UNCLE SAM IN COLOMBIA

Of all the foreign-policy quagmires President George Bush has inherited,
few are as muddy as the mess in Colombia. Alarmed by rising coca
cultivation and by the strength of the leftist guerrillas in a country that
produces most of the world's cocaine, the Clinton administration boldly
stepped into Colombia's complex internal conflicts. It granted $1.3 billion
in mainly military aid last year for "Plan Colombia", a wider bundle of
security and development projects drawn up by President Andres Pastrana's
government. Should Mr Bush continue with, scrap or amend this policy?

Most of the American aid is meant to be spent on training three new army
battalions and equipping them with helicopters. Their mission is to stop
the FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, from hindering
anti-drug operations in Putumayo, on Colombia's border with Ecuador, where
roughly half the coca crop is grown. Two of the battalions are already
protecting police spraying the coca plantations with herbicides. It is also
hoped that, if the FARC can be denied drug income, it will be more inclined
to make peace.

Several things have changed since the plan was first mooted. First, the
United States' aid has been widely seen as a crude intervention in its
Latin American backyard. As a result, European governments, which Mr
Pastrana had unrealistically hoped might stump up some $2 billion in aid
for social and development projects, aimed at providing alternatives to
coca, have offered only $280m--leaving Plan Colombia looking unbalanced.

Second, the peace talks with the FARC launched by Mr Pastrana in 1998 have
stalled. As the FARC has continued its tactics of kidnapping, extortion and
attacks on small towns, public support for the talks has plunged. This week
their future hangs in the balance: Mr Pastrana has delayed until Sunday a
decision on ending or extending the life of a "demilitarised" zone for the
guerrillas (ie, a haven all their own), as he seeks gestures from the FARC.
Third, right-wing paramilitaries, often also linked to drugs, have become
the fastest-growing military force in Colombia. In a cold-blooded manner,
they attack civilians in guerrilla areas, and often act with the collusion
of army officers--and with growing public support. Lastly, neighbouring
countries worry that Plan Colombia will push refugees, violence and drugs
into their countries. That is already happening in Ecuador, which is
economically and politically fragile (see article).

So far, Mr Bush has expressed support for Plan Colombia. But critics worry
that he may be sucked into the quagmire, perhaps even choosing to send
troops. In fact, a greater temptation may be to walk away, or to narrow the
plan to anti-drug aid to the police, as some Republicans favour.

All three approaches would be a mistake. The United States--and Europe--do
have responsibilities for peace in Colombia. After all, their drug
consumers unwittingly finance both the FARC and the paramilitaries.

The best course is to mould Plan Colombia into a more balanced policy, more
clearly aimed at strengthening the democratic state. That means continuing
to help Colombia to make its armed forces more efficient, more professional
and more respectful of human rights, but it also means a police and
judiciary able to give security to citizens. Colombia, in turn, has to make
a more serious effort to tackle the paramilitaries--though critics of Plan
Colombia would do well to note that to do so requires stronger, not weaker,
armed forces.The unwinnable war

At the same time, the United States should recognise that aerial spraying
of other peoples' fields with herbicides is no substitute for failing to
stop its own citizens from taking drugs. Manual eradication, backed by
social development, may be a better alternative. But Europe should be under
no illusions: alternative development requires lots of money.

In truth, Plan Colombia is bound to fail if it is just seen as a war on
drugs: any "victory" in wiping out Putumayo's coca will simply make the
industry move, not disappear. But any aid that helps Colombia and its
neighbours achieve peace and strengthen democracy is money well spent. The
drug war still looks unwinnable--but at least some of its battles can be
made less costly to the countries where they are fought.