The United States And Colombia

CHANGING THE PLAN

The United States Should Be Helping Colombia Not To Banish Drugs But To
Build A Better Army

Next week Colin Powell, the American secretary of state, is due to become
the first member of George Bush's cabinet to visit Colombia. Not before
time, you might think. The Bush administration inherited a controversial
commitment to Plan Colombia, a scheme launched by President Andres Pastrana
to fight drugs and guerrillas. Mr Bush has opted to continue with the plan:
he has asked Congress for $880m in aid to Colombia and its Andean
neighbours, on top of the $1.3 billion in mainly military aid approved last
year.

Plan Colombia arose from a fear that the country's democracy was being
overwhelmed by guerrillas, right-wing paramilitary vigilantes and the drug
gangs that supply four-fifths of the world's cocaine. But, so far, its
results have been, at best, mixed. Parts of it should be scrapped, and
others rethought.

At the plan's centre is the creation of an army brigade trained and
equipped by America. Its job is to give protection to the government's
agents in their efforts to eradicate coca, mainly through the aerial
spraying of weedkiller on coca fields. It is hoped that the spraying will
encourage other coca farmers to agree to voluntary eradication schemes.

There are two main objections to the scheme. One is that the weedkiller
destroys the food crops of the coca farmers, and may damage human health.
The other is that the whole exercise is a Sisyphean folly, which benefits
only a bureaucratic-industrial complex of contractors who carry out the
eradication. A decade of intense American efforts to eradicate coca have
had almost no effect on overall cocaine production. Unless cocaine is
legalised, Plan Colombia will drive coca deeper into virgin jungle or into
neighbouring countries.

The Bush administration's aid request gives only a token nod to such
worries: rebaptised as the Andean Regional Initiative, it offers a little
extra money for economic development and for Colombia's neighbours (though
Congress may yet trim the total). A better, though more expensive, policy
would concentrate on promoting economic alternatives to coca, especially
since the collapse in coffee prices is driving thousands more farmers into
coca production.

A second aim of Plan Colombia is to strengthen the army, thus, it was
hoped, forcing the main guerrilla force, the FARC, to take more seriously
peace talks begun by Mr Pastrana in 1998. The two aims are linked: the idea
was that coca eradication would weaken the guerrillas by squeezing their
drug income. In practice, Mr Pastrana has held back from eradication in
FARC-controlled areas. However, thanks in part to American aid, the army is
stronger than it was three years ago. The FARC is no longer winning the
war. But neither has it shown any sign of being serious about making peace
(see article).

Mr Pastrana now looks unlikely to achieve a ceasefire with either the FARC
or the ELN, the second guerrilla group, before his term ends next August.
That is leading to calls, both in Colombia and in Washington, for him to
put an end to the "demilitarised zone" that he granted the FARC to get
talks going. Yet that would be a mistake. There is a case for reducing the
size of the zone, and for insisting on outside monitoring of the FARC's
activities there. But ending it, and thus the talks, would give credence to
the idea, held by army commanders and some of the candidates to succeed Mr
Pastrana, that the FARC can be defeated militarily. It cannot. It can,
however, be weakened to the point where it seeks peace. Even so, political
engagement and talks will still be needed.

Drug-Takers Have Obligations Too

So, too, may military aid. That horrifies Europeans. But as a democracy
under siege from drug-financed illegal armies, Colombia has the right to
ask its drug-consuming allies for help. On the other hand, there is a
genuine danger that the army's greater military strength will turn into
greater political power.

To counter that means doing more to safeguard democracy and human rights.
The United States should be pressing harder than it has so far for
Colombia's army to tackle the rightist para-militaries, who work in cahoots
with some of its officers. And if a new national-security law that gives
the army quasi-judicial powers in some circumstances is not to be misused,
Colombia needs a stronger prosecutors' office and a stronger judiciary.
Plan Colombia should pay less attention to weedkilling, and more to
strengthening democracy.