COLOMBIA IN CRISIS NARRATOR: Colombia is the most violent nation in the Western Hemisphere. While guerrilla warfare batters the Colombian countryside, political violence and organized crime menace the cities. In this climate of fear and lawlessness, the production of cocaine and heroin has expanded in Colombia, threatening to flood the United States with dangerous drugs. In October, 1999, Republicans in the United States Senate introduced an emergency aid package for Colombia. The vast majority of the aid would provide weapons, equipment, and other support to Colombia's police and military forces. Advocates of the plan say that only by aiding the Colombian armed forces can we hope to bring order to the country and stem the flow of illegal drugs. Critics worry that a new infusion of American weapons will only fan the fires of violence. This week, America's Defense Monitor looks at Colombia's crisis, and America's controversial rescue plan. TITLE SEQUENCE "...television for changing times." NARRATOR: Colombia is one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America. The country lies on 440,000 square miles of some of the world's most fertile land, and is a major producer of oil, emeralds, and coffee. Colombian culture is a vibrant mixture of European, African, and Native American people and traditions. FARR: Colombia's a beautiful country. It's got beautiful people. It's such an important country, and it has so many resources that are essential for the economic well-being of the Western Hemisphere. NARRATOR: Congressman Sam Farr of California served in the Peace Corps in Colombia in the mid-1960s. FARR: It's one of the largest countries in Latin America, it's as large as Texas and California put together, it's 40 million people. It's the most biodiverse country in the Americas. It has more resources, more microclimates for growing crops than any other country we know of.... NARRATOR: But despite the country's natural wealth and economic potential, millions of Colombia's people live in poverty, isolation, and fear. Colombians in rural areas are caught in the crossfire of a brutal, and seemingly endless, civil war. Refugees from the war have swelled the cities, where political violence and organized crime are daily realities. FARR: Colombia is in an economic depression, Colombia has a serious problem internally with different factions in the country, political factions, warring factions. NARRATOR: The roots of Colombia's current miseries can be traced back 50 years, to a period known in Colombian history as La Violencia, "the Violence." In 1949, civil war erupted between Colombia's two major political parties. In all, 200,000 Colombians were killed in the Violence, and a million others were forced from their homes. When the war ended in 1972, political elites took over much of the agricultural land vacated by fleeing peasants. Thousands of displaced campesinos, forced to fend for themselves, joined the ranks of leftist guerrilla armies. When wealthy landowners faced a popular uprising, the Colombian military stepped in to protect them. Those whom the government could not protect were allowed to form private armies. These "paramilitaries," as they are now known, have become Colombia's death squads. FARR: The private landowners form their own militia, or paramilitaries. The paramilitaries don't operate under any provision of law. They are not accountable to anyone. They create incredible atrocities that go unaccounted for.... NARRATOR: Political violence continued as La Violencia gave way to La Guerra Sucia, the "dirty war". Colombian security forces, and their paramilitary allies, became infamous for deadly attacks on unarmed civilians suspected of supporting the guerrillas. In the mid-1980s, armed rebels joined with political dissidents to form a political party, the Patriotic Union. The party rose to power in many of Colombia's poor areas. The army and the paramilitaries swiftly reacted by killing more than 1,500 Patriotic Union activists, including nearly all of the party's elected officials. The guerrillas countered with a campaign of assassinations, kidnappings, and sabotage, against both civilian and military targets. In the last decade, 35,000 people have died in the armed conflict. The vast majority of the victims have been civilians. YAGARI: (In Spanish) The FARC are murderers. I testify to that. The paramilitaries are murderers. And there is a part of the army which are also murderers. I testify to that. NARRATOR: Eulalia Yagari is an indigenous rights activist from the coffee-growing region of Antioquia. While Antioquia's 16,000 indigenous people have refused to align themselves with any of the armed factions, they have been victimized by all of them. YAGARI: (in Spanish) There, the indigenous people are completely the victims of war. For example, the guerrillas, the FARC, have killed 22 of us. The civil defense groups, or paramilitaries, have killed 18 indigenous leaders. Local leaders and traditional spiritual authorities. And they have "disappeared" six of our brothers. The Colombian Armed Forces have raped indigenous women, including one who was six months pregnant. FARR: You live in fear. If you have money you live in fear you're gonna be kidnapped, if you don't have money there'll just be fear that you'll be thought of as