NEW LABEL, OLD PROBLEM

Will NATO Make Afghanistan Secure?

For the first time in its 54-year history, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has taken on a mission outside Europe, and it's a tough one:
Afghanistan. In theory it could turn out well both for NATO, which has been
internally at odds over the war in Iraq and has yet to redefine its
post-Cold War role, and for Afghanistan, which badly needs both greater
security and a major push to develop its economy.

But whether that will happen is far from certain.

That NATO is taking over command of the International Security and
Assistance Force in Afghanistan, which until now has been led by various
countries on a rotating basis, is no guarantee that the country will be
more secure.

Until now, neither the United States nor any other power has agreed to
expand the 4,800-member ISAF's size and its mission beyond Kabul, the
Afghan capital.

Now there are hints from Washington that that could change once the
transition in Kabul is complete.

One must hope so; without security it will be impossible to build a truly
national government and a viable economy.

In the face of lagging progress toward those ends, the White House also
appears ready to release another $1 billion in reconstruction aid to
Afghanistan -- still well under what Congress has approved but far more
than it has spent so far -- and will seek $600 million from other
countries. That would help. But security and reconstruction go hand in
hand. The money can only produce fruitful results if the reconstruction
process can proceed in safety, which it now cannot in some areas. Outside
Kabul, banditry is rife and human rights abuses are frequent.

In some cases the abuses are committed by Afghan police and soldiers who,
receiving no wages, turn to robbery and extortion.

There's also a resurgence in opium poppy production, yielding huge profits
for local warlords, who also impose taxes and keep them. U.S. authorities,
and the central government, have tolerated these abuses, however
reluctantly. Corruption and banditry also partly account for long delays in
planned public works projects, most critically construction of a major
highway from Kabul to Kandahar, an indispensable part of a badly needed
national transport network.

To stabilize and unify Afghanistan will require a major infusion of funds,
an expanded mission for the international force and the political will to
make it happen.

The Bush administration is spending $10 billion a year on a separate U.S.
force of 9,000 troops tracking down Taliban and al-Qaida terrorist bands in
areas along the border with Pakistan. More must be done on a broader scale,
and if hints from U.S. officials that that may happen are followed by
strong action, the hopes generated by the U.S. military victory over the
Taliban, and the pledges of more than $5 billion in aid promised by the
international community, may again be justified.

Otherwise, putting a NATO label on the security force in Afghanistan would
be no more than cosmetic.