FAKE-DRUG FUROR SPLITS POLICE, PROSECUTORS

Mistrust, frustration linger as agencies' accounts conflict

The early days of Dallas' fake-drug scandal caught top-level police
and prosecutors off guard, but in public they appeared united to solve
the problem.

More than 15 months later, this united front has crumbled amid an FBI
investigation that led to an undercover narcotics officer's indictment
Friday. Three former paid Dallas Police Department informants already
have pleaded guilty to civil rights charges.

For the first time, key players in each agency agreed to describe what
was going on behind the scenes as the fake-drug scandal unfolded.
Their accounts conflict in many areas, pointing to increasing friction
between the agencies and even mistrust among top officials.
Prosecutors and police officials say they can still work together
effectively. Police officials are speaking out now in response to
comments from prosecutors.

The district attorney's office now says that police knew much earlier
than they have ever publicly let on that the main informant -- Enrique
Alonso -- lied in at least one drug case. Prosecutors believe police
tried to use that revelation to justify not turning over records that
the district attorney needed to help identify affected cases. A police
supervisor said he does not recall the conversation.

They also disagree about who asked for what information and
when.

"We were contacting DPD from the time we got the first no-dope lab
test or just trace amounts, and we continued to contact them as the
lab tests would come in," First Assistant District Attorney Mike
Carnes said.

Police Lt. Craig Miller, a narcotics unit supervisor, said: "If I had
been notified that one rock was fake and that an informant was duping
us perhaps or that there was something askew, it would have rang a red
bell." Also Online

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Critics say the scandal developed into a perfect storm that has hit the
Dallas criminal justice system. Corrupt informants scammed police officers.
Prosecutors pleaded out cases without seeking drug tests for seized
substances. Defense lawyers didn't challenge the evidence.

It was one of the most embarrassing episodes in Dallas police history. Vast
amounts of seized drugs turned out to be billiards chalk. At least a dozen
people -- mostly Spanish-speaking immigrants -- went to jail on bad charges.
Prosecutors later dismissed more than 80 cases tainted by two officers and
their informants.

The six-count indictment against fired Dallas police Senior Cpl. Mark
Delapaz addresses allegations of criminal wrongdoing but does not answer
broader questions of accountability beyond that officer.

If lawyers for the wrongly charged immigrants can prove that police ignored
or covered up warning signs that the informants were crooked, then the city
- -- and taxpayers -- could face liability, said Don Tittle, an attorney who
has filed a federal civil rights lawsuit.

"It appears they [police] had direct knowledge of problems with this
particular group of informants, and yet they continued to use them," Mr.
Tittle said.

Frustrations

During an editorial board meeting with The Dallas Morning News, District
Attorney Bill Hill recently hinted that he distrusted top-level Police
Department officials. He expressed frustration with what he believes was
Police Chief Terrell Bolton's slow response to the scandal.

He said prosecutors repeatedly called the department asking why it was
taking so long to get requested documents, which finally arrived about four
months later. The reply was always: "Check's in the mail," Mr. Hill said.

Chief Bolton, in a separate editorial board meeting, insisted that "we don't
stall at the Dallas Police Department." He also vowed to take appropriate
action when the time comes.

The scandal's fallout has left top managers at the Police Department and the
district attorney's office at odds.

Lt. Miller, who temporarily supervised the street squad at the center of the
FBI investigation, acknowledged it took a "considerable amount of time" for
officials to realize the scope of the problem. But he insisted the Police
Department acted as swiftly as possible.

"We didn't drop the ball," Lt. Miller said.

Notification

Lt. Miller was a contact between the Police Department and prosecutors as
the scandal evolved. He said a fax from the district attorney's office in
late November 2001 served as the department's first "official" notification
of eight problematic cases. A fax about a ninth case came days later, he
said.

"Were there conversations that took place in the hallways? There may have
been," he said. "Could they be corroborated? Not to my qualifications they
can't. ... If I felt the sky was falling, I would reduce it to writing as
soon as I could."

In response, Mr. Carnes said his office handled the matter by phone and in
person -- as they routinely do with the 63 agencies that file cases to them
- -- because prosecutors don't view police departments as adversaries.

"We're never asked to put our requests in writing, nor have we," he said.
"If everything was to be put in writing, how did the CI [confidential
informant] files show up in our office [in January 2002] without a written
request? How did we get those and the [detectives'] daily activity reports?"

Mr. Carnes said the Police Department waited months to respond to
prosecutors' requests for information to help them identify tainted cases.
He said his office notified police as problems arose and prosecutors
dismissed cases in September, October and November 2001.

In addition, he said, police automatically receive laboratory reports from
each drug case filed -- so they should have known about the problematic
cases before prosecutors warned them.

"Ten [narcotics] cases had been dismissed by then [the end of November],"
Mr. Carnes said. "Ten cases dismissed would be important to a police
department. When we dismiss one big case, the police department in that case
is always very interested in the reasons why."

Mr. Carnes also said for the first time that in early January 2002 -- as
prosecutors pressed for police documents -- Lt. Miller called prosecutors to
say that the main informant, Mr. Alonso, had admitted lying on one narcotics
case. Mr. Carnes said his office thought that the Police Department no
longer considered it necessary to turn over records.

"Our response was, 'We still want the CI files,' " Mr. Carnes said. "We
didn't see how that should end the whole thing. We were trying to determine
the number and identify the cases that the DA's office had that he was
involved in."