being aligned with the wrong politics.... Nobody wants to live in an environment like that. NARRATOR: In the 1990's, the destructive guerrilla wars in Central America came to an end. In exchange for a chance to participate in the democratic process, thousands of combatants agreed to lay down their arms. But the progress made elsewhere in Latin America in the 90s has left Colombia behind, largely for one reason: the explosive growth in the drug trade. Over the past decade, government forces in Peru and Bolivia, once the largest producers of cocaine, have had some success in disrupting the local drug trade. As a result, the major source of supply has shifted to Colombia. Ten years ago, about 30,000 acres of Colombian territory were dedicated to coca production. Today, coca-growing areas total more than 250,000 acres. As the coca and poppy plantations have spread, so has corrupting influence of drug money. WHITE: ...the export of drugs accounts for about a third of Colombia's total exports. Now there is no way that a business of that order of magnitude can exist and prosper without key people inside business, banking, commerce, and government, including the military.... And what this means is that a huge number of key Colombians have a vested interest in the status quo.... NARRATOR: Robert White, a former US Ambassador to El Salvador, is President of the Center for International Policy in Washington. WHITE: In Colombia, they have a saying: "Plata o Plomo." Silver or lead. Take the bribe, or we'll shoot you. And I have to tell you that in a violent, war-torn society... there are very few people, high or low, that can resist that choice. NARRATOR: In addition to official corruption, efforts to fight the drug trade have been hampered by the Colombian government's losing battle against the country's guerrilla armies. Colombia's two largest guerrilla groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or ``FARC'', and National Liberation Army, or ``E.L.N.'' The two groups combined form a force of 20,000 soldiers. These well-armed rebels, along with about 5,000 right-wing paramilitaries, have made large areas of the country too dangerous for counter-drug operations. In an effort to enhance peace talks with the rebels, in 1998 Colombian President Andres Pastrana withdrew the National Police and the Armed Forces from almost half of Colombia's territory. As a result, FARC and ELN guerrillas now occupy a number of demilitarized zones. And it is in these regions that the vast majority of Colombia's cocaine and heroin are produced. According to Major Andy Messing, Director of the National Defense Council Foundation, the guerrillas have become Colombia's new drug kingpins. MESSING: ...at about 1990, when there was a decision to go after the cartels, and the cartels were eliminated by '93 or '94, the guerrillas wound up jumping into the void, and assuming the drug trade, and making their own cartels.... NARRATOR: The guerrillas collect taxes from drug growers and producers in exchange for protecting their plantations, processing laboratories, and shipments. The US government estimates that the guerrillas receive more than $500 million dollars per year from the narcotics trade, earning them the moniker, "narco-guerrillas." The income helps the guerrillas buy weapons, supplies, and manpower equal or superior to those of Colombian government forces. While drug money has strengthened the guerrillas, it has also corrupted their cause and cooled their desire to negotiate with the government. MESSING: The guerrillas have two advantages right now. They are winning on the battlefield, and they have an incredible amount of money that they are making through the drug trade. And so they are doing things to their timetable, their way... And like a comandante I once met said to me, who was involved in the drug trade... he held up his gold credit card and said to me, 'when I got this gold credit card my ideology went out the window.' NARRATOR: The guerrillas are not alone in profiting from Colombia's chaos. A number of paramilitary groups work directly for major drug traffickers. Elements of the Colombian Armed Forces have also been implicated in the drug trade. WHITE: Eight months ago, a... Colombian Air Force plane... landed in Miami. DEA agents tore it apart and found over a half-ton of cocaine. That plane had spent its entire life on military bases.... So the idea that there are black hats and white hats in this country is simply an illusion. NARRATOR: The booming drug trade, the strength of the guerrillas, and an almost total lack of public confidence in Colombia's institutions have combined to threaten the country's very existence. FARR: ...the situation in Colombia is desperate. It's more desperate now than it's ever been. NARRATOR: The threat does not stop at Colombia's borders. One matter of international concern is a potential environmental disaster in an area known as the "lungs of the world." Chemical solvents used in cocaine processing are contaminating the headwaters of the Amazon River, and the drug trade is eating away at Colombia's rainforests. MESSING: Worldwide, there's been particular ecological damage done to our planet by drug-purveyors of drugs, drug dealers. They cut down tens of thousands of acres of jungle, virgin triple-canopy jungle.... And this