STATE OUTSOURCES SECRET WAR

Special Report

Best known as a place where the Air Force shoots satellites into orbit, the
Eastern Space and Missile Center--just south of the Kennedy Space Center in
Florida's Brevard County--would appear to focus solely on the wild blue
yonder and beyond.

Indeed, the 45th Space Wing's web page is pretty clear about the mission of
Patrick Air Force Base and the adjacent Cape Canaveral Air Force Station:
to enhance "national strength through assured access to space for
Department of Defense, civil, and commercial users."

But according to a closely held government document, in the corner of the
base that's occupied by the defense contractor Raytheon there's an
operation that has absolutely nothing to do with the 45th's role as
"premier gateway into space." In fact, the 10,000-square-foot fenced-in
yard isn't used by Raytheon at all. Nor is the 62,000 square feet of
office, storage and hangar space located at 1038 South Patrick Drive.
Officially, it's the province of the State Department, which maintains a
dedicated high-speed data line linking its Foggy Bottom headquarters in
Washington with Buildings 984-986.

What the State Department is doing here has little to do with the genteel
art of diplomacy but everything to do with combat.

For all intents and purposes, South Patrick Drive is the gateway to the US
government's private war in the South American Andes.

Building 985 at Patrick Air Force Base is occupied by at least two State
Department officers and a handful of administrators from DynCorp, a giant
contractor which does most of its $1.4 billion in business with the US
government--particularly in the realms of defense and intelligence. Since
1991, the company has effectively--and quietly--served as the State
Department's private air force in the Andes, providing pilots and mechanics
for US-owned aircraft.

Both DynCorp and the State Department have been reticent about just what
DynCorp does. A handful of media reports and public statements have shown
that the company's pilots are flying fumigation and search-and-rescue
missions, primarily in Colombia.

There's also been passing mention of DynCorp operating in Peru and Bolivia.
But when reporters, activists and even members of Congress have asked for
more details on what DynCorp does for the Aviation Division of State's
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, they've received
nothing. Sometimes State simply doesn't respond. "We're hitting a stone
wall here," sighs Nadeam Elshami, an aide to Representative Jan Schakowsky,
who recently introduced a bill banning the use of private military
companies like DynCorp in the Andes. "We've asked State for information,
and we haven't received any yet."

Other times State says it can't say anything because to do so would
compromise information proprietary to DynCorp that's protected by the
"trade secrets exemption" in the Freedom of Information Act. If DynCorp
ever responds to queries, it says it won't divulge any details because the
State Department won't let it. "We haven't gotten any answers from them,
either," says Elshami, "though they did contact us after Veronica Bowers's
plane was shot down over Peru last month and told us they weren't involved.
I think they made sure everyone knew that, but about what they're actually
doing, no."

The Nation has obtained a copy of State's contract with DynCorp--a contract
that requires all employees to have a "secret"-level clearance and "not
communicate to any person any information known to them by reason of their
performance of services." Additionally, it instructs DynCorp to "not refer
to this award in any public or private advertising" or in the news media.

Looking through it, it's not hard to see why. The contract reveals
DynCorp's Andean aerial counternarcotics operations to be far more
expansive and far-flung than previously reported.

From its "Main Operating Base" at Patrick AFB, DynCorp oversees an aerial
fleet of forty-six helicopters and twenty-three fixed-wing aircraft which
can operate from twenty-three locations spread out over Colombia, Bolivia
and Peru. In some cases, DynCorp's operations are not limited to fumigation
and search-and-rescue but, according to the contract, include maintenance
and pilot training, aircraft ferrying, mat?el transport, reconnaissance and
flying local troops in to destroy drug labs and coca or poppy fields.

According to Federation of American Scientists secrecy specialist Steven
Aftergood, the State-DynCorp contract is a prime example of how the
executive branch is unilaterally projecting power and implementing policy
without leaving a trace. "The kind of routine oversight that official
military activities would be subjected to are evaded by contractors as a
matter of course," he says. "This highlights how the whole phenomenon of
privatizing military functions has enabled the government to evade
oversight to a shocking degree."

Politically, the contract's specifics only reinforce concerns voiced by
Representative Schakowsky and others that US taxpayers have been funding a
secret war that has the potential to slowly but surely draw the United
States further into a poorly understood counterinsurgency conflict. "What
most people either forget or don't know," says Sanho Tree, director of the
drug policy project at the Institute for Policy Studies, "is that conflict
in Colombia is a civil war, and is not about drugs.

But instead of doing things like infrastructure and economic development to
connect with people who have been abandoned by their government, the first
contact scores of peasants have with their government--and the United
States, thanks to Plan Colombia--is with armed soldiers and
herbicide-spraying aircraft, which only underscores the rebels' case. If
the American people don't know the full extent of what's being done in
their name, how can they make informed decisions?"

Perhaps the most interesting part of the contract deals with Bolivia, a
country where DynCorp's activities have gone virtually unacknowledged and
undocumented. Operating out of a main base at Santa Cruz and forward
operating locations (FOLs) in Puerto Suarez, Chimore and Trinidad--as well
as at staging areas in San Matia, Riberalta, San Ignaci and Via
Montes--DynCorp's contractors both train mechanics and do maintenance work
themselves on twelve State Department UH-IH ("Huey") helicopters, and
another ten Hueys provided by the Pentagon.

Used to transport troops to coca laboratories--as well as to fly
reconnaissance missions--some Hueys belong to the Red Devil Task Force
(RDTF), a little-known special unit of the Bolivian Air Force funded by the
US government. According to the contract, DynCorp is "responsible for the
military support, aircraft maintenance quality control and standardization
of flight training for the RDTF," the latter including "some individual
flight training" by DynCorp pilots.

According to a recently retired DynCorp contractor, the company's pilots
work with Red Devil pilots "day in and day out, hand in hand, on everything
from keeping the log book to refueling, and are still actively training
those pilots."

"I think this confirms the general sense that we have too little
information about the kind of counternarcotics contract operations being
carried out in the Andean region," says Gina Amatangelo, international
narcotics fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America. Amatangelo says
she'd be particularly interested to know if any DynCorp personnel working
with the RDTF have flown for the government's Umopar mobile eradication
unit, which has a documented history of human rights abuses.

In Colombia, DynCorp is required to support Bell 212 helicopter operations
"seven days a week, twelve hours a day, in day, night, and NVG [night
vision goggles] conditions." Operations include "search and rescue, host
nation training, interdiction, command and control, and reconnaissance
missions," specifically at two FOLs.

And there is no shortage of FOLs: In addition to the main base at El Dorado
International Airport, DynCorp's personnel can apparently be found flitting
between eight forward locations at La Remonta, Neiva, Apaiy Meta, Puerto
Asis, San Jos?Tulua, Valledupar and Larandia. (According to the contract,
there's also a maintenance base in Guaymaral, a training base under
construction in Mariquita and three more forward bases planned for
Florencia, Tres Aquines and Turbo.) The main mission continues to be
"aerial opium poppy and coca reconnaissance and eradication" with
fixed-wing T-65s and OV-10D Broncos--planes flown by both DynCorp pilots
and their traineees, and maintained by DynCorp mechanics.

In Peru, as in Colombia and Bolivia, the State Department has instructed
DynCorp to "collect, process, and disseminate aerial eradication flight
path and spray data from 'Pathlink' [and/or] 'SATLOC'"--two high-tech
recording and mapping systems--"to facilitate planning and analysis of
aerial eradication and reconnaissance operations on deployment." This is
particularly interesting since last month, after the Bowers shootdown,
DynCorp spokeswoman Charlene Wheeless told reporters via e-mail that she
wanted to "assure you that DynCorp does not provide surveillance services"
in its areas of operation, especially Peru. When contacted by The Nation,
another DynCorp spokeswoman, Janet Wineriter, clarified the statement,
saying "We were speaking strictly about tracking aircraft." (When asked to
comment on other aspects of the contract, Wineriter said that "I've never
even seen the contract myself," but added that she was sure if it had been
obtained from the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act,
"You would certainly get it redacted.")

But in Peru, DynCorp does much, much more. In addition to having a presence
at a large US government compound in Pucallpa, as a recent Washington Post
reporter noted, DynCorp also operates at forward locations including Tingo
Maria, Santa Lucia, Mazamari and Tarapoto. For herbicide spraying, DynCorp
has to be able to have four T-65s or four OV-10s simultaneously airborne,
and has to both maintain the aircraft, train mechanics and train pilots
both individually and as a unit.

According to a recently retired DynCorp veteran, while the company's people
are "of the highest caliber--Delta guys, SEAL team guys, career military
pilots and mechanics," most of the knowledge and experience they have isn't
being passed on in training, insuring that the DynCorp contractors
constantly operate in a very hands-on capacity. "It's probably one of the
hardest things to put up with, because there's no perfect area or classroom
to train people when they come in, and a lot of times they're in and then
they move out, so you start over with new people, and then they move out,"
he says. "You always have the mission to adhere to first, and the mission
is maintaining and flying those aircraft to spray and kill crops."

The veteran also says that DynCorp personnel have been tasked with rescuing
army personnel whose missions may not be counternarcotics related.

Not, he says, that the contractors mind. "Most people stay until they're
ready to go, because they really like what they're doing.

The contract is constantly changing to fulfill new requirements, so there
will always be work." He pauses. "I haven't been down there in awhile, but
in the time I worked for 'em, we went from having 120 people to 450 people."

For University of Wisconsin professor Alfred McCoy, the contract harks back
to the days of his book The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,
originally published in 1972. "One of these days we may actually get all
the records describing everything the CIA did in Laos, but we'll never get
the records of the Continental Air Service, their contractor who worked
there," he says. "The fact that this company is so large and is doing so
much down there raises real questions of accountability. What's the
relationship between the nominal drug war and the realities of
counterinsurgency? If it's just the drug war, it raises questions about
whether or not this is the best way to handle it, whether it's cost
effective, what the consequences are. But the operations described here can
very easily spill into involvement in counterinsurgency. And the worst-case
scenario would be that we could become embroiled in a de facto
counterinsurgency situation, because this is a privately held corporation
for which there's no particular restraint."