News (Media Awareness Project) - US: OPED: The Bush Agenda |
Title: | US: OPED: The Bush Agenda |
Published On: | 2001-05-15 |
Source: | Wall Street Journal (US) |
Fetched On: | 2008-01-25 19:56:47 |
THE BUSH AGENDA
Don't Surrender
The drug war worked once. It can again.
George W. Bush recently announced the nomination of John P. Walters
to serve as the director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy. The new "drug czar" is being asked to lead the nation's war
on illegal drugs at a time when many are urging surrender.
The forms of surrender are manifold: Buzzwords like "harm reduction"
are crowding out clear no-use messages. State initiatives promoting
"medical marijuana" are little more than thinly veiled legalization
efforts (as underscored by yesterday's 8-0 Supreme Court ruling
against medical exceptions). The film "Traffic" portrayed the war on
drugs as a futile effort. In a recent survey by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press, 74% of Americans believe the war
on drugs is a failure.
And yet recent history shows that, far from being a failure,
drug-control programs are among the most successful public-policy
efforts of the later half of the 20th century. According to a
national drug survey, between 1979 and 1992, the most intense period
of antidrug efforts, the rate of illegal drug use dropped by more
than half, while marijuana use decreased by two-thirds. Cocaine use
dropped by three-fourths between 1985 and 1992.
Why is this record described as a failure? For those who would
legalize drugs, all drug-control efforts must be painted as
disastrous. But for most Americans, frustration with the drug issue
stems from the fact that over the past eight years we have lost
ground.
During the Clinton administration, our nation's drug policy suffered
a period of malign neglect. President Clinton's two clearest
statements about illegal drugs were his infamous statement "I didn't
inhale" and his immediate and dramatic cut in the size of the federal
antidrug staff. Morale and political leadership were both
compromised, and a national cynicism about drug use resulted. Hiring
a four-star general may have fooled the public and the Washington
press corps for a while, but it didn't add up to a meaningful
program. To paraphrase Arthur Miller, attention was not paid, and the
problem quickly worsened: Between 1992 and 1999, rates of current
drug use--defined as using once a month or more--increased by 15%.
Rates of marijuana use increased 11%. The situation was far worse
among our children: Lifetime use of illegal drugs increased by 37%
among eighth-graders and 55% among 10th-graders. We have reached the
point where more than one-quarter of all high school seniors are
current users of illegal drugs; indeed, rates of monthly drug use
among high school seniors increased 86% between 1992 and 1999.
We must re-engage this fight. What we were doing in the 1980s and
early 1990s--vigorous law enforcement and interdiction coupled with
effective prevention and treatment--worked. It can work again.
The most important component of any antidrug strategy is prevention.
Children who reach the age of 21 without using illegal drugs are
almost certain never to do so. The Partnership for a Drug-Free
America has crafted some of the most memorable and effective
advertisements in history, encouraging children to turn down illegal
drugs. The message that drug use is dangerous and immoral is the
essential key to prevention.
In addition, we must continue to develop effective treatment
programs. Many criticisms have been leveled at America's lack of
treatment capacity, but more troubling is the lack of treatment
efficacy. However, 12-step programs (akin to Alcoholics Anonymous)
have been shown to be both inexpensive and effective in
private-sector drug treatment. Hopefully, their success can be
extended to public-sector treatment as well.
Everyone agrees on the necessity of effective treatment and strong
prevention efforts. Some people, however, believe that law
enforcement should have no role in the process. This is an altogether
simplistic model: Demand reduction cannot be effective without supply
reduction. It is true that there will always be a supply of illegal
drugs as long as there is a demand. But forceful interdiction can
help to increase the price and decrease the purity of drugs
available, a critical means of intervening in the lives of addicts,
who can only beg, borrow and steal so much to support their habit.
Government reports document that recovering addicts are more likely
to relapse when faced with cheap, plentiful drugs. Aggressive
interdiction efforts, then, are not supply reduction so much as the
first step in demand reduction.
Some people will admit that there is a place for law enforcement, but
contend we spend too much on this effort, to the detriment of demand
reduction. In fact, according to Robert DuPont, who led the nation's
antidrug efforts under Presidents Nixon and Ford, there has never
been as much federal money spent on prevention education as is being
spent today. The U.S.'s total spending on drug-demand reduction far
exceeds the amounts spent in the rest of the world combined.
A more pragmatic point: While treatment is often centered at the
individual and local levels, interdiction and law enforcement must be
federal responsibilities. Given the scope and complexity of drug
trafficking, the federal government can and must assume the
responsibility for stopping the traffic of drugs across and within
our borders. The drug czar's first concerns, then, must be
interdiction and law enforcement, if only because they are tasks no
other agency can perform as effectively.
I believe that the position of drug czar ought to remain at the
cabinet level, but more important is the president's personal support
and commitment to the office. I had that backing, and I expect the
new drug czar will enjoy that same support and commitment from Mr.
Bush. If Mr. Walters is to have any success, he must enjoy it. The
past eight years are, once again, illustrative: Gen. Barry McCaffrey
never enjoyed that support from President Clinton. In renewing the
drug war, the new drug czar will not be alone. He will be able to
draw on the assistance of people--parents, teachers, substance-abuse
counselors, clergymen and elected officials--who have continued to
fight drug use over the past eight years. These groups are our first
lines of defense; without them, the regression since 1992 would have
been far worse. Their dedication gives the lie to the gospel of
futility.
