IN THE LINE OF FIRE

Colombians Are Trapped In Misguided War On Drugs

THE memory of Vietnam combined with the fear of an American military
intervention in the Colombian jungles has prompted heated debates in
Washington and Bogota about $1.3 billion in U.S. aid over the next two years.

At the heart of the debates lie inexact parallels and unfounded fears. To
begin with, the conflict in Colombia has nothing to do with a national
liberation war, as it did in Vietnam. Neither does the civilian population
support the armed groups that promote violence in Colombia. On the
contrary, as all polls and surveys indicate, more than 90 percent of the
population is emphatically against the guerrilla soldiers and the
paramilitary groups. So in that sense, Colombia is not involved in a
``civil war'' as the American media would have us believe. It is, however,
involved in a confrontation between powerfully armed left- and right-wing
groups.

The civilian population has found itself trapped in the line of fire. It's
true that the confrontation keeps escalating at an alarming rate. Every
three hours there is a new, high-profile kidnapping; 10 people die on a
daily basis as a direct result of this confrontation. Electric towers and
aqueducts are bombed on a weekly basis.

It is also true that this problem now affects all social classes and has
created a huge internal destabilization, which is beginning to threaten
bordering countries.

In the face of this predicament, the democratically elected government of
Andres Pastrana now has the tough task of re-establishing order in the
country. Critics of ``Plan Colombia'' do not seem to consider the
government's legitimate right to defend itself and to respond to the
challenge presented by private Marxist and right-wing armies financed with
drug money.

I believe the U.S. strategy to combat drugs is wrong-headed and
inefficient. Alternate legalization and decriminalization tactics should be
considered because the ``war against drugs'' strategies have failed.

It should be clearly understood that drug trafficking is at the forefront
of all of Colombia's armed conflicts. Drug economics know no ideology. Drug
trafficking needs destabilization and chaos to operate. For this reason, it
is necessary to break the spine of the drug bank for the illegitimate armed
enterprises before it breaks Colombia. This is the only route that could
lead to a peace agreement.

We must also know that the anti-drug movement cannot work exclusively
through repressive military means. We need to remember the social and
economic roots of the problem, the economics of the illegal trade and the
fact that the cultivation of coca and poppy leaf provides a living for
thousands of farm families. This is why the social and economic component
of Plan Colombia is just as important as the military component.

Without alternate development strategies for the people, the war will never
be won. You can't take away the means of subsistence for the people without
offering them a resource to survive. To do otherwise would put the people
at odds with the state and the army and push them to seek refuge with the
drug dealers or the guerrillas.

It is imperative that Presidents Bush and Pastrana not see this as a ``war
against drugs'' but rather as an integrated and balanced strategy for
peace. There should be an emphasis on hand-to-hand plant eradication and
not aerial fumigation. The two presidents should seek a new, more regional
approach to solve the drug problem in Colombia, and it should involve the
bordering countries. Let's not rake Colombia's trash over to the neighbor's
yard.

THE overall objective of Plan Colombia is to strengthen democratic
institutions in Colombia whose weakening would facilitate the action of
drug dealers, guerrillas and paramilitary groups. This means not only
improving methods of security and intelligence but also making the judicial
system more robust, eliminating political corruption and modernizing the
country's legitimate armed forces.

This will allow the Colombian economy to begin to recuperate. There will be
no Plan Colombia possible, or a possible peace, in a ruined economy with 20
percent unemployment. If the U.S. Congress is serious about wanting to
prevent the collapse of democracy in Colombia, it must approve preferential
tariffs and trade agreements. Additionally, whatever victory Colombia can
attain from Plan Colombia will surely be temporary unless the United States
can curtail the demand for drugs in its own country.

Colombia has sacrificed its greatest people -- judges, police officials,
journalists, politicians -- all in the name of the ``war on drugs.'' The
United States can't pretend that this is solely a problem that Colombia
must solve on its own.

Enrique Santos Calderon is the editor of the newspaper El Tiempo in
Colombia. This was written for the Los Angeles Times.