Soldiering On

CALDERON'S OWN 'SURGE' IN MEXICO

War Against Drug Trafficking Needs To Be Broader Than A Military Buildup

Who would have thought that Felipe Calderon, Mexico's mild-mannered,
wonkish and uncharismatic president, would morph into an action hero?
Clad in military fatigues, at the helm of an increasingly active and
visible army, Calderon has declared an all-out war against Mexico's
two main scourges: drug trafficking and the organized crime networks
it has spawned. This is a bold move and one fraught with risk. If
Calderon wins, he will strengthen his presidency and ensure Mexico's
long-term stability and national security. If he loses, he could imperil both.

Calderon has little choice but to act. Mexico is growing increasingly
lawless, and his presidency began in a weakened state because of a
contentious election and its divisive aftermath. He must prove that
he can establish the authority many Mexicans believe he didn't gain
legitimately, and use it to govern in an effective way. In a country
in which 1,500 people per year are killed in drug-related violence,
security is the top priority for most Mexicans. Years of government
inaction under former President Vicente Fox have left key
institutions infiltrated with cartel accomplices, hundreds of police
officers dead, scores of judges assassinated and dozens of
journalists missing. During the Fox administration, Mexico turned
into a more violent country than Colombia; Calderon's task is to
recover lost ground and clean it up.

This will not be easy because the surge of drug trafficking in Mexico
reflects a painful paradox:

The government's drug enforcement efforts are undermined by the
corrupting influence of the drug trade, yet the drug trade cannot
survive without the protection of compromised elements within the government.

Cocaine traffickers spend as much as $500 million on bribery, which
is more than double the budget of the Mexican attorney general's
office. As a result, it frequently becomes difficult to tell the good
guys from the bad guys.

Police regularly play dual roles:

They act as drug enforcers and as protectors of the smugglers.
Violent conflicts routinely erupt between police operating as law
enforcers and police acting as lawbreakers.

So it's no wonder that as part of Operation Tijuana -- the Calderon
crackdown that made headlines this month -- local police were forced
to relinquish their weapons.

In the face of police corruption, Calderon has turned to the military
to take on the antidrug effort -- 3,300 army, navy and federal
officers took part in Operation Tijuana.

But moving soldiers -- who are separate from the federal police --
around the country at will is a cause for concern, and not just
because of potential human rights violations. As a result of its
expanded role, the military is becoming the supreme authority -- in
some cases the only authority -- in parts of some states. And greater
militarization frequently leads to corruption.

When cartel leader Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman escaped from jail
several years ago, it is believed that generals helped him do so. So
using the military as a roving cleanup force may solve some
short-term image problems, but it also creates other, intractable ones.

Calderon hopes to overcome the corrupting influence of the drug trade
by creating a new national police force as well as a special antidrug
division, similar to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. He
believes that with greater resources and more autonomy, those in
charge of combating crime will not end up succumbing to it.

But setting up a new agency and extending its reach will not be
enough. Calderon needs to deal with Mexico's culture of illegality
and pervasive impunity.

Over the past decade, Mexico's transition to democratic rule has cast
a glaring light on the country's limited rule of law. Often judges,
prosecutors and state officials have been unable to withstand the
corrupting influence of the drug trade, a $7 billion-a-year business.
And the credibility of public institutions has suffered when those
proved guilty have eluded punishment.

So, while Calderon's efforts are to be applauded, they must also be
accompanied by comprehensive measures that entail more than soldiers
on the streets and photo-ops of the president dressed in olive green.
The prospects for a stable, less insecure Mexico will be contingent
on Calderon's capacity to enact a major overhaul of the country's
judiciary and law enforcement apparatus. In other words, he needs to
fight not only drug traffickers but the political networks that protect them.

If Calderon's "surge" is unable to rein in drug-related violence and
bring its perpetrators to justice, even after using the army as an
instrument of last resort, drug lords and their allies will know that
the president's hand is weak -- and that his efforts are too little, too late.