IN THE FIELDS OF THE WARLORDS

U.S. Efforts, Supported By Canada, To Eradicate Afghanistan's Poppy
Production Are Turning Farmers Against The Coalition. As A Result,
According To One European Think-Tank, Canadian Soldiers' Lives Are At
Greater Risk.

Each morning by 4 a.m., Attah Mohammad is working his field, farming
wheat or onions, depending on the season. At 10 a.m., he rests for an
hour and a half, then returns to his two-acre farm for another 10 or
11 hours. Even after all those back-breaking hours, Mr. Mohammad, who
is in his mid-fifties, can't be sure there'll be enough food to feed
his wife or 11 children. Mr. Mohammad's wheat and onions bring him
about 22 cents a kilogram. But where he lives, in Panshar,
Afghanistan, the cash crop is poppies. The opium derived from poppies
and destined for the illicit drug trade, is worth about $155 per
kilogram to the farmers.

"The people who cultivate poppies, their lives are much better than
mine," says Mr. Mohammad through a translator. "They have their own
food, they eat three meals in the day and they have everything that
I'm not having. If I find something for lunch, then I'm not finding
for dinner."

Mr. Mohammad isn't the only one suffering from the U.S. government's
efforts to eradicate poppy production in Afghanistan. According to
one European think-tank, Canadian soldiers are among those endangered
by the ongoing war between farmers trying to eke out a living,
powerful drug warlords suspected of funding a violent insurgency, and
a government trying to stabilize its country.

The Senlis Council, a Paris-based defence policy research group,
released a contentious report last week detailing how "Canadian
troops and Afghan civilians are paying with their lives for Canada's
adherence to the U.S. government's failing military and
counter-narcotics policies in Kandahar," and noting that "following
U.S. policies is turning Kandahar into a suicide mission for Canada."

While the Canadian government officially supports the eradication,
the Canadian Forces aren't involved in the process. But they're
having a hard time convincing the locals of that, which, the council
says, is part of the problem.

The solution, says the report, is to help Afghanistan set up a legal
drug trade, growing opium poppies and converting them into pain relievers.

On its surface, the plan makes some sense: the report, a feasibility
study on opium licensing in Afghanistan, says that there is a
shortage of legal opiates in the developing world -- namely, codeine
and morphine, which are used for pain control both after surgery and
with seriously ill patients. The Senlis Council wants Afghanistan to
set up processing facilities so that the crops grown there can be
turned into much-needed medicine, meaning more jobs for an economy
that currently relies on the illegal opiate trade for more than half
of its income.

Most of all, allowing farmers to continue to grow poppies means that
they will earn more than they would with substitution crops such as wheat.

The council's researchers spent months interviewing farmers, security
officials and other locals, and concluded that eradicating poppy
fields means financial ruin for farmers. As a result, as coalition
soldiers protect the Afghan government contractors tearing up the
poppy fields, the local population turns to the insurgency for help.

"(The) Taliban used to be seen as oppressors, and they are now seen
more and more as protectors," says Emmanuel Reinert, the council's
executive director. "Foreign troops used to be seen as liberators,
and now they're seen more and more as invaders.

"The level of hostility to foreign troops is extremely high."

The council, which has an office in Kabul, says that its proposal
would allow the farmers a legitimate source of income and eliminate
some of the world's supply of illegal heroin. Estimates suggest 4,000
tonnes of opium worth $3.4 billion were smuggled out of Afghanistan
last year alone.

The council's report has drawn its share of critics, including
Canada's Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Rick Hillier, who suggested the
Senlis Council lacked the credibility to draw such conclusions.

"One of the thing that I found when I was the commander on
international operations was the most dangerous thing of all was the
individual who visited the theatre of operations for 48 hours and
then left as instant experts with the solution to everything, which
invariably was wrong," he said.

"We don't have everything right in Afghanistan. We know that. Each
day we change the way we do business just a little bit, and we'll
continue to do that until the day we come home from that mission."

The Vienna-based International Narcotics Control Board, an
independent body that implements the United Nations' drug-control
conventions, was also critical of the report, noting that the
council's recommendations won't work until the security situation in
Afghanistan changes.

"You take one step out of Kabul and it's like the Wild West," says
Saul Takahashi, a drug control officer with the INCB. "(The plan is)
just not feasible and it won't be feasible in the near future."

The council disagrees, though, explaining that the local community
leaders, if they come on-side, have enough sway to ensure security.

"It's not total anarchy in the countryside," says Mr. Reinert. "It's
not the order we want, but in the rural communities, there is very
strong social order."

Mr. Reinert adds that the need for legal opiates in the developing
world is growing, and that a system should be in place to ensure they
get there.

But the idea of selling legal drugs to Third World countries leads
critics to point out another potential problem: whether those who
need the painkillers could afford them.

"Unless you were able to guarantee (farmers) were going to receive
.. a price close to what they already get, then obviously it's all
going to fall flat on its face," says Ross Coomber, an academic at
the University of Plymouth in England who studies illegal drug
markets and substitution policies.

Peter Reuter, director of the University of Maryland's Center on the
Economics of Crime and Justice Policy, adds that there is too much
opportunity for farmers to double dip.

"The Afghan farmers can plant lots more opium," he said. "They might
well produce for the licit market, (but) why would that reduce the
amount they sold into the illicit market?"

With Afghanistan supplying the world with 4,000 tonnes of opium a
year -- enough to refine about 400 tonnes of morphine -- it alone
produces enough opium to more than satisfy worldwide demand for
opiate-based pain relievers. Mr. Takahashi believes that the excess
would end up diverted to the illicit market.

Plus, he says, even countries such as India, which is licensed for
legal production, end up with some of their product diverted to the
black market.

"That's in a country where they put in a lot of effort and a lot of
resources to make sure that this is controlled in an adequate
manner," he says. "In Afghanistan, it's just not going to happen for
a long while."

Still, the Senlis Council wants the chance to experiment with pilot programs.

"Right now, 100 per cent of the crop is diverted into the heroin
market. Even if it's not perfect, it can only be better," says Mr. Reinert.

Moreover, he adds, letting the farmers maintain their crops will
improve the security situation, as local communities start to trust
the coalition forces and stop supporting the insurgency.

"It's a way to break the vicious circle, to bring the problem to a
more manageable level. If you say you cannot start because
Afghanistan is not secure, it will never be secure."

Mr. Mohammad, the farmer who says he won't be able to feed his family
without growing opium poppies, would like to see the international
community support the Senlis Council's proposal.

"I cannot tell you about the politics," he says.

"But this is going to support the Afghan economy and farmers and also
bring peace and stability."