LONG HAUL U.S. PRESENCE IN COLOMBIA BEGINNING TO LOOK QUAGMIRISH

Reports from Colombia do not inspire confidence that our nation's
involvement in that nation's internal affairs will be over any time soon.

The civilian death toll mounts.

Rebel forces, who depend on the production of cocaine for cash and
weaponry, seem not to be losing much ground.

And what remains of the country's infrastructure is falling apart.

Meanwhile, neighboring nations are jittery that they'll be victims of
collateral damage. This had to be one of the things that Vicente Fox talked
to President George W. Bush about when the two met recently in Mexico.

Perhaps it is too early to say flat out that the U.S. presence in Colombia,
which is mainly in the form of military advisers and cash right now, is the
making of a quagmire, but it's starting to take on certain recognizable
quagmirish characteristics.

Last year, Congress approved spending $1.3 billion in Colombia, mainly in
the form of military aid, as part of this nation's war on drugs.

Today in Washington, President Bush meets with Andres Pastrana, president
of Colombia, and it's a cinch that Pastrana will not be talking about less
aid over the long haul.

And "long haul" seems to aptly describe what the United States is in for.

In a cogent and persuasive analysis of the situation these days in Colombia
appearing in Sunday's New York Times, Christopher Marquis suggests that
what Pastrana will want and what the U.S. will be hard-pressed not to offer
is nothing less than help to rebuild his shattered nation, assuming, of
course, that it is possible to defeat the rebel forces, reform the coca
farmers and restore some semblance of stability there.

Colin Powell is reportedly already preparing to encourage the president and
Congress to focus not only on Colombia but its neighbors as well. The
Pentagon is also said to be preparing a study that encourages deeper U.S.
involvement beyond just trying to win the drug war in Colombia and the
region. And some in Congress are pressing for vastly more aid for the area
and goals that go far beyond eradicating coca.

The problem, as Marquis and others see it, is that Colombia is caught
between many rocks and many hard places.

"Colombians can't affect the drug flow until they pacify the country. They
can't get a deal with the guerrillas until they have a development
strategy. They can't undertake public works in a war zone." That's the way
Marquis puts it, while also noting that Colombia's legitimate government
has few resources to tackle any of the challenges.

What, then, should the United States do?

Marquis recommends we answer several questions as a nation before we commit
further resources:

What is the basic plan? Is it a peace strategy with a military component? A
counterinsurgency drive? A bulwark to salvage the Pastrana administration?
A Marshall Plan for South America?

If we are to get fully involved in rebuilding Colombia as a nation, that is
an entirely different proposition than the one we've already bought into,
and it is one we ought to be thoroughly convinced we want to embrace and
finance.