Lt. Miller said he does not recall the conversation.

The revelation about Mr. Alonso came days after Chief Bolton held a New
Year's Eve 2001 news conference to praise officers and the informant for
taking fake drugs off the streets. Chief Bolton told reporters that he was
notified only the week before that there were questions about several
narcotics cases and he vowed to look into the matter. He said the department
had no information indicating that the informant was not "aboveboard."

"Based on the information I have, I have a confidential informant that knows
how to find drugs or poison," the chief said at the time. "He's very good at
it."

In recent interviews, police and prosecutors disagreed over when police
supervisors should have been contacted and by whom.

Mr. Carnes said when the lab tests showed in September 2001 that there were
no drugs in what were thought to be major scores, prosecutors dealt with
Cpl. Delapaz because his cases were affected. He and his partner, Officer
Eddie Herrera, were put on paid leave in January 2002. Cpl. Delapaz was
fired Friday.

Mr. Carnes declined to give the officer's explanation for the cocaine cases
that were turning up with fake evidence, citing the ongoing FBI
investigation.

The district attorney's office quit dealing with Cpl. Delapaz in mid-October
2001 after the crime lab reported that a methamphetamine case also contained
fake drugs. At that time prosecutors began trying to contact Lt. Miller.

"You don't call in a supervisor until you see you have a real problem," Mr.
Carnes said. "Delapaz was telling our people that he was keeping his
supervisors posted. When the meth case turned up, Delapaz's credibility was
at issue."

Lt. Miller said he questions why prosecutors did not immediately contact
supervisors: "If they're dealing with Delapaz on a deal that is of a
multi-kilo nature . that sure seems like it warrants notifying a
supervisor."

Lt. Miller became involved in mid-to late October after Lt. Bill Turnage was
promoted to deputy chief over northeast patrol operations. Lt. Miller took
over temporary supervision of the street squad to which Cpl. Delapaz and
Officer Herrera were assigned.

"I don't know what Chief Turnage knew," Lt. Miller said. "I barely knew
Delapaz and Herrera. When people came to me asking me things, I said, 'Let
me look into it.' "

Prosecutors said they were raising red flags from the start, but police
dispute that.

Mr. Carnes said prosecutors first spoke with Lt. Miller on Oct. 26, 2001,
asking him for help in identifying cases involving two police officers and
their informants.

According to Lt. Miller, the prosecutor expressed no sense of urgency: "They
call me and tell me, 'Hey, we'd like to talk to you about some different
things, primarily dealing with the [field] testing.' "

In multiple fake-drug cases, field tests performed by officers at crime
scenes indicated that seized substances were illegal drugs. More
sophisticated lab tests later showed the substances to contain little or no
narcotics.

Prosecutors say that in late October 2001, Lt. Miller called to say police
had prohibited Mr. Alonso from working cases. Mr. Carnes said prosecutors
asked whether the Police Department had concerns with the informant's
credibility. He said Lt. Miller told them that police didn't think it was
appropriate to use Mr. Alonso because he was under investigation.

Lt. Miller disagreed with the timing, saying he thinks the conversation
occurred in early November.

It's unclear why the department did not open an internal investigation of
officers when concerns about the informant first arose. Lt. Miller declined
to comment, citing the FBI investigation. A police timeline shows that
payments to the informant were suspended in November 2001.

If the Police Department pulled Mr. Alonso from duty in late October 2001,
that would contradict information the officers gave in response to a civil
lawsuit. They stated that an unidentified supervisor ordered them to
continue using the informant after an Oct. 12 lie-detector test. The results
have not been given to prosecutors despite their requests.

Another contradiction

Meanwhile, prosecutors and police also contradict each other about the
purpose of a Nov. 20, 2001, meeting at the Southwestern Institute of
Forensic Sciences.

"We're really discussing at that point how we're conducting our drug
testing," Lt. Miller said.

Mr. Carnes disputed Lt. Miller's characterization of the meeting: "When we
were out at the lab, it wasn't because we had an academic interest in how
the field tests were conducted. It was serious," he said.

Eight days later Lt. Miller received a fax from prosecutor Gregg Long, who
supervised the drug courts at the time. That "official notification"
concerning specific cases led police to open an internal affairs inquiry of
Cpl. Delapaz and Officer Herrera on Nov. 30, records show.

Because there appeared to be possible criminal wrongdoing, the case went to
the public integrity unit, which began its investigation Dec. 3, Lt. Miller
said.

Mr. Carnes said prosecutors sorted through thousands of cases, reviewing any
that involved the two officers. But without the names of their informants or
any other identifiers, they couldn't determine the extent of the problem,
Mr. Carnes said.

"It's only when we received the CI [confidential informant] files that we
discovered they [the police department] had all that information at their
fingertips -- but we didn't get it until the 11th of January," he said.

Mr. Carnes said prosecutors quickly spotted problems with the Police
Department's record keeping. Mr. Carnes said the appearance of the
informants' signatures varied in several cases, but he couldn't say for sure
that they were forged. Mr. Hill called in the FBI shortly thereafter.

More than a year and a half later, managers at the two agencies say hard
feelings over the scandal have not affected the ability of front-line
officers and prosecutors to work together.

"We have to have a relationship," Lt. Miller said. "It's all of our goals to
stick bad guys in jail."

Mr. Carnes said, "They've been cooperating, and I think the partnership is
sound."