EYES IN THE SKY

Forward Operating Bases Bolster US Counterdrug Operations

Before the closure of Howard Air Force Base, Panama, in December 1999, the
US military and the US Customs Service had used this site to operate
airborne early warning, maritime patrol, and tracker aircraft in support of
the nation's counterdrug operations in South America, the Caribbean, and
the Eastern Pacific.

To help offset the operational capabilities lost as a result of the Howard
AFB closure, the Office of National Drug Control Policy asked the
Department of Defense to develop a "post-Panama-presence" plan for
supporting aircraft used in counterdrug missions. DoD's plan calls for the
use of airfields-termed forward operating locations (FOLs)-by military and
Customs Service aircraft at: Manta, Ecuador; Aruba; Curacao; and Comalapa
Airport (San Salvador), El Salvador. All sites are expected to be fully
operational by late 2002.

Congressional Interest

In a statement to AFJI from Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), Chairman of
the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, the senator recalled that he
"was not very satisfied with the state of planning on finding sites for
sustained aerial operations that preceded the closing of Howard AFB," nor
was he pleased "with the level of DoD and State Department thinking on how
much new sites would cost."

Senator Grassley asked the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a
survey of the [former Clinton] Administration's efforts to establish a
forward operation location to support counterdrug missions in the source
and transit zones, after the closing of Howard AFB. The senator indicated
that he "wanted a baseline so Congress would have some basis to judge
relative costs and some idea of what a comprehensive source and transit
strategy would look like." Grassley noted that a December 2000 GAO report,
"Drug Control: International Counterdrug Sites Being Developed,"
established that baseline.

New Advantages

The US appears ready to gain strategic and tactical advantages from
establishing the four new FOLs.

The December 2000 GAO report on the four FOLs stated: "Together, the four
sites provide greater geographic coverage than did Howard Air Force Base,
according to DoD officials. In particular, they provide deeper source zone
coverage and extend coverage farther into the increasingly trafficked
Eastern Pacific because of their proximity to the targeted zones."

Stephen Lucas, public affairs public information officer at US Southern
Command (USSOUTHCOM), told AFJI that the Howard AFB closure and the
transition to expeditionary operations in the unimproved FOLs at Curacao,
Aruba, and Manta would cause a 15 percent decrease in the US force's
ability to "cover" the source and primary transit zones in the Eastern
Carribean and Eastern Pacific. He projected that as "infrastructure
improvements continue and are completed at those FOLs-and a fourth site at
Comalapa-that the eventual 'coverage' capability will exceed the capability
we had at Howard AFB by a like amount."

Lucas said some of the strategic and tactical out comes of the new FOLs
will include: improving US coverage of the entire source zone and improved
coverage of the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean transit zones; and increased
loiter time-the time surveillance aircraft can spend in their patrol zones.

One of the more dramatic examples of how air assets can influence the
counterdrug mission in this region is described on the homepage of US Naval
Forces Southern Command. One operational summary recounts how, in November
of last year, a US military aircraft visually detected a small surface
craft loaded with 60 to 65 bales of cocaine. The aircraft may have
contributed to the boat operator's decision to throw the bales overboard
when it became apparent he was unable to shake his pursuer. The estimated
street value of the jettisoned cargo was set at $200 million.

FOL Costs

The GAO report on the four FOL sites estimates that
infrastructure-improvement costs at all four sites will vary
significantly-Manta ($61.3 million); Curacao ($43.9 million); Aruba ($10.2
million); and Comalapa ($9.3 million)-amounting to approximately $125
million. Lt. Col. George Rhynedance, spokesman in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), revised this amount upward to $137.8
million-due to emergent Fiscal Year 2002 construction requirements at
Comalapa. Rhynedance told AFJI that DoD estimates that the annual operating
costs for the four sites will be $38.4 million. At least 25 military
personnel, augmented by civilian contractor support staff at Manta, will
form the permanent US staff required to keep these sites fully operational.

The US is expected to realize financial advantages from the relocation to
the new FOLs. USSOUTHCOM spokesman Lucas indicated that the costs of
preparing the FOLs for operations compare favorably with the cost of
maintaining Howard AFB. He noted that in its last full year of operation,
the base cost $75.8 million to operate and maintain. Lucas added: "Even if
you add the cost of the initial infrastructure improvements at all four
locations to their projected annual operating and maintenance costs, the
American taxpayer is getting significantly more 'bang for the buck' from
the network of access agreements which created the FOLs. This is especially
true when you consider the fact that when the operations are in full swing,
counterdrug agencies will actually have more capability than existed when
operations were in Panama."

Agreement Terms

Under an interim agreement with the Netherlands, and permanent agreements
with El Salvador and Ecuador, the US is authorized unrestricted airfield
access only to conduct counterdrug detection and monitoring operations.
Each agreement is for a 10-year period and, if both parties agree, the
agreements may be renewed for five-year periods.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense spokesman Lt. Col. Rhynedance
reiterated that the FOLs are not US bases. He noted that the host
governments maintain sovereign control over the airports and the national
airspace used by US forces. Additional host-nation control over these
operations is exercised by embarking a country representative on a US
aircraft whenever the aircraft overflies a nation's airspace. The
representative serves as the communications link between the aircraft and
national law enforcement authorities on the ground and in the air.

Other important tenets of each agreement cited in the GAO report are:

*The host-nation authorities have overall responsibility for air traffic
control and the physical security of the airfield.

*The US will maintain these facilities and provide physical security for
its aircraft.

*Airfield access is 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

The Netherlands parliament is expected to next month to debate a permanent
FOL agreement involving Curacao and Aruba. It is anticipated that other
multi-national participants in counterdrug operations in the region will
also use the FOLs. These participants include the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands.

Operational Constraints

The GAO report on the FOLs briefly addresses operational constraints that
US aircraft encounter as they operate from the new sites. The most
significant constraint is the lack of overflight and pursuit agreements
with regional nations. In Venezuela, the report points out: "The lack of an
overflight agreement with Venezuela increases the transit time for US
aircraft flying from Aruba and Curacao to the source region." The report
also notes that the US does not have agreements with other nations,
including Guatemala and Nicaragua.

An official at Venezuela's embassy in Washington DC discussed with AFJI his
country's position on signing an overflight and pursuit agreement with the US.

The official said that Venezuela has been recognized for supporting
counterdrug operations in the region, and that this one disagreement should
not tarnish his country's image of wanting to reduce the flow and use of
illegal drugs. The issue of overflights and pursuit of suspected aircraft
by the US is considered a sensitive issue of national sovereignty-a
position that remains unchanged through two consecutive governments, the
official said.

The Venezuelan official left open the door for further dialogue with the US
on this issue, indicating that perhaps a compromise could be reached. He
said that Venezuela's ground-based, air-surveillance/control radar
infrastructure needs upgrading. He also indicated that if two conditions
existed-if his country were to receive resources to improve its air radar
network and if Venezuelan personnel were allowed to operate the
network-that it may be possible to arrange to share information-that would
allow the air network's information to support regional counterdrug operations.

A US State Department source provided a generally upbeat assessment of the
status of securing overflight agreements with other regional governments.
The source reported that negotiations have been completed with Nicaragua
and that an agreement is ready to be signed-following a final review by
that government.

An overflight arrangement involving the Turks and Caicos was completed last
October under an agreement with the United Kingdom. It may be more
difficult to achieve an agreement with Guatemala; the State Department
source indicated that the US has approached that government several times
without much success. Future overflight negotiations are planned with the
French West Indies.

The Road Ahead

As democracies become more firmly entrenched in the Caribbean and Latin
American regions, there will be more interest in addressing both the supply
and demand sides of the global drug problem. The prospect that four robust
FOLs will help to the US and her allies reduce the supply of drugs will
boost a decades-old effort to attack the problem at its source.