THE US DRUG REPORT AND THE CRIME CRISIS

Friday's rebuke by the US of Guyana's drug efforts will be hard for
this government to lightly dismiss especially in the backdrop of the
current UK-funded security sector reform programme which identifies
the narcotics trade as a risk factor.

One would also expect that in the wake of the convening of the
national stakeholders' forum on the crime crisis and the renewed
sense of urgency in governmental circles, the criticisms contained
in the State Department report will be weighed objectively
and threshed to glean important insight on what is going wrong.

What was also startlingly conveyed in the report is the extent of
Washington's concern about the way the fight against the drug trade
is being handled here. What had been talked about in recent years is
now stated in black and white in the annual International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR): Washington is not planning to put
money into Guyana's efforts to combat the trade but will focus on
the just as direly needed substance abuse programmes - quite
shamelessly neglected by the government over the years.

The report acknowledges that neither the government of Guyana nor US
law enforcement has invested sufficient resources to ascertain the
quantity of illegal drugs flowing through Guyana and therefore all
projections are speculative. It then draws the line in the
padi. "In the absence of both sound data and more robust DEA/INL
involvement, the US will not augment resources for investigation and
interdiction in Guyana. Instead, it will continue to channel any
future assistance to initiatives that demonstrates success in
treating substance abusers". While data is mentioned, the key part
of the sentence refers to the lack of progress with the government
on the establishment of a Drug Enforcement Administration office
here. Washington clearly has concerns about the quality of the
drug fight here and wants its own personnel in situ. Georgetown has
baulked or found ways of not agreeing in keeping with its general
reticence to involve foreign law enforcement operato! rs here. So
the DEA is left to reconnoitre from Trinidad and to plot the capture
of drug criminals from there.

This is quite a pity considering the valuable time that has been
lost in confronting the drug lords and the drug trade. And more so
now that there is a general acceptance across civil society and
political parties that Guyana needs expert law enforcement help
from overseas to help crush the merchants of crime. Will
the government accede to this? That will be the ultimate test of
the national stakeholders' forum. More than four weeks after
Lusignan and two weeks post Bartica there can be hardly anyone who
would disagree that the failure of the Joint Services to capture the
main body of the attackers or engage them is shocking and
exposes their incapability.

In a country where there is such disrespect for data that the Bureau
of Statistics can get away with not issuing inflation bulletins for
months, Guyanese on the streets and in office buildings don't need
figures to tell them about the drug trade and its impact. They know
through their own experience or anecdotally the conspicuous
spending, the dozens of addicts on the streets, the bloody violence
of the cartels, the unexplained discoveries of airstrips and burnt
craft, the proliferation of high-calibre weaponry and
the 'businesses' that materialize from nowhere. They also know that
a lot of the violence and crime in general is driven by narco dollars.

While there were some successes noted by the INCSR such as the
increase in cocaine seizures - mainly through one major bust by the
Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit - and the apprehension of a man wanted
by the US who had been lying low here for some time, not much else
has happened. In particular, as has been pointed out on numerous
occasions in these columns and elsewhere, the much chirped about
National Drug Strategy Master Plan has not been effectively rolled
out. As the report puts it "cooperation among law enforcement bodies
is fragmented and minimally productive; weak border controls and
limited resources for law enforcement allow drug traffickers to move
shipments via river, air, and land without meaningful resistance."
Essentially, if your main plan isn't up and running nothing will
work and the drug lords will rule. The government keeps quibbling
about the money that is needed for the execution of the plan. That
money must come from the country's own re! sources. The VAT windfall
should have been designated for national priorities such as crime,
literacy and poverty alleviation programmes etc. If we don't show we
have our priorities right - the world cup bill will always stand out
- - we can hardly expect donors to rescue us.

That the drug trade poses a grave threat to a successful crime fight
should now be a major part of the deliberations of the national
stakeholders. They should seek to address what needs to be
fast-tracked to even the scales: anti-money laundering legislation,
a well-resourced and functioning Financial Intelligence Unit,
soaking up the illegal weapons and improving the performance and
professionalism of the security forces so that they would be trusted
with information by members of the public.

There should also be serious consideration at all levels of how
Washington can be more meaningfully engaged in assisting Guyana to
battle the drug trade.