TIME IS RIPE TO OVERHAUL CITY'S DRUG WAR

When you're trying to survive a maelstrom of criticism and
controversy, it's a little difficult to see the moment as an
opportunity for constructive change.

But that's just the opportunity that Police Chief Richard Pennington
has. He should use it to rewrite his department's strategy on drug
interdiction.

Pennington will get less resistance from tradition-bound police
officers if he moves now, while the public outcry over the shooting
death of 88-year-old Kathryn Johnston is still at full volume.
Without the tragedy - in which plainclothes police burst into the
home of a frightened old woman, who shot at the intruders and was
then killed - narcotics officers, especially, would likely protest
any shift that precluded use of their favored cowboy tactics.

So the unfortunate episode gives Pennington some maneuvering room. He
and his zone commanders should institute a strategy that a) places
more emphasis on arrests of significant dealers, those whose drug
sales amount to several thousand dollars a year; b) shuts down crack
houses and other locations that become magnets not just for drug
sales but also for other crimes; and c) goes after drug dealers who
also engage in violent crimes.

While they're at it, they should also limit their use of no-knock
warrants to dire emergencies. (Most dire emergencies don't even
require a warrant; if police believe someone is injured or in harm's
way inside a home, they may enter.) Catching a small-time dealer with
a few bags of marijuana or crack cocaine doesn't constitute an
emergency, much less a dire one.

It's not that the Atlanta Police Department's focus on petty dealers
is unusual.

Across the country, law enforcement agencies have played a numbers
game, complimenting themselves for driving up arrests and convictions
of low-level dealers, many of them addicts themselves. New dealers
immediately replace the old ones. Meanwhile, the major players, the
kingpins, go about their lucrative business as usual. It's rare that
a local police agency, acting on its own, brings down a captain of
the drug trade.

Some criminologists argue that arresting low-level dealers is an
essential part of the "broken-windows" strategy, which theorizes that
focusing on minor crimes - vandalism, subway-fare-jumping, stealing
porch furniture - prevents a criminal element from taking hold. That
theory holds that neighborhoods begin to deteriorate when minor
lawbreakers are emboldened by their ability to get away with their
crimes and graduate to major offenses.

To prevent that, the theory goes, police must stop the small crimes -
including sales of nickel ($5) bags of crack.

But not if it means breaking down a homeowner's door in the middle of
the night.

The risks, including the danger to police themselves, far outweigh
any advantages. If Johnston had had only slightly better aim, one or
more police officers might also have been killed.

That's not worth it.

Better to concentrate on the crimes that are visible or that disrupt
neighborhoods. In many down-at-the-heels areas, law-abiding neighbors
complain vociferously about the presence of houses where drug sales
are continuous, bringing constant traffic, noise and violent
criminals. (Johnston's neighbors have said there are one or more such
houses in her neighborhood.) But a stakeout over one or two days is
usually enough to produce compelling evidence for a warrant to search
those places.

Moreover, civil laws governing code violations have been used
frequently to shut down such establishments. That tactic may take a
little longer, but it's more effective over the long haul.

So far, Pennington has made all the right moves to deal with the
crisis stemming from Johnston's death.

He has initiated a multijurisdictional investigation of the bungled
drug raid; he has placed his entire narcotics squad on administrative
leave, with pay, pending the outcome; he has appeared at several
public meetings to answer questions - and draw not-so-friendly fire -
about police tactics. He has also promised to review the department's
use of no-knock search warrants.

But he should take this opportunity to entirely rethink his
department's approach to the so-called war on drugs.

He has the chance to create a policy that is more effective in
targeting violent criminals and major drug traffickers, while
decreasing the risks to law-abiding citizens and officers alike.

The old tactics have made no discernible difference in disrupting the
drug trade, so what's he got to lose?