THE AFGHAN POPPY TRADE

Canadian and other NATO troops will face greater dangers as a result
of the Afghan government's pursuit of poppy eradication in southern
areas where the Taliban are strongest, government authority is
weakest and the farmers have no alternative sources of income. It is
not in the strategic interests of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's forces for Kabul to target opium production at a time
when the region remains so unstable. Yet the Afghan government, under
pressure from U.S. drug enforcement officials, has launched this
ill-advised program without considering the economic fallout or the
military ramifications.

Washington has long pursued a strategy of eradication in its war on
illicit drugs, but that strategy has rarely proved successful, even
in more stable environments where growers could switch to legal
crops. A U.S. company, DynCorp, which specializes in military
contract work, has been hired to destroy Afghan fields without
apparent regard for the military situation or the needs of NATO commanders.

Already, Britain has ordered that an additional battalion of 600
paratroopers be placed on standby for deployment to Afghanistan to
cope with an expected surge in fighting in Helmand province once the
government launches its eradication program in the south in December
and January. Helmand accounts for more than a quarter of
Afghanistan's entire annual crop. But other parts of the south are
also producing poppies, mainly because the soil is too poor and the
farms too tiny to grow much else -- and nothing that comes close to
the value of the poppy crop. Britain was hard-pressed to come up with
the additional battalion. Canada has no extra troops to spare.

Fuelled by endemic corruption, lawlessness, ineffective
reconstruction and the growing Taliban insurgency, Afghanistan has
become a drug trafficker's paradise. The country is by far the
world's biggest supplier of opium poppies, with production up by
close to 60 per cent in the past year alone. Afghan growers now
account for more than 90 per cent of the global supply, which is
converted into more heroin than is needed to meet worldwide demand.
No one questions the need to curb this deadly business. But the
Afghan government is making a serious mistake. Its previous assaults
on the country's most important export crop have all proved futile,
because they have not been linked to an effective economic strategy
that would give the growers a viable alternative. That remains the case today.

Destroying southern poppy fields raises the risk of more intense
battles with the Taliban, who derive a chunk of their income from
protecting drug kingpins and their operations. The Taliban will also
have a bigger supply of potential recruits among poor farmers
desperate to feed their families. Fighting for the Taliban puts money
in their pockets.

There are alternatives to eradication that both Kabul and U.S. drug
enforcement officials should be considering. The most obvious is to
buy the opium output directly from the farmers, making their cash
crops legal. There is a huge global shortage of morphine, codeine and
other legal opiates, particularly in the Third World. The World
Health Organization estimates that 80 per cent of the world's
population has no access to the painkillers needed to battle cancer
and other diseases. Afghan growers could actually increase their
output, the drug middlemen could be driven from the market and there
would no longer be a demand for Taliban protectors.

Surely that makes more sense than a strategy that is utterly divorced
from the needs of Afghanistan's rural communities and adds needless
extra risk to an already tough military task.