goes on day after day, we're seeing acres and acres eroded day after day to make way for coca bushes and... poppy plants. NARRATOR: Apart from the ecological threat, the increasing production of cocaine and heroin represent a very real threat to public health and security in the United States. MESSING: Every ton of cocaine that comes into the United States means a billion dollars in damage to our economy and to our citizens. One ton, one billion. NARRATOR: With more than 200 tons per year entering the United States, the cocaine trade's economic, social, and human costs to American communities are staggering. MESSING: Right now we're having more supply than demand. They are trying to create additional marketplaces. That's why, this is why it's a national security issue for the United States. They're sending in more drugs than current drug users need right now. NARRATOR: The looming threat of cheap, dangerous drugs flooding America's cities is especially frightening due to the apparent powerlessness of either the Colombian or American governments to stop it. Without assistance from the United States and other allies, Colombia could succumb to the violent criminal enterprise. FARR: We cannot afford to allow Colombia to fall into a country of disrepair.... It is one of the most important countries in Latin America. And certainly no American can afford to see it be lost. NARRATOR: In 1999, the American and Colombian governments began working in earnest on a plan to rescue the troubled country. In Colombian President Andres Pastrana, the United States seems to have found a capable and reliable ally. WHITE: Fortunately, Colombia elected a courageous young president, who has decided that fighting is not the proper route.... And he was elected, elected in a very strong majority by the Colombian people, to bring peace through negotiation. He's begun that process. NARRATOR: President Pastrana's peace plan, known as the Plan Colombia, is expected to cost about $7.5 billion over the first three years. The Pastrana government wants roughly half of the funding to strengthen and reform the nation's police and the military forces. The other half would pay for rural development projects, and programs to strengthen Colombia's judicial system. FARR: ....for the first time what you're hearing from the President of Colombia is a comprehensive plan. Not just looking for military aid to fight the narco-traffickers. But for a comprehensive plan to really revitalize the country. To educate uneducated people, to keep people in the rural areas with economic prosperity. To really fight the violations of human rights so that people will trust their government, trust the institutions of government. NARRATOR: But the United States has decidedly different priorities in funding Colombia's recovery. On October 20, 1999, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee introduced the Alianza Act, a three-year, $1.6 billion emergency aid package. 90% of the funding in the Alianza Act would go to Colombia's military and police. Economic development and social programs would receive less than 10% of US aid. FARR: I think what you're seeing in Washington is two dialogues going on. One, a general dialogue with Colombia looking for the well being of the entire country. And another group here that, pretty much members of Congress that are tied to the military interests, trying to solve the problem solely with military solutions. NARRATOR: Supporters of American assistance to Colombia's armed forces argue that military aid is necessary to disrupt the drug trade. The United States already provides weapons, training, intelligence, air support, and about 300 military personnel to assist Colombian counter-drug activities. Still, the firepower of the Colombian military and national police are often no match for the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and criminal organizations involved in the drug trade. MESSING: They've had 4,000 policemen die in five years, fighting in the drug war... This is a very tough war.... So somewhere along the line you have to make it a priority to wind up giving them the right equipment at the right time, and train them to use it.... NARRATOR: Supporters of military aid to Colombia also see it as a way to pressure Colombia's rebel forces into a peace agreement. MESSING: ...right now, they are in the driver's seat. They have no reason to settle on Pastrana's terms, or in conjunction with Pastrana. So the object of the exercise of us putting economic and military aid into this situation is to get parity on the battlefield, so that we wind up having these negotiations. NARRATOR: But just as important as matching the rebels' firepower is a process which Messing describes as "taking the cause away from the guerrillas." Simply put, the Colombian government and armed forces must do more to earn the trust and support of Colombia's poor. First and foremost, the government must put a stop to human rights abuses by the Colombian army and police. MESSING: And any time we give people equipment, we have to do a conditional release of that equipment to them, where we're monitoring the human rights, we're monitoring their total behavior. In other words, that that element is not doing anti-democratic, anti-human rights activities.... It's a behavior modification