MILITARY SHOULDN'T DISMISS SURVEY OF AFGHANS

LAST WEDNESDAY the Senlis Council released a report critical of the
coalition forces' tactical approach to waging a counter-insurgency
effort in southern Afghanistan. True to form, the Canadian military
and NATO allies immediately launched their own counter-attack,
calling into question the motives and credibility of the council.

This response was certainly not unexpected.

In the past, the council has tabled similar findings that warned
against losing the hearts and minds of the local Afghan population
through either heavy-handed military tactics or the policy of drug
crop eradication. The argument put forward by the council is that
rising collateral damage and the deaths of innocent civilians caused
by NATO offensives against the Taliban are causing widespread
resentment of foreign troops.

When this finding was reported in the media, a Canadian officer
vehemently denounced the Senlis Council's report and invited its
researchers to "get out of their air-conditioned offices and visit
the war-torn region to get a better perspective of the reality on the ground."

This quip sparked the usual round of tub-thumping by the military's
media cheerleaders, who harrumphed and wheezed in this sort of
chorus: "Who are those left-leaning pinko weenies sitting in their
plush European digs to criticize the good work being done by all our
brave troops in harm's way? Listen to the boots on the ground. That's
the ticket."

It mattered naught that the NATO commander of the time, British
Lt.-Gen. David Richards, had echoed the exact same sentiment when he
warned of a "five-month window" to win the hearts and minds of the
people of Kandahar. None of the Colonel Blimps shouting down the
council's assessment took the time to note that Afghan President
Hamid Karzai was also chastising the very same NATO troops who prop
up his shaky regime for their use of excessive force in their combat
operations.

Last summer, the Senlis Council recommended that the international
community purchase the Afghan poppy crop and use it to create
pharmaceutical products rather than illegal street drugs. The premise
is that the simple eradication of the poppy fields leaves the farmers
with no means of survival. As the Afghans are producers, not users,
in the opium trade, the purchase of their existing crops would
provide a short-term regional economic solution until the farms can
be converted to generate alternative products.

Once again, retired military analysts were quick to shoot down the
proposal. "Can't have that, old chum. We'd simply be empowering the
drug lords. Military knows best; burning the poppies is the only
answer, what, what."

What most of these naysayers don't know is that long before the
council proposed this solution, Canadian officers and the Karzai
government had discussed the same solution. It turns out the major
obstacle to implementing this common-sense initiative came from the
Western pharmaceutical companies - not the Afghan drug lords.

If there's one thing the big drug corporations understand, it's the
principle of supply and demand. The last thing they want is to flood
the existing market with a glut of Afghan opiates.

Contrary to the claims of its critics, the Senlis Council does not
generate its findings from far-removed European office suites. While
this international non-governmental organization does have
administrative bureaus in London, Paris and now Ottawa, its research
is conducted on the ground in Kandahar.

In January, I spent a few days travelling with Senlis team members as
they risked their lives to collect data used in their latest report.
While they do carry weapons and employ a couple of dozen local Afghan
guards, the Senlis crew could only at best offer token resistance to
a concerted Taliban attack.

The information they gathered by talking to more than 500 residents
in Kandahar, Lashkar Gah and throughout Helmand province should not
be dismissed lightly. While the military publicly bristles at the
suggestion that their tactics may be flawed, it should pay serious
heed to the results of the Senlis survey.

The council's conclusion that NATO has a two-month window to alter
its policy, earn the trust of the local population and thereby ward
off a bloody Taliban spring offensive may sound alarmist. However, it
is worth noting that this timetable actually gives the coalition 60
days more hope than that of the recently departed Richards. According
to his original assessment, the sands of time had already run out on
our chances for success.

Keep that in mind when the retired brass run about like clucking
hens, collectively denouncing the Senlis report.