PAY HEED TO SENLIS SURVEY

Last Wednesday the Senlis Council released a report critical of the
coalition forces tactical approach to waging a counterinsurgency
effort in southern Afghanistan.

True to form, the Canadian military and NATO allies immediately
launched their own counterattack calling into question the motives
and credibility of the Senlis Council.

This response was certainly not unexpected.

In the past, Senlis has tabled other similar findings that warned
against losing the hearts and minds of the local Afghan population
through either heavy-handed military tactics or the policy of drug
crop eradication.

The argument put forward by Senlis is that mounting collateral damage
- - or deaths of innocent civilians caused by NATO offensives against
the Taliban - is causing widespread resentment towards the presence
of foreign troops.

When this finding was reported in the media, a Canadian officer
vehemently denounced the Senlis Council's report and invited their
researchers to "get out of their air-conditioned offices and visit
the war-torn region to get a better perspective of the reality on the ground."

This quip sparked the usual round of tub-thumping by the military's
media cheerleaders. 'Who are those left-leaning, pinko weanies
sitting in their plush European digs to criticize the good work being
done by all our brave troops in harm's way? Listen to the boots on
the ground. That's the ticket,' they harrumphed and wheezed in unison.

It mattered naught that the NATO commander of the time, British
Lt.-Gen. David Richards had echoed the exact same sentiment when he
warned of a "five-month window" to win the hearts and minds of the
people of Kandahar.

None of the Colonel Blimps shouting down the Senlis assessment took
the time to note that Afghan President Hamid Karzai was also
chastising the very same NATO troops who prop up his shaky regime for
their use of excessive force in their combat operations.

Last summer, Senlis recommended that the international community
should purchase the Afghan poppy crop and use it to create
pharmaceutical products rather than illegal street drugs.

The premise being that the simple eradication of the poppy fields
leaves the farmers with no means of survival.

As the Afghans are producers, not users in the opium trade, the
purchase of their existing crops would provide a short-term regional
economic solution until the farms can be converted to generate
alternate products.

Once again, retired military analysts were quick to shoot down the
proposal. 'Can't have that old chum. We'd simply be empowering the
drug lords. Military knows best - burning the poppies is the only
answer, what, what.'"

What most of these naysayers don't know is that, long before Senlis
proposed this solution, Canadian officers and the Karzai government
had already discussed this same solution. It turns out the major
obstacle to implementing this common-sense initiative came from the
Western pharmaceutical companies - not the Afghan drug lords.

If there's one thing the big drug corporations understand it's the
principle of supply and demand. The last thing they want is to flood
the existing market with a glut of Afghan opiates.

Contrary to the claims of their critics, the Senlis Council does not
generate their findings from far-removed European office suites.
While this international non-governmental organization does have
administrative bureaus in London, Paris and now Ottawa, their
research is conducted on the ground in Kandahar.

In January, I spent a few days travelling with the Senlis team as
they risked their lives to collect data used in their latest report.

While they do carry weapons and employ a couple of dozen local Afghan
guards, the Senlis crew could only at best offer token resistance to
a concerted Taliban attack.

The information they gathered by talking to more than 500 residents
in Kandahar, Lashkar Gah and throughout Helmand province should not
be dismissed lightly.

While the military publicly bristles at the suggestion that their
tactics may be flawed, they should pay serious heed to the results of
the Senlis survey.

Their conclusion that NATO has a two-month window to alter their
policy, earn the trust of the local population and thereby ward off a
bloody Taliban spring offensive may sound alarmist.

However, it is worth noting that this timetable actually gives the
coalition 60 days more hope than that of the recently departed
Commander David Richards. According to his original assessment, the
sands of time had already run out on our chances for success.

Keep that in mind when the retired brass run about like clucking
hens, collectively denouncing the Senlis report.