CENTRAL ASIAN "RAZBORKA:" FALLOUT FROM AFGHANISTAN'S OPIUM BAN

Shock waves from a dramatic drop in Afghanistan's opium production are
beginning to reverberate throughout Central Asia's drug trafficking
networks. Street prices for heroin in Eurasian and European markets have
remained stable, indicating that the cutback in opium supplies still has
not hit drug consumers. But specialists in drug trafficking say that
Afghanistan's ban on poppy cultivation can be expected to result in a drop
in opium supplies and, consequently, to send prices for opium-based drugs
skyrocketing in the year ahead. Central Asian drug traffickers are already
reportedly engaged in what Russian Mafia bosses describe as a major
"razborka"-- a weeding out of suppliers, transporters, and marketers in
new, much fiercer market conditions.

Russian border guards along the Tajik-Afghan border report that trafficking
activity remains intense, according to the Interfax news agency. Border
guards have confiscated over 150 kilograms of heroin and detained 15
suspected smugglers in May. Two border guards have been wounded in at least
four clashes with "armed aggressors," Interfax reported.

Afghanistan has emerged as the world's top source of opium. Initially,
poppy cultivation was concentrated in Kandahar and Helmand regions in
central and southern Afghanistan, areas under the control of the Taliban.
But by the late 1990s poppy cultivation spread to northern regions, in
territory dominated by the Taliban's chief opponents, the Northern
Alliance. This change in cultivation patterns led the UN's Drug Control and
Crime Prevention office to warn that Central Asia was becoming a preferred
"transit zone for opium and heroin trafficking."

Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries have been home to poppy
cultivation for centuries. Until recently poppies were cultivated primarily
for medicinal purposes, as the dangers of opium addiction were well
understood. In addition, not only did official ideology during the
Communist era discourage profiteering and speculation, but the Soviet
financial system made profits from illegal drug sales hard to conceal.
Also, the Soviet economic system functioned so poorly that goods were so
scarce that illegal profits could hardly be used to buy anything of value.

The collapse of Communism, followed by the subsequent regional economic
crash, helped transform attitudes on drug production and trafficking. The
legacy of prolonged civil war in Afghanistan, widespread official
corruption throughout Central Asia and other factors have combined to
undermine social institutions that might otherwise discourage illegal
activities associated with poppy production.

After tolerating and even encouraging poppy cultivation for several years,
Afghanistan's supreme leader, Mullah Omar, called in 1997 for restrictions
on poppy cultivation. Then, in July 2000, Mullah Omar decreed that the
Koran and Islamic law forbade the cultivation and trade in opium. Initial
reports by international organizations were highly skeptical of Mullah
Omar's ban. Later, United Nations officials, whose market-based drug
eradication and crop substitution programs have met with mixed success
worldwide, reported that the Taliban's top-down decrees to eliminate poppy
cultivation appeared to be working. Despite the worst drought in memory,
many Afghan farmers had switched to planting wheat, onions, garlic and
other crops.

Even if the ban does prove effective over the short term, there are reasons
to be skeptical about its long-term prospects. Opium is a source of revenue
for the Taliban. A ban on cultivation allows the largest producers to
assert cartel powers over the drug trade. There are reports that large
caches of unprocessed opium are stockpiled in northern Pakistan. As
scarcity pushes prices up, overall profits for the big producers may
actually increase as a result of the ban.

While the true picture of drug transportation routes is far from clear,
Central Asia's drug traffickers probably are responsible for shipment of
only a minor proportion of the overall Afghanistan opium crop. The highly
publicized arrests of drug traffickers at major border points in Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan often represent "renegade" operations of traffickers
unwilling to play by the established rules. The publicized arrest of
"mules" -- individuals who knowingly or unknowingly are carrying small
amounts of drugs -- has only marginal effect on overall supply. Most large
shipments of Afghanistan opium are probably still routed through
distribution routes involving Pakistan.

But those distribution routes that do extend throughout the Central Asian
countries are now experiencing intense competition in the struggle for
control over dwindling deliveries from suppliers. Sorting out who is in and
who is out in the new hierarchy of control over distribution is likely to
involve conflicts that will have clearly visible consequences.