I look forward to America re-engaging in the war on drugs--and
continuing the success that we had between 1980 and 1992.
Don't Surrender
The drug war worked once. It can again.
George W. Bush recently announced the nomination of John P. Walters
to serve as the director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy. The new "drug czar" is being asked to lead the nation's war
on illegal drugs at a time when many are urging surrender.
The forms of surrender are manifold: Buzzwords like "harm reduction"
are crowding out clear no-use messages. State initiatives promoting
"medical marijuana" are little more than thinly veiled legalization
efforts (as underscored by yesterday's 8-0 Supreme Court ruling
against medical exceptions). The film "Traffic" portrayed the war on
drugs as a futile effort. In a recent survey by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press, 74% of Americans believe the war
on drugs is a failure.
And yet recent history shows that, far from being a failure,
drug-control programs are among the most successful public-policy
efforts of the later half of the 20th century. According to a
national drug survey, between 1979 and 1992, the most intense period
of antidrug efforts, the rate of illegal drug use dropped by more
than half, while marijuana use decreased by two-thirds. Cocaine use
dropped by three-fourths between 1985 and 1992.
Why is this record described as a failure? For those who would
legalize drugs, all drug-control efforts must be painted as
disastrous. But for most Americans, frustration with the drug issue
stems from the fact that over the past eight years we have lost
ground.
During the Clinton administration, our nation's drug policy suffered
a period of malign neglect. President Clinton's two clearest
statements about illegal drugs were his infamous statement "I didn't
inhale" and his immediate and dramatic cut in the size of the federal
antidrug staff. Morale and political leadership were both
compromised, and a national cynicism about drug use resulted. Hiring
a four-star general may have fooled the public and the Washington
press corps for a while, but it didn't add up to a meaningful
program. To paraphrase Arthur Miller, attention was not paid, and the
problem quickly worsened: Between 1992 and 1999, rates of current
drug use--defined as using once a month or more--increased by 15%.
Rates of marijuana use increased 11%. The situation was far worse
among our children: Lifetime use of illegal drugs increased by 37%
among eighth-graders and 55% among 10th-graders. We have reached the
point where more than one-quarter of all high school seniors are
current users of illegal drugs; indeed, rates of monthly drug use
among high school seniors increased 86% between 1992 and 1999.
We must re-engage this fight. What we were doing in the 1980s and
early 1990s--vigorous law enforcement and interdiction coupled with
effective prevention and treatment--worked. It can work again.
The most important component of any antidrug strategy is prevention.
Children who reach the age of 21 without using illegal drugs are
almost certain never to do so. The Partnership for a Drug-Free
America has crafted some of the most memorable and effective
advertisements in history, encouraging children to turn down illegal
drugs. The message that drug use is dangerous and immoral is the
essential key to prevention.
In addition, we must continue to develop effective treatment
programs. Many criticisms have been leveled at America's lack of
treatment capacity, but more troubling is the lack of treatment
efficacy. However, 12-step programs (akin to Alcoholics Anonymous)
have been shown to be both inexpensive and effective in
private-sector drug treatment. Hopefully, their success can be
extended to public-sector treatment as well.
Everyone agrees on the necessity of effective treatment and strong
prevention efforts. Some people, however, believe that law
enforcement should have no role in the process. This is an altogether
simplistic model: Demand reduction cannot be effective without supply
reduction. It is true that there will always be a supply of illegal
drugs as long as there is a demand. But forceful interdiction can
help to increase the price and decrease the purity of drugs
available, a critical means of intervening in the lives of addicts,
who can only beg, borrow and steal so much to support their habit.
Government reports document that recovering addicts are more likely
to relapse when faced with cheap, plentiful drugs. Aggressive
interdiction efforts, then, are not supply reduction so much as the
first step in demand reduction.
Some people will admit that there is a place for law enforcement, but
contend we spend too much on this effort, to the detriment of demand
reduction. In fact, according to Robert DuPont, who led the nation's
antidrug efforts under Presidents Nixon and Ford, there has never
been as much federal money spent on prevention education as is being
spent today. The U.S.'s total spending on drug-demand reduction far
exceeds the amounts spent in the rest of the world combined.
A more pragmatic point: While treatment is often centered at the
individual and local levels, interdiction and law enforcement must be
federal responsibilities. Given the scope and complexity of drug
trafficking, the federal government can and must assume the
responsibility for stopping the traffic of drugs across and within
our borders. The drug czar's first concerns, then, must be
interdiction and law enforcement, if only because they are tasks no
other agency can perform as effectively.
I believe that the position of drug czar ought to remain at the
cabinet level, but more important is the president's personal support
and commitment to the office. I had that backing, and I expect the
new drug czar will enjoy that same support and commitment from Mr.
Bush. If Mr. Walters is to have any success, he must enjoy it. The
past eight years are, once again, illustrative: Gen. Barry McCaffrey
never enjoyed that support from President Clinton. In renewing the
drug war, the new drug czar will not be alone. He will be able to
draw on the assistance of people--parents, teachers, substance-abuse
counselors, clergymen and elected officials--who have continued to
fight drug use over the past eight years. These groups are our first
lines of defense; without them, the regression since 1992 would have
been far worse. Their dedication gives the lie to the gospel of
futility.
I look forward to America re-engaging in the war on drugs--and
continuing the success that we had between 1980 and 1992.
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