AIR FORCE MAY HAVE A BITTER PILL TO SWALLOW IN 'FRIENDLY FIRE' INCIDENT

Stimulant Use By Pilots Is Focus Of Inquiry Into The Deaths Of Canadians In
Afghanistan.

WASHINGTON -- The Air Force calls them "go pills," and that is what they
do: keep pilots going in the air long after their tired minds and bodies
would have preferred to fall asleep.

The stimulants have been used by fliers since World War II, and were doled
out by the hundreds during the Persian Gulf War and in Afghanistan. But the
practice is coming under new scrutiny in the investigation of two F-16
pilots who were taking Air Force-provided amphetamines when they mistook a
midnight training exercise for hostile fire and bombed a gathering of
Canadian soldiers.

Four Canadians were killed in the April incident, and eight others were
wounded. The Air Force has taken the unprecedented step of pursuing
criminal charges against the pilots, Maj. Harry Schmidt and Maj. William
Umbach; each faces as long as 64 years in prison.

But if the case proceeds beyond a scheduled Jan. 13 preliminary hearing,
the Air Force could find many of its own practices also on trial, including
its distribution of drugs that are banned in commercial aviation.

A lawyer for one of the pilots said this week that he intends to argue that
the airmen's judgments were impaired by repeated use of amphetamines
prescribed by Air Force doctors in Afghanistan -- drugs, he said, that
would cost the pilots their jobs if they were caught using them behind the
wheel of a car instead of in an F-16.

"Were these pilots' perceptions affected by their use of dextroamphetamine?
I don't know," said Charles Gittins, a Virginia attorney and former naval
flight officer representing one of the pilots who bombed the Canadians.
"But we're going to present it and let the [court] decide."

A Pentagon investigation of the bombing ruled out the use of stimulants as
a factor, concluding instead that the pilots were guilty of "reckless"
behavior and violated rules of engagement.

Experts say Gittins could have a hard time connecting the pilots' fateful
mistake to the influence of a relatively small dose of dextroamphetamine.
Even he acknowledges that the drugs aren't at the heart of his case.

Instead, he said, the accidental bombing was the result of a series of
breakdowns, including the failure of the Air Force to notify the two
pilots, both members of the Illinois National Guard, that there were
training exercises in the area.

But the level of attention surrounding the case is calling attention to the
Air Force's little-known drug policies. Some say that if the Air Force were
forced to change those policies, it also would change the nature of its
pilots' missions.

Many in the service see the use of stimulants as a prerequisite for
nightlong fighter patrols and transoceanic bombing runs that are mainstays
of the modern aerial campaign.

"They're used because pilots are sometimes required to fly missions that
exceed 10 to 12 hours," said Col. Alvina Mitchell, an Air Force spokeswoman.

"Or they're [used for] missions that are scheduled during time when pilots
would ordinarily be sleeping."

Mitchell stressed that use of the pills is voluntary, safe and monitored
closely by Air Force surgeons, who prescribe them only after testing
pilots' reactions to them on the ground.

The Air Force has never attributed a crash or other accident to the use of
stimulants, she said. But, she said, "fatigue has been cited as a
contributing cause in nearly 100 mishaps."

The military has a long and uneasy history of experimenting with stimulants
as a means of enhancing the performance or endurance of its fighters.
Histories of World War II indicate widespread use by German and U.S.
troops. But pilots' use of amphetamines expanded dramatically during the
1991 Persian Gulf War, when pilots struggled to adapt to that conflict's
largely nocturnal schedule.

Fliers were given "go" pills to keep them awake for night missions, and
"no-go" pills, or sedatives, to help them sleep through the din and desert
sun on base during the day.

Surveys show that roughly half of U.S. fighter pilots took amphetamines
during the Desert Storm campaign. Some commanders were so alarmed by many
pilots' growing addiction to the pills that they ordered subordinates not
to use them.

Because of such concerns, the Air Force banned the use of the pills that
year. But the decision was reversed in 1996, Mitchell said, because
officials thought the pills could help pilots during lengthy missions in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Serb province of Kosovo in Yugoslavia.

The Navy also forbade the use of stimulants during the 1990s, but lifted
the ban in 1999. The policy now leaves the decision to unit commanders. But
Navy officials said only a tiny fraction of Navy pilots use the pills,
partly because their missions tend to be shorter than those of Air Force
pilots.

"A long flight for us is six to eight hours," said one Navy officer, who
asked not to be identified. Besides, he said, "Do you want to land on an
aircraft carrier at night on amphetamines?"

The drug distributed by the Air Force is commonly known by its brand name
Dexedrine. It is primarily used to treat hyperactivity in children and
narcolepsy, a disorder in which patients fall asleep suddenly. The drug is
produced by United Kingdom-based GlaxoSmithKline.

The company's literature warns that the drug has a "high potential for
abuse" and "may impair the ability of the patient to engage in potentially
hazardous activities such as operating machinery or vehicles."

But experts concerning the use of amphetamines say the drugs are effective
and generally safe when administered carefully. One likened the small doses
distributed by the Air Force to cups of coffee.

"Amphetamines can show the same effects as low doses of caffeine," said
Mark Rosekind, former director of fatigue studies at NASA's Ames Research
facility in Mountain View, Calif. "When you use it right, it's helpful.
When you take it too much, you get jittery."

The individual doses taken by the two Air Force pilots involved in the
"friendly fire" incident -- between 5 milligrams and 10 milligrams -- are
relatively small, he said. But the effect of the drug on the pilots would
depend on how many doses they had taken in preceding weeks.

The pilots each had been in Afghanistan for more than a month before the
strike, according to an investigation of the incident by U.S. Central Command.

Both "had complained about the 24-hour nature of the operations," the
Central Command report said. "Both ... had been prescribed go and no-go
pills for use in combating fatigue and in adjusting to the new time zones
in the deployed region."

Each had taken a dose during the flight, which was shaping up as a
relatively uneventful night in the skies over Afghanistan until Schmidt saw
what he described as "fireworks" as they passed south of Kandahar.

The flashes were from Canadian troops engaged in a live-fire exercise at a
former Al Qaeda training camp. But Schmidt and his superior, Umbach,
believed they were under attack.

Schmidt, who taught at the Navy's elite "Top Gun" fighter pilot school,
asked permission to strafe the ground with his cannon. He was told to hold
fire and stand by, but instead he moved lower. After further flashes, he
said he was "rolling in in self-defense" and, with a call of "bombs away,"
released a 500-pound, laser-guided munition.

A moment later, a ground commander warned that "Kandahar has friendlies"
and to get the F-16s "out of there." By then it was too late.

Schmidt and Umbach both have been charged with four counts of manslaughter
and eight counts of assault -- the first time such charges have been
leveled against pilots for actions in wartime. The upcoming hearing at
Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana is to determine whether they will
face courts-martial.