OPIUM AND THE TALIBAN

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned European leaders early this
week that unless they stepped up their support for Afghanistan, they
would likely face more terrorist attacks at home.

His remarks, in Munich, were the most strident in a weeklong
succession of warnings from Washington that Afghanistan would fall
deeper into chaos unless Europe assigns more troops to the NATO force
there.

While the warnings and retorts flew across the Atlantic, the United
Nations put out a major report that got little notice but could have a
more direct effect on the security problem than troop deployments or
counter-terrorism strategies. The U.N. drug-control office found that
Afghanistan's opium-poppy crop, in the words of the agency's executive
director, was once again "shockingly high." Neither Gates nor other
officials involved in last week's public debate over Afghanistan's
future ever mentioned the opium-poppy problem -- except once, in answer
to a question. They seem preoccupied with putting more boots on the
ground.

What none seem to realize or want to admit, however, is that the opium
problem has helped create and sustain the Taliban insurgency. Without
it, the Taliban would have trouble maintaining its offense. And yet,
while the United States and Europe continue to agonize about the
deteriorating situation, little is being done about the poppies.

That U.N. report plainly states what most people in public life have
quietly assumed: that the Taliban extort money from the poppy farmers.
U.N. workers interviewed dozens of these farmers and then ran the
numbers. Last week, the executive director of the U.N. agency that
published the opium report, Antonio Maria Costa, made public the conclusion.

"Opium is a massive source of revenue for the Taliban," Costa said.
"They tax farmers, it's called the usher, set roughly at 10 percent,
and generate close to $100 million a year."

The $100 million estimate may be conservative. The Taliban also
maintain heroin refining labs throughout Afghanistan. Refined heroin
is worth much more than raw opium. What's more, in just the last year,
Afghanistan has become the world's largest grower of marijuana.

So, wouldn't ending the opium and marijuana trade starve the
insurgency, cripple the Taliban? That sounds easy, but controlling
narcotics production has proved exceedingly difficult around the
world. Except in one place -- Afghanistan.

Paradoxically enough, when the Taliban were in power, they managed in
just one year to virtually eliminate the nation's opium-poppy trade
simply by exhorting the people, warning them that growing poppy was
contrary to the teachings of Islam -- and plowing under the crops of
anyone who disobeyed.

That was in the spring of 2001, and hundreds of poppy farmers wound up
in refugee camps or neighboring states that were more forgiving of
their trade. But then, of course, came Sept. 11 and the American
invasion. With the Taliban gone, the opium crops returned. Since then
the crops have grown exponentially. Afghanistan now produces 90
percent of the world's opium.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offered the only comment about
this in recent days, in answer to a question. "The Afghans have to
step up," she said. But the United States shares some responsibility.
The Pentagon is spending $2.5 billion this year to train and equip the
Afghan police. But, despite strong objections from the State
Department, these police are being sent to fight the Taliban -- not the
drug traffickers.

Ultimately, though, responsibility rests with Hamid Kharzai, the
Afghan president. Americans quietly express frustration with his
reluctance to take on the opium farmers. Still, he does seem to
understand the stakes. I asked him once about fighting the opium trade.

"If we fail," he averred, "we will fail as a state and eventually will
fall back into the hands of terrorism." Karzai may not be a
particularly effective president. But no one can argue with his prescience.