MEXICO'S MULTI-FRONT WAR ON DRUGS

The New President Must Win a Formidable Fight Against Rampant Drug
Trafficking, or Risk Making the Problem Worse.

WHO WOULD have thought that Felipe Calderon, Mexico's mild-mannered,
wonkish and uncharismatic president, would morph into an action hero?
Clad in military fatigues, at the helm of an increasingly active and
visible army, Calderon has declared an all-out war against Mexico's
two main scourges: drug trafficking and the organized crime networks
it has spawned. This is a bold move and one fraught with risk. If
Calderon wins, he will strengthen his presidency and ensure Mexico's
long-term stability and national security.

If he loses, he could imperil both.

Calderon has little choice but to act. Mexico is growing increasingly
lawless, and his presidency began in a weakened state because of a
contentious election and its divisive aftermath.

He must prove that he can establish the authority many Mexicans
believe he didn't gain legitimately, and use it to govern in an
effective way. In a country in which 1,500 people are killed a year
in drug-related violence, security is the top priority for most
Mexicans. Years of government inaction under former President Vicente
Fox have left key institutions infiltrated with cartel accomplices,
hundreds of police officers dead, scores of judges assassinated and
dozens of journalists missing.

During the Fox administration, Mexico turned into a more violent
country than Colombia; Calderon's task is to recover lost ground and
clean it up.

This will not be easy because the surge of drug trafficking in Mexico
reflects a painful paradox: The government's drug enforcement efforts
are undermined by the corrupting influence of the drug trade, yet the
drug trade cannot survive without the protection of compromised
elements within the government. Cocaine traffickers spend as much as
$500 million on bribery, which is more than double the budget of the
Mexican attorney general's office.

As a result, it frequently becomes difficult to tell the good guys
from the bad guys.

Police regularly play dual roles: They act as drug enforcers and as
protectors of the smugglers.

Violent conflicts routinely erupt between police operating as law
enforcers and police acting as lawbreakers. So it's no wonder that as
part of Operation Tijuana -- the Calderon crackdown that made
headlines this month -- local police were forced to relinquish their weapons.

In the face of police corruption, Calderon has turned to the military
to take on the anti-drug effort -- 3,300 army, navy and federal
officers took part in Operation Tijuana. But moving soldiers -- who
are separate from the federal police -- around the country at will is
a cause for concern, and not just because of potential human rights
violations. As a result of its expanded role, the military is
becoming the supreme authority -- in some cases the only authority --
in parts of some states. And greater militarization frequently leads
to corruption. When cartel leader Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman escaped
from jail several years ago, it is believed that generals helped him
do so. So using the military as a roving cleanup force may solve some
short-term image problems, but it also creates other, intractable ones.

Calderon hopes to overcome the corrupting influence of the drug trade
by creating a new national police force as well as a special
anti-drug division, similar to the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration. He believes that with greater resources and more
autonomy, those in charge of combating crime will not end up
succumbing to it. But setting up a new agency and extending its reach
will not be enough.

Calderon needs to deal with Mexico's culture of illegality and
pervasive impunity.

Over the last decade, Mexico's transition to democratic rule has cast
a glaring light on the country's limited rule of law. Often judges,
prosecutors and state officials have been unable to withstand the
corrupting influence of the drug trade, a $7-billion-a-year business.
And the credibility of public institutions has suffered when those
proved guilty have eluded punishment.

So, while Calderon's efforts are to be applauded, they must also be
accompanied by comprehensive measures that entail more than soldiers
on the streets and photo-ops of the president dressed in olive green.

The prospects for a stable, less insecure Mexico will be contingent
on Calderon's capacity to enact a major overhaul of the country's
judiciary and law enforcement apparatus.

In other words, he needs to fight not only drug traffickers but the
political networks that protect them.

If Calderon's "surge" is unable to rein in drug-related violence and
bring its perpetrators to justice, even after using the army as an
instrument of last resort, drug lords and their allies will know that
the president's hand is weak -- and that his efforts are too little, too late.