COLOMBIA RX WILL WORK IN THEORY, BUT NOT IN REALITY

For Igor Sikorsky, the helicopter used science to fly in hope. In the
great inventor's dreams, a whirlybird would swoop down from on high
and, like Hartford Hospital's Life Star, miraculously rescue people
who would otherwise die.

Over time, the helicopter also became a weapon of war. One option on
the Blackhawk assault helicopters recently sold to Colombia is
Hellfire guided missiles and rockets. In well-trained hands, these
weapons will theoretically eradicate both drugs and guerrillas.

In the real world, that's doubtful, since the General Accounting
Office just issued a report indicating that, despite many years of
substantial U.S. military and technical assistance, Colombia doubled
its cocaine production between 1995 and 1999. Moreover, almost 20
percent of the gas (469,000 gallons) used for counternarcotics
operations disappeared.

After completing its first review in 15 years, the U.S. embassy in
Bogota now thinks the gasoline was "misused."

So, while Connecticut's Blackhawks will undoubtedly perform as
designed, anyone who thinks these machines will help rescue the
political situation in Colombia is snorting the drugs these weapons
are meant to eradicate.

Let's start with a fact. Since the time of the Spanish conquest, no
Bogota government has controlled all the nation's territory. If only
because of the mountains, Colombia's geography lends itself to
resistance, especially from the traditional elites who have
continually refused to share either wealth or power.

A 1999 study from the U.S. Army War College notes that 10 percent of
the people own 90 percent of the farmable land. Meanwhile about 50
percent of the people live in poverty, with 20 percent in even more
dire condition.

Today, revolutionary violence is a given. But Washington's perennial
focus on the guerrillas is a terrible instance of smart people doing
stupid things. The War College study stresses that, during the first
nine months of 1998, paramilitaries -- vigilantes with the latest
weapons -- committed an estimated 76 percent of all "politically
motivated extra judicial killings."

In a story dated Jan. 7, Colombia's conservative newspaper El Tiempo
reported that the "paras" grew by 100 percent between 1998 and 2000.
In just nine days in early January, they murdered 23 people and, in a
report dated Jan. 18, paramilitaries murdered another 25 people in one
attack. An especially hideous fact was the use of machetes to publicly
behead two of the victims.

Who funds the paras? The War College says that a prime source is the
drug dealers who used their 1980s profits to buy an estimated 5
million to 6 million hectares of land. The drug profits fueled an
"agrarian counterreform." Ultimately, even more land rested in even
fewer hands, aggravating all the traditional problems of rural
inequality and the class conflicts that accompany them. Thus, to
protect their investment, the drug lords worked with the government
and traditional elites to fortify the paramilitaries who are arguably
the principal scourge of the nation.

And the estimated 20,000 guerrillas? Well, they exercise serious
influence over 50 percent of the nation's municipalities; they also
thrive on drug money, and they also murder with impunity. More than
200 political candidates and elected officials were killed on the eve
of 1997 elections.

Manuel Marulanda Velez leads the guerrillas. This is not his real
name. He chose it when, in 1946, he saw a campesino brutally murdered
by the conservative forces trying to hold back efforts at land reform
and land redistribution.

Since Marulanda's activities extend over 54 years, it seems fair to
argue that his movement (growing at the rate of 40 percent between
1998 and 2000) has staying power and that the elite forces opposing
significant change are also unwilling to radically change their positions.

Washington is supporting the government, as in Haiti, El Salvador and
Guatemala, by training locals to be professional soldiers. This could
help if U.S. policy-makers can somehow persuade the Colombian
government to change its standing orders. The War College reports that
the 35,000 high school graduates in the Colombian army are exempt from
serving in combat units. And, if you have money, you can also buy your
way out of the war.

In reality, poor guerrillas fight poor soldiers who fight drug-funded
paramilitaries recruiting other poor Colombians. In a recent story in
El Tiempo, the going rate varied with the level of danger. And to
those who refused service, the recruiter offered this admonition. "We
take them to Vietnam," the name chosen by the paramilitaries for their
punishment camps.

The vast majority of Colombia's 39 million people desperately want
peace. When the University of Miami's North/South Center recently
suggested that the incoming Bush administration stop Washington's
focus on the drug war, the center's recommendations were front-page
news in Colombia.

The message was clear: Concentrate all efforts and energies on
fortifying the Colombian government and the peace negotiations --
including real land and social reforms -- that are the only plausible
solutions to a conflict that has already lasted for at least 54 years.

Is anybody listening? I hope so. Because this is a nightmare that
could come true: Connecticut helicopters will be used to rescue
Connecticut kids in uniform from the Vietnams created by the
drug-funded paramilitaries.