thing. NARRATOR: But monitoring the use of American-supplied weapons and equipment in Colombia will be nearly impossible under the Alianza Act. The proposal allows only one percent of US military aid to Colombia to be used to oversee how those weapons and equipment are used. To restore public trust, the government urgently needs to improve Colombia's judicial system. In a country where 28,000 people are murdered each year, 95% of all crimes currently go unpunished. FARR: ...they're going to have to revise their judicial system, and make it a much more efficient and effective system. Also one where you could bring cases for violations of human rights. And where people when they are charged with a crime can be tried and sentenced and jailed if necessary. NARRATOR: But the Senate proposal allots just $100 million over three years-6% of the total aid package-for judicial reform and the defense of human rights. The Alianza Act earmarks $540 million for military equipment and support for the eradication of Colombia's coca and poppy plantations. But efforts to wipe out illegal crops continue to meet with resistance--not only from drug traffickers and guerrillas, but from the campesinos who survive by tending the fields. To earn more support for these efforts, the government needs to offer economic alternatives in areas dominated by the drug trade. Converting Colombia's coca and poppy fields to other cash crops is expected to cost a total of $4 billion. But the Alianza Act only allows $50 million over three years for crop substitution programs. FARR: They will be able to increase attacks on the narco-traffickers. But again, with the economy being in such bad shape, as they wipe them out, new ones will replace them, because that's where money can be made. So it's not the war on drugs alone that's going to solve the problem. It's part of it, but without looking at the rest of the package, we're doomed to fail in Colombia. NARRATOR: To bring peace to Colombia, Pastrana's government will have to achieve what no Colombian government ever has-- to provide security and economic opportunity for Colombia's poor. FARR: You need economic development. I mean economic development is small marketplaces. It's the person who opens up that small restaurant or that small fruit stand, or that ability to haul something on the back of a truck. It's the security to be able to take what you can do as an individual and derive some economic well-being for that.... But that security does not exist for anybody in Colombia today. NARRATOR: The Colombian government has identified the nation's enemies as corruption, poverty, and fear. Yet, the United States continues to focus almost solely on drugs and leftist guerrillas. In either case, these enemies cannot be defeated by military force alone. MESSING: ...if we're going to provide aid, it should be two-part aid. One-fourth of the aid should be military aid, three-quarters of it should be economic aid. FARR: I think the dialogue in Washington is too much on the ability to ship Colombia helicopters and arms, and equipment for eradication of crops, without considering the other points of the Peace Plan. NARRATOR: Without effective programs to promote human rights, the rule of law, and economic development, the Colombian government could miss a golden opportunity to build public support for its peace plan, and its fight against the drug trade. MESSING: There are a lot of decent Colombians who wanna fight the drug scourge within their own country. They have seen how it's corrupted their own judicial processes, their own political processes, their own business processes, and they are repelled over the idea that drugs has corrupted elements of their societies. Because Colombians first and foremost are decent people. NARRATOR: The guerrillas' public image has suffered due to their increased brutality and involvement in the drug trade. And, the Colombian people are simply tired of war. On October 24, 1999, 13 million Colombians, about one-third of the country's population, demonstrated to show their opposition to war. The time is ripe for the Colombian government to move aggressively for peace. WHITE: You have a President who is committed to negotiations, and who has specifically stated that he does not want a military solution.... So what I wanna know is, what is it that you want to achieve through fighting? ...First you have to unite Colombia by negotiations.... Once you do that, you can start to talk about how to interdict narcotics. NARRATOR: The American and Colombian governments, and the Colombian people, all share the goal of advancing the peace process. But doing so by building up Colombia's armed forces is a risky proposition. The guerrillas could respond by building up their own forces, escalating the violence rather than ending it. Bringing more military power to bear on the crisis, without supporting peaceful programs calculated to rebuild Colombia's economy, will not help the country's millions of war victims rebuild their lives. YAGARI: (In Spanish) We don't want arms in Colombia. We want to live. We want the honorable Senators of the United States to convince the President to invest the money he's requesting for arms in health and education programs for all Colombians.
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