from the CBI headquarters at 1370
Broadway.

1974: McIvor, a former newspaper reporter and director of the Governor's
Council on Crime Control, weathers allegations that he improperly took a
trip to Rome paid for by Sperry Univac Corp., the company that was
supplying new computers to the CBI.

1980: The Colorado Department of Local Affairs forms a special team to
investigate allegations of serious mismanagement in the CBI's computer
center, computer-filing system and the Medicare Fraud Unit. The
investigation comes after an earlier state study shows "chaos" in attempts
to install a new computer system. That led to a massive backlog of evidence.

1984: CBI Director John Ray Enright is forced to resign after his superiors
attack his management style. He is paid $31,000 to act as consultant in
picking a new director but says a year later that he was never contacted
for advice by the state agency doing the hiring.

1985: Neil Maloney is appointed director of the CBI after he was demoted
and later fired as chief of the Washington State Patrol. He quickly causes
controversy when he orders his lab agents to stop wearing guns.

1986: The CBI is criticized for publicly releasing reports on organized
crime in the state. Police officials in Colorado Springs and Denver allege
that the bureau released erroneous information to obtain more funding.

Maloney strips 20 CBI lab technicians of their authority to make arrests
after an independent evaluation of the agency's crime lab shows serious
deficiencies, including backlogged cases and lax supervision.

1987: The legislature considers cutting state funding for the bureau, which
has a turnaround time of 100 days for routine lab work on evidence. The
legislature also considers a plan that would eliminate the 22 investigative
field agents and retain only the crime laboratory. The legislature orders
Maloney to transfer two agents to the Western Slope after Maloney uses
money appropriated for those positions to pay salaries of Denver agents.

Maloney resigns after Gov. Roy Romer says he has serious concerns about
management of the agency. A state audit turns up examples of serious
mismanagement and deepening morale problems within the agency and
increasing turf battles between the CBI and local law enforcement agencies.

1988: Carl Whiteside, who was promoted to director in 1987, is arrested a
second time for DUI while driving a state car. His blood alcohol level is
three times over the legal limit. He spends a week in jail.

1994: A year-long backlog in the fingerprint-identification computer system
at the CBI is blamed for a Texas murderer's being free for 15 years, 12 of
those in Denver.

The CBI hires a psychologist and a former Colorado State Patrol supervisor
to study morale and operational problems in the CBI's Montrose office.

1995: The input of DNA evidence in state sex offenders databases becomes
seriously backlogged.

1998: A state audit shows that a dozen criminals slipped through the CBI's
screening process for day care workers because of a CBI backlog in that
database.

1999: Bob Cantwell, chief of staff for the Colorado Department of
Corrections and a former bodyguard for Elvis Presley, is named director
when Whiteside resigns.

2002: Local law enforcement agencies express frustration over backlogs in
the CBI laboratories.