DEATH FALLS FROM THE SKY

Plan Colombia's Fumigation Campaign Destroys Everything In Its Path

With 62,000 acres of coca destroyed, the politicians and generals in
Washington and Bogota are calling Plan Colombia's initial fumigation
campaign a success. But on the ground in Putumayo, Colombia's
principal coca growing region, people watched in horror as the deadly
mist drifted down and stuck to everything in sight. Their food crops
turned brown, wilted and slowly died. Their children and animals
became sick. If death didn't come at the hands of the guerrillas, the
paramilitaries or the Colombian army, it fell out of the sky.

The fumigation campaign began on December 19. For the next six weeks,
U.S.-supplied helicopters swooped down almost daily to unload soldiers
whose mission was to prevent attacks by leftist guerrillas and
right-wing paramilitaries. The aerial spraying dumped an estimated
85,000 gallons of the herbicide glyphosate onto Putumayo's coca fields
from an altitude of 100 feet. The fumigation campaign in Putumayo
utilized two of the three U.S.-trained anti-narcotics battalions and
15 of the 60 helicopters that are part of the $ 1.3 billion aid
package approved by Congress last year.

Serious questions have been raised about the tactics used during the
fumigation. Even Monsanto -- the manufacturer of Round-Up Ultra, the
chemical used for coca eradication in Colombia -- cautions against
aerial application at altitudes greater than 10 feet above crops
because higher altitudes increase the risk of drift. Monsanto also
warns that "even very small amounts of Round-Up herbicide brands may
damage crops if allowed to drift into fields adjoining the target area."

Another reason the herbicide is so destructive, says Ivan Rios,
spokesman for Colombia's largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), is because "they are fumigating with
glyphosate mixed with a special ingredient that sticks to the leaves
and is more harmful to the people."

That "special ingredient" is called Cosmo-Flux, which according to
Ricardo Vargas Meza, a researcher for Accion Andina, an organization
studying drug policy in the Andes, "makes the glyphosate heavier and
stickier so it adheres better to the coca plants."

Cosmo-Flux also makes the herbicide more potent. "Cosmo-Flux
substantially increases the biological activity of the agrochemicals,
allowing better results with smaller doses," says Dr. Elsa Nivia,
Colombia's Regional Director of the Pesticide Action Network. But the
fumigation campaign is adding Cosmo-Flux to an herbicide dosage five
times greater than that recommended by Monsanto.

According to many campesinos in Putumayo, the herbicide also
contaminated maize, yucca, plantains, animals and even children. Some
of the families who fled the fumigation are now living in rundown
wooden shacks in the town of San Miguel near the Ecuador border.
Cecilia, a middle-aged woman who, along with her husband and three
children, abandoned their farm in La Dorada in January after it had
been fumigated, says, "everything was killed. Maize, yucca,
everything." She now sells home-cooked food to travelers crossing the
border in a struggle to support her family.

Even the leader of Putumayo's paramilitary forces, Commandante
Enrique, admits that "if you go to San Miguel you can find campesinos
who don't have food and money because the fumigation was
indiscriminate."

The local hospital in La Hormiga has witnessed some of the human
health consequences of the fumigation campaign. "I have treated
people with skin rashes, stomach aches and diarrhea caused by the
fumigation," says Dr. Edgar Perea. "And I have treated five children
affected by the fumigation in the past 25 days. I don't know how many
the other doctors have treated."

Prior to launching the offensive, the government offered $ 1,000 and
technical assistance to those willing to switch from coca to
alternative crops, along with a promise that their farms would not be
fumigated. Some campesinos accepted the offer, while others,
distrustful of a government that has repeatedly failed to deliver on
past promises, steadfastly refused. "Historically, the government has
never helped anyone here," one La Hormiga resident explained. "People
helped themselves, and with coca the economy is good. Now the
government wants to help, but people are afraid it will ruin the economy."

When the eradication campaign began, many of the small farmers who had
accepted the government's offer stood by helplessly while the aerial
fumigation killed their newly planted crops. But according to Col.
Blas Ortiz of the Colombian army's Putumayo-based 24th Brigade, the
fumigation campaign only targeted "industrial sized" coca farms of 25
acres or more. Furthermore, Ortiz claims, "One of the techniques used
by the big coca growers is to grow two acres of yucca or plantains in
the middle of 125 acres of coca. These two acres don't belong to the
campesinos, they belong to the big coca grower. They use this
strategy to avoid being fumigated."

Ruben Dario Pinzon of the National Plan for Alternative Development
(PLANTE), the government agency in charge of the alternative crop
program, sympathizes with the campesinos. "Growers financed by PLANTE
have been fumigated because they are a small area in the middle of
coca growers," he says. "It is impossible to protect them because the
pilots can't control exactly where they fumigate. They fumigate the
whole area."

The indiscriminate nature of the fumigation campaign has led many to
call for a greater emphasis on manual eradication, which would avoid
damaging food crops. "PLANTE is fighting to end fumigation in the six
municipalities in which we are working," Pinzon says, "so we can start
the process of alternative crops and then begin negotiations with
other towns."

But most coca farming occurs in remote areas that lack the
infrastructure required to transport perishable crops to distant
cities and ports. And if the number of campesinos turning to
alternative crops continues to increase, production will likely
surpass local demand and drive prices down. Consequently, impoverished
campesinos will face the same economic problems that forced them to
turn to coca cultivation in the first place.

When asked if PLANTE intends to help campesinos get their alternative
crops to market, Pinzon laments, "At this time it is not possible to
propose such an economic plan. It is desirable that the government
subsidize some items like they do in the United States and Europe.
But in Colombia it's not possible because we do not have the money."

It is the lack of social and economic funding in the U.S. aid package
that is criticized by many in Colombia and the international
community. Many organizations do not believe coca can be successfully
eradicated until more money and resources are used to create viable
economic alternatives. The campesino who cultivates coca does not
have to be concerned with getting his crop to market before it spoils.
The narcotrafficker comes to him. Also, coca is a hardier plant than
most legal crops and can reap three or four harvests a year. And if
the grower is willing to perform the first step of processing into
coca paste, he will be paid more than if he just sold the leaves. The
local farmer is not getting rich from this illicit crop, but the $
1,000 a year he can earn from two or three acres of coca cultivation
helps prevent his family from going hungry.

Local officials are now desperately trying to convince Washington and
Bogota to permanently suspend the aerial fumigation before there is a
further destruction of legal crops and a renewed exodus of people.
But their pleas have fallen on deaf ears. The politicians and
generals are too busy celebrating the campaign's success and planning
future operations. For the campesinos of Putumayo, it is only a
matter of time before death once again begins falling from the sky.