WHEN SCIENCE RUNS INTO AN IDEOLOGICAL WALL

The Canadian Government Has Been Taken to Task for Its Lack of
Support For, or Knowledge Of, Scientific Research

While it's usually a badge of distinction to have your work cited in
a top-flight academic journal, the federal government wasn't exactly
in a celebratory mood after two recent journal editorials discussed
the feds' attitude toward science.

That's because the journals had little good to say about the
government's lack of support for, or knowledge of, scientific
research. As far as lack of support is concerned, Nature magazine
cited the government's recent decision to eliminate its science
adviser position, its muzzling of Environment Canada scientists, and
its putative failure to adequately fund research as evidence of "the
government's manifest disregard for science."

And as for a lack of knowledge, scientists at the B.C. Centre for
Excellence in HIV/AIDS took Health Minister Tony Clement to task in
The Lancet Infectious Diseases for Clement's apparent inability to
distinguish between peer-reviewed medical literature and an opinion
piece appearing on the website of a lobby group.

The Lancet Infectious Diseases article followed an earlier editorial
published last year in the online journal Open Medicine. That
editorial, written by University of Toronto medical professor Stephen
Hwang and endorsed by more than 130 scientists, argued that the
government's approach to Vancouver's supervised injection site
reveals "that scientific evidence is about to be trumped by ideology."

These are damning charges. And there is no question that the
government has been less than supportive of any scientific evidence
that conflicts with its ideology. This is a serious problem, since
preferring to see the world as you think it ought to be (ideology)
instead of the way it is (the scientific evidence) can be fatal, not
just for governments, but for everyone.

Yet there is substantial evidence that ideology influences our
assessment of scientific evidence, particularly when one's views are
ideologically entrenched.

In one experiment, social psychologist Charles Lord divided students
into two groups -- one made up those who were the most ardent
supporters of capital punishment, and the other of the most ardent
opponents of the death penalty.

Lord then gave half of the students in each group a set of studies
showing that the death penalty acted as a deterrent, and the other
half in each group received studies showing that capital punishment
had no deterrent effect.

Now, were the students acting rationally, we would expect those who
received evidence contrary to their views to soften their positions
somewhat. But the opposite happened -- both the supporters and
opponents of capital punishment strengthened their views upon
receiving contrary evidence.

In effect, the students explained away the contrary evidence -- and
justified their original positions -- by criticizing the methods of
those studies that failed to support their ideologies.

More recently, Donald Braman and Dan Kahan of Yale University, in a
paper titled More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of
Gun Risk Perceptions, found that people's positions on gun control
are determined by their cultural worldviews. Much as in the death
penalty study, the researchers concluded that "individuals can be
expected to credit or dismiss empirical evidence on 'gun control
risks' depending on whether it coheres or conflicts with their
cultural values."

These are troubling findings because they suggest people behave in a
manner exactly the opposite of that prescribed by science, which
dictates that we test and modify our theories on the basis of the
evidence, rather than interpreting the evidence in light of our theories.

But given that this is how many people -- and many governments --
behave, and given the importance of allowing scientific evidence to
inform government policy, it's essential that we find ways of
developing a rapprochement between researchers and policy-makers.

Fortunately, there is a wealth of literature on what is called
"research transfer" or "knowledge utilization." Much of this
literature has been written by Canadians, including many in the
employ of the federal government.

In one important paper titled Connecting Research and Policy,
Canadian Health Services Research Foundation CEO Jonathan Lomas notes
that many factors influence government decision-making, including
interests (how one would like the world to work), ideologies (how one
thinks the world ought to work) and beliefs (how one thinks the world
actually does work.)

Of these three, Lomas argues that beliefs are the only factor likely
to be changed as a result of information, and even then, information
comprises much more than just scientific research, as it also
includes "anecdotes, experience and even propaganda." Further,
beliefs typically take a long time -- often years -- to change, and
then only after "repeated exposure from competing sources of information."

Given this reality, how can we make governments more responsive to
scientific research? Perhaps most importantly, Lomas notes both
researchers and policy-makers must have a better understanding of
each others' domains.

In particular, both scientists and decision-makers tend to view the
others' field as a product rather than a process. Government
policy-makers, for example, typically see science as a "retail store"
that provides them with just the product they need when they want it.

A good example of this view came from Tony Clement when he
begrudgingly extended the supervised injection site's lease on life,
saying that he needed more "facts" about the site's effect on
lowering drug use and fighting addiction.

While science can provide such information, Clement's words reveal
that he sees science as a retail store rather than as an activity, a process.

The problem with this approach is that it virtually guarantees that
researchers and policy-makers will come into contact with each other
only at the moment a decision is made, and researchers will present
their findings only after the policy agenda "has been framed within a
particular context . . . and often after the limits have been set
around feasible options."

And as the government's approach to the supervised injection site --
and the study of students and the death penalty -- make clear, it's
highly unlikely scientific research will change the beliefs of
policy-makers at such a late stage in the process, particularly when
the government holds ideologically entrenched views.

If, on the other hand, policy-makers view science as a process, and
maintain regular contact with scientists, they can influence the
"conceptualization and conduct of a study" and are also more likely
to allow the study's results to inform policy.

Similarly, if scientists view policy-making as a process, and
maintain regular contact with policy-makers, they stand a much better
chance of influencing the policy agenda and framing the issues, which
again increases the chances that their results will inform policy.

For these reasons, the Canadian government has placed considerable
emphasis on research transfer, and has developed many linkages
between researchers and policy-makers. This close relationship might
explain why many bureaucrats within the government have been
influenced by the research on the supervised injection site.

The problem, of course, is that government policy is ultimately set
by the cabinet ministers and the prime minister, who continue to view
science as a retail store. And until that changes, the government
will continue to make the pages of academic journals, for all the
wrong